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我们先回顾一下Letmestartbyreviewingtheproblem上周讨论的问题thatwewereconsideringlastweek.我们提出了Wewereraisingadifficulty人格同一性的人格理论的一个难题forthepersonalitytheoryofpersonalidentity根据人格理论成为同一个人的关键accordingtowhichthekeytobeingthesameperson在于拥有同一个持续不断发展的人格ishavingtheverysameongoing,evolvingpersonality.而从根本上来说Andthedifficultywasbasically这一难题其实就是有关复制的问题theproblemofduplication.也就是说我们或者说一个人Thatitseemedasthoughwecouldhavemorethanone--似乎可以拥有不止一具肉体callitanindividual--morethanonebody,它们皆拥有同样的thathadtheverysamesetof记忆信仰等等memories,beliefsandsoforth.我们得问问自己Andthatwehavetoaskourselves,人格理论该对此Well,whatshouldthepersonalitytheory做出怎样的解释呢sayaboutacaselikethat?想象一下周末时Soimaginethatovertheweekend,那个疯子科学家拷贝了我的themadscientistcopiedmy记忆信仰愿望恐惧memories,beliefs,desires,fears,抱负目标意图ambitions,goals,intentions然后将这些移植到另一个人的大脑里andimprintedthatonsomebodyelse'sbrain.一切皆于昨晚午夜完成Theydiditlastnightatmidnight.人人影视问自己Andwehavetoaskourselves,谁是雪莱·卡根Who'sShellyKagan?谁是上周给你们讲课的那个人Who'sthepersonthatwaslecturingtoyoulastweek?我们似乎无法Well,itdoesn'tseemplausible依照人格理论确定intermsofthepersonalitytheorytosay那个人就是雪莱·卡根thathe'sShellyKagan,就是你们面前的这个人andtheoneheretoday.假设另有个人在密歇根Supposetheotherone'sinMichigan.如果在密歇根的人才是雪莱·卡根IftheoneinMichigan'sShellyKagan而眼前的这个不是butthisone'snot.尽管他确实拥有雪莱·卡根的记忆Afterall,althoughit'struethathe'sgotShellyKagan'smemories,且醒来后觉得自己正是雪莱·卡根hewokeupthinkinghewasShellyKagan,就像我醒来觉得自己是雪莱·卡根一样justlikeIwokeupthinkingIwasShellyKagan.他起床以后思索Hewokeupthinkingabout今天课上要讲些什么whathewasgoingtolectureoninclasstoday,就如同我起床以后就会考虑justlikeIwokeupthinkingabout今天上课该讲什么一样whatIwasgoingtolectureinclasstoday.他记得上周上课的内容Herememberedlastweek'slecture就如同我记得上周上课的内容一样justlikeIrememberedlastweek'slecture.但是人格理论Well,noclearreasontosay并没有明确的理由确认forthepersonalitytheorytosay他是雪莱·卡根而我不是thathe'sShellyKaganandI'mnot.毕竟我与他拥有相同的Afterall,I'vegottheverysamesetof记忆信仰和愿望memories,beliefs,desiresthathehas.同样更出乎意料的是Butequallytrue,andmoresurprisingly,人格理论也毫无理由说明fromthepersonalitytheorypointofview,there'snoreasontosaythat我是雪莱·卡根而他不是I'mShellyKaganandhe'snot.毕竟他也和我拥有相同的Afterall,he'sgotallthesame记忆信仰和愿望memories,beliefsanddesiresthatIdo.此外我们俩都是Itdoesn'tseemplausibletosaywe'reboth雪莱·卡根的说法也不成立ShellyKagan,因为这样一来就意味着becausenowwe'dhavetothensay雪莱·卡根同时置身两处ShellyKagan'sintwoplacesatthesametime.所以答案只可能为Sotheonlyalternativeseemstobe我们俩都不是雪莱·卡根tosaythatneitherofusisShellyKagan.但如果我们俩都不是雪莱·卡根ButifneitherofusisShellyKagan,那么最初说的那个人格理论就是错误的thenthesimpleoriginalpersonalitytheorywasfalse.因为该理论表明Becauseaccordingtothattheory,成为雪莱·卡根的关键就是具有他的人格havingthepersonalityiswhatittooktobeShellyKagan.我们俩都具有他的人格Webothhaveit,但我俩都不是雪莱·卡根yetneitherofusisShellyKagan.如此以来人格理论必定是错的Thepersonalitytheorymustbefalse.所以我们将人格理论稍事修正Sowerevisethepersonalitytheorytosay,判断人格同一性的关键是thesecrettopersonalidentityis在不存在其他分支的前提下havingthesamepersonality具有同样的人格providedthatthere'snobranching.假设没有分裂Providedthere'snosplitting.只存在唯一的最佳竞争者Providedthere'sonlyonebestcompetitor,而非两位势均力敌的候选人nottwoequallygoodcandidates.根据无分支原则Giventhenobranchingview,thenobranchingrule,我们可以说在一般情况下wecansay,intheordinarycase,其实并没有人look,therereallywasn'tanybody将我的记忆和愿望移植至密歇根imprintedwithmymemoriesanddesiresinMichigan.世上只有我一人I'mtheonlyonearoundintheearthrightnow拥有雪莱·卡根的记忆和愿望withShellyKagan'smemoriesanddesires.因为没有其他竞争者存在Sincethere'snocompetitor,我独占他的人格andI'vegotthepersonality,所以我是雪莱·卡根I'mShellyKagan.我就是I'mtheverysameperson上周给你们上课的那个人thatwasherelecturingtoyoulastweek.这就是我们在一般情况下That'swhatthepersonalitytheoryitgivesustheanswerwe'relookingfor从人格理论得出的答案intheordinarycase.但是在科幻故事里Butinthesciencefictionstory如果出现人格复制wherethere'saduplicate,也就是说人格出现分支itsays,uh,ifthere'sbranching,那么无分支原则就会说明thenobranchingrulecomesin.两者其实都不是雪莱·卡根NeitherofthemisShellyKagan.所以为解决这一难题Allright,sothat'sthebestwayforthepersonalitytheory我们必须修正人格理论togetrevisedtodealwiththisproblem.然而困难在于无分支原则Thetroublewas,itseemsthenobranchingrule似乎和直觉背道而驰seemsverycounter-intuitive.你想想Sothinkaboutit.现在我站在你们面前Here,rightnowI'mstandinginfrontofyou说我自己是雪莱·卡根sayingI'mShellyKagan,即上周给你们上课的那个人theguywhowaslecturingtoyoulastweek.我相信我是雪莱·卡根IbelieveI'mShellyKagan,我上周给你们上过课theguywhowaslecturingtoyoulastweek.那么我是不是雪莱·卡根呢AmIShellyKagan?我拥有雪莱·卡根的人格Well,I'vegotShellyKagan'spersonality.到现在为止没什么问题Sofarsogood.我们现在要确定的是Nowallwehavetodecideis,是否具备无分支原则成立的条件wasthebranchingrulesatisfiedorviolated?所以我们必须知道Soallwehavetoknowis,全宇宙里有没有一个人istheresomebodyelsesomewhereintheuniverse拥有我全部的记忆信仰以及愿望who'sgotallmymemoriesandbeliefsanddesires?那怎么才能知道呢Well,howintheworldcouldIknowthat?这个在你们面前讲课的我WhetherI,thispersontalkingtoyourightnow,是不是雪莱·卡根isShellyKagan取决于密歇根是否存在一个dependsonwhetherthere'ssomeduplicate拥有我所有记忆的复制品withallmymemoriesinMichiganornot?这听上去太有悖直觉了Itseemsverycounter-intuitive.所以尽管附带无分支原则的Soalthoughthepersonalitywithnobranchingrule人格理论避免了复制这一问题avoidstheproblemofwhattosayaboutduplicates,表示如果出现分支bysayingwhenthere'sbranching,那么他们就都不是雪莱·卡根neitherofthemisShellyKagan,但分支原则本身却是极其有悖直觉的thebranchingruleitselfseemsverycounter-intuitive.人们判断一个人是不是我Wefeelasthoughwhethersomebodyismeornot应该依据shoulddependuponinternalfacts我在不同阶段的内部事实来判断aboutmeintheearlierst