公司理财与治理的制度成因(英文版)(pdf 66)

InstitutionalCausesofCorporateFinanceandGovernance公司理财与治理的制度成因JosephP.H.Fan范博宏(~b109671/index.html)Professor,SchoolofAccountancyandDepartmentofFinanceDeputyDirector,CenterforInstitutionsandGovernance()TheChineseUniversityofHongKongPreparedforthe2005ChinaCorporateGovernanceResearchIncubator,ShanghaiJosephFanInstitutionsOutline{Researchframework{EffectsofrentseekingonzCorporatefinancezCorporategovernance{EffectsofcostlyexchangeofpropertyrightsonzOrganizationalstructurezFamilyfirmsJosephFanInstitutionsTop-downResearchFrameworkCountryInstitutionsThelegalsystem(thecourtandthelaw)Thegovernment(regulations,publicsectorgovernance)Thesociety(religion,ideology,custom,socialnorm)MarketsProduct,labor,manager,rawmaterial,financialcapitalFirmsFirmboundary(verticalintegration,diversification)OwnershipandcontrolstructuresGovernancestructures(accounting,boardsofdirectors,executivecompensation,reputationmechanisms)PartIEffectsofRentSeekingon(1)CorporateFinance(2)CorporateGovernanceJosephFanInstitutionsWhatisrentseeking?{Seekingabnormalprofits.{Butthisdefinitionistoogeneral.Wefocusonseekingpoliticalrentsbetweenbusinesspeopleandpoliticians/governmentbureaucrats{Politicalrentseekingisreferringtothecasewhengovernmentpossessthepowertoallocateanation’sbusinessrights,theassociatedprofitopportunitiesgivebureaucratsandbusinessmanagersincentivestoinfluence{PoliticalrentseekingarelegalorillegalactivitiestoobtainspecialprivilegezCountrieshaveformaland/orinformalplatformsforpoliticallobbying{ThedirectionofrentseekingcanbeeitherfromgovernmenttofirmorviceversazPoliticians:winningpoliticalsupport,self-dealingzFirms:winningbusinessprivilegesJosephFanInstitutionsTheCostsofRentSeeking{Rentseekingiscostly.Itdoesnotjustresultinwealthtransfer.Peoplehavetoworkforspecialprivilege{DirectcostzThecostofthelobbyingestablishment(busyrestaurantsinChina)zRiskoflostinvestmentinconnections{IndirectdamageisevenworsezDrawingthebulkofintelligentandenergeticpeopleinsocietyintoanactivitythathasnosocialproduct,ormayhaveanegativesocialproduct,isimportantinexplainingthestagnationofthesesocieties(Tullock,2002)RentSeekingandCorporateFinance:EvidencefromCorruptionCasesJosephP.H.Fan*OliverM.Rui*MengxinZhao***ChineseUniversityofHongKong**BentleyCollegeJosephFanInstitutionsResearchQuestions{ToinvestigatetheimpactofpoliticalrentseekingoncorporatefinancingbehaviorsinChina{ResearchquestionszHowdorentseekingandcorruptionaffectcapitalstructure,debtmaturity,long-andshort-termdebtfinancingofChinesefirms?zDopoliticalconnectionswithcorruptbureaucratsprovidethefirmsfinancingadvantages?zDostockpricesreflectanyfinancingadvantagesofpoliticallyconnectionswithcorruptbureaucrats?JosephFanInstitutionsCorporateFinancingPatternsinEmergingMarkets{Companiesinemergingmarketsrelyondebtmuchmorethanequitytofinancetheirinvestment{Moreover,theyrelyonshort-termdebt,evenwhentheyengageinlong-terminvestment{Banks,notcapitalmarkets,aretheprimarysourcesoffundsforfirmsindevelopingcountriesJosephFanInstitutionsCrosscountrypatternofcorporateleverage(Fan,Titman,Twite,2004)0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.80Korea,Rep.ThailandIndonesiaIndiaBrazilPhilippinesChinaAustriaPakistanItalyPortugalJapanFinlandDenmarkSwitzerlandBelgiumFranceHongKong,ChinaCanadaMexicoIrelandPeruTaiwanNewZealandSpainChileSingaporeMalaysiaNetherlandsGermanySwedenNorwayUnitedStatesAustraliaUnitedKingdomIsraelTurkeySouthAfricaGreeceJosephFanInstitutionsCrosscountrypatternofcorporatedebtmaturity(Fan,Titman,Twite,2004)0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.90CanadaSwedenNewZealandUnitedStatesAustraliaNorwayFinlandIrelandSwitzerlandMexicoDenmarkIndiaNetherlandsSouthAfricaChilePortugalBrazilFranceBelgiumUnitedKingdomGermanyPhilippinesIsraelJapanSpainAustriaKorea,Rep.HongKong,ChinaItalyPakistanPeruTaiwanTurkeyIndonesiaMalaysiaThailandSingaporeChinaGreeceJosephFanInstitutionsWhatexplainthecross-countrycorporatefinancingpatterns?R2LeverageDebtmaturityCountry+Industry+Firm0.320.23Industry+Firm0.240.09Firm0.210.07{Whereafirmislocatedhasagreatereffectonitscapitalstructureanddebtmaturitythanitsindustryaffiliation.{CountryfactorsandfirmfactorsarebothimportantJosephFanInstitutionsExistingCross-countryResearch{RajanandZingales[1995],Booth,Aivazian,Demirguc-KuntandMaksimovic[2001]andGiannetti[2003]–zcorporatefinancechoicesindevelopinganddevelopedcountriesareassociatedwiththesamefirm-levelvariables(andinthesamedirection).{Demirguc-KuntandMaksimovic[1996,1998,1999,2001]–zafirm’slong-termfinancing(equityandlong-termdebt)isaffectedbyitscountry’slegalinfrastructureandthedegreetowhichfinancialmarketsandintermediariesaredeveloped.{Fan,Titman,Twite[2004]zCapitalanddebtmaturitystructuresarerelatedtoacountry’staxsystem,legalsystem,andcorruptionlevelJosephFanInstitutionsOurfocus:EffectsofRentSeeking/CorruptiononCorporateFinance{Rentseekingandcorruptionbiascapitalstructuretowardmoredebtasopposedtoequityz(1)Contractualstructureofdebtlimitsthepotentialfortheexpropriationofinvestorrights(SmithandWatts,1979