江苏上市公司独立董事薪酬水平研究(1)

南京财经大学硕士学位论文江苏上市公司独立董事薪酬水平研究姓名：陆娟申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：杨洪常20061224I200320051101020IIABSTRACTAlongwiththepromotingroleoftheindependentdirectors,therecentresearcheshaveconcentratedonthewaytoimprovetheenthusiasmoftheirperformanceonbasisofthecorporategovernanceindepth.Despiteofthisphenomenon,thepaststudyathome,limitedbythelatestartoftheindependentdirectorsystemandfewcurrentindependentdirectors,wererarelyreferredtotheareaofcompensationstimulustotheindependentdirectors.However,manyrecenteitheroverseasordomesticfindingsillustratethatthecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorisrelatedtotheirenthusiasmonperformance.Inlightoffactors,includingthecasestudyrestriction,thefeasibilityandJiangsupubliccompaniescanstandforallpubliccompaniestosomeextent,thepaperdevelopsthediscussionofrelatedproblemsfromthedimensionofthepubliccompaniesinJiangsu.Asanempiricalstudypertainingtotherelationshipoftheindependentdirectors’performanceandtheircompensation,thepaper,usingtheexperienceofthecompensationreformationincorporategovernancetotheindependentdirectorsintheUSA,thereviewofquestionnaireresultsoftheindependentdirectorsandanalysisofdatarelatedfromtheJiangsupubliccompaniesforalltheyears,aimstotestthenecessityandfeasibilityofthecompensationinmathwiththeroleoftheindependentdirectorsinJiangsupubliccompaniesonthegroundofcompensationtheoriesandfactorsrelatingtoextentwhichinfluencestheindependentdirectors’compensation.Boththelawandregulationsandthequestionnaireresultofindependentdirectorsrevealthattheroleoftheindependentdirectorispromotingonaspectsoftheincreasingworkingtime,difficultyandrisk.Besides,thequestionnaireresultimpliesthattheindependentdirectorsexpecttheircompensationtomatchthetimeandenergythattheyspent,i.e.,thecompensationhastobeincreasedwiththeenrichmentofthecompensationstructure.TheempiricalresearchofJiangsupubliccompanies’integralsamplesconcludesIIIthatthecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorduringtheperiodfrom2003to2005issignificantlypositivelyrelatedtothatofseniormanagers,andisnegativelyrelatedtoenterprises’performance,andbecomemoresignificantly.TheempiricalresearchofJiangsupubliccompanies’classifiedsamplesstatesthatthecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorinstatemanipulativeandnon-statemanipulativecompaniesestablishesthepositiverelationshiptothatoftheseniormanager.Itissuchacaseincompanieswithdifferentsizesinthesameindustrythatcompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorwiththerevenueof100millionand1billiononthemainbusiness,issignificantlypositivelyrelatedtothatoftheseniormanager.Whatismore,thepositiverelationshiphasalsobeenprovedbetweenthecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorwiththemainbusinessrevenueof1-2billionandboardsize,enterprise’performanceandthestockportionthatfirststockholderowns.Inaddition,thecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorinthemonopolyindustryisalsosignificantlypositivelyrelevanttotheboardsize,andsignificantlynegativelyrelatedtotheportionoftheinsidedirectors.Aboveall,thecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorinJiangsupubliccompaniesismostrelatedtothatoftheseniormanager,butnosignificantrelationshiprelevanttothegovernancerolethattheindependentdirectorplays.However,thefair-mindedroleoftheindependentdirectorhasbeenrealizedbytheJiangsupubliccompanies,i.e.,thecompensationleveloftheindependentdirectorisnegativelyrelatedtotheenterprise’performance.KEYWORDSJiangsupubliccompanies;independentdirector;corporategovernace;compensationmanagement11.11203020018161[N]200011(16)72200212002920051.231.32003200542.12.1.1122.1.2FamaJense1983BricklyJamesAuupKnoeber199812[M]2002236512003222.1.332.22.2.11.1[M]20032582[J]2003653-603[M]200446(1)Ehrenberg&Smith,19881Crystal1991(2)Gerhart&Milkovich(1990)2(3)Henderson&Fredrickson19963(4)Hildreth&Oswald(1997)16%4(5)Batt(2001)Hunter(2000)51CrystalG.S.WhyCEOCompensationisSoHigh[J].CaliforniaManagementReview,1991,3:9-29.2L[M]2005:193HendersonA.L,Fredrickson,J.W.A.Information-ProcessingDemandsasaDeterminantofCEOCompensation[J].AcademyofManagement,1996,39:575-606.4L[M]2005:255L[M]2005:2672.Spierler&AndrewCraig20011(JensenMurphy,1990)23.200334.Maslow,1943(Herzberg,1987Kohn,1993)4(1)(a)(b)(c)L20055(2)/L200561SpielerAndrew,Craig.Essaysonoutsidedirectorcompensation[M].Binghamton:stateuniversityofnewyork,2001:17.2JensenM.C,MurphyK.J.CEOIncentivesIt’snotHowMuchYouPayButHow[J].HarvardBusinessReview,1990,68(3):138-149.3[M]20031264L[M]20051185L[M]20051236L[M]20051328BenderandPorter2001a-cHeald1970Jones1995Evan,1966;Merton,1957HosseiniandBrenner,199212.2.21.90YaleDTauber19862Davis&Stobaugh199531NadaKkakabadse,AndrewKakabadse,AlexanderKouzmin.Directors'remuneration:Theneedforageo-politicalperspective[J].PersonnelReview,2004,33(5/6):561.2YaleDTauber.TrendsinCompensationForOutsideDirectors[J].Compensation,1986,4:43.3CordeiroJames,VeliyathRajaram,EramusEdward,etal.AnEmpiricalInvestigationoftheDeterminantsofOutsideDirectorCompensation[J].CorporateGovernance:AnInternationalReview,2000,3:268.91CarlRWeinberg200450%22.(1)K.HallockK.J.Murphy(1998)1998,M.Firth.etall,Margo.etall,,,3ScottandDaniel(2003)Br