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FederalReserveBankofNewYorkStaffReportsShadowBankingZoltanPozsarTobiasAdrianAdamAshcraftHayleyBoeskyStaffReportno.458July2010Thispaperpresentspreliminaryfindingsandisbeingdistributedtoeconomistsandotherinterestedreaderssolelytostimulatediscussionandelicitcomments.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsandarenotnecessarilyreflectiveofviewsattheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkortheFederalReserveSystem.Anyerrorsoromissionsaretheresponsibilityoftheauthors.ShadowBankingZoltanPozsar,TobiasAdrian,AdamAshcraft,andHayleyBoeskyFederalReserveBankofNewYorkStaffReports,no.458July2010JELclassification:G20,G28,G01AbstractTherapidgrowthofthemarket-basedfinancialsystemsincethemid-1980schangedthenatureoffinancialintermediationintheUnitedStatesprofoundly.Withinthemarket-basedfinancialsystem,“shadowbanks”areparticularlyimportantinstitutions.Shadowbanksarefinancialintermediariesthatconductmaturity,credit,andliquiditytransformationwithoutaccesstocentralbankliquidityorpublicsectorcreditguarantees.Examplesofshadowbanksincludefinancecompanies,asset-backedcommercialpaper(ABCP)conduits,limited-purposefinancecompanies,structuredinvestmentvehicles,credithedgefunds,moneymarketmutualfunds,securitieslenders,andgovernment-sponsoredenterprises.Shadowbanksareinterconnectedalongaverticallyintegrated,longintermediationchain,whichintermediatescreditthroughawiderangeofsecuritizationandsecuredfundingtechniquessuchasABCP,asset-backedsecurities,collateralizeddebtobligations,andrepo.Thisintermediationchainbindsshadowbanksintoanetwork,whichistheshadowbankingsystem.Theshadowbankingsystemrivalsthetraditionalbankingsystemintheintermediationofcredittohouseholdsandbusinesses.Overthepastdecade,theshadowbankingsystemprovidedsourcesofinexpensivefundingforcreditbyconvertingopaque,risky,long-termassetsintomoney-likeandseeminglyrisklessshort-termliabilities.Maturityandcredittransformationintheshadowbankingsystemthuscontributedsignificantlytoassetbubblesinresidentialandcommercialrealestatemarketspriortothefinancialcrisis.Wedocumentthattheshadowbankingsystembecameseverelystrainedduringthefinancialcrisisbecause,liketraditionalbanks,shadowbanksconductcredit,maturity,andliquiditytransformation,butunliketraditionalfinancialintermediaries,theylackaccesstopublicsourcesofliquidity,suchastheFederalReserve’sdiscountwindow,orpublicsourcesofinsurance,suchasfederaldepositinsurance.TheliquidityfacilitiesoftheFederalReserveandothergovernmentagencies’guaranteeschemeswereadirectresponsetotheliquidityandcapitalshortfallsofshadowbanksand,effectively,providedeitherabackstoptocreditintermediationbytheshadowbankingsystemortotraditionalbanksfortheexposuretoshadowbanks.Ourpaperdocumentstheinstitutionalfeaturesofshadowbanks,discussestheireconomicroles,andanalyzestheirrelationtothetraditionalbankingsystem.Keywords:shadowbanking,financialintermediationPozsar,Adrian,Ashcraft:FederalReserveBankofNewYork;Boesky,currentlywithBankofAmericaMerrillLynch,waswiththeFederalReserveBankofNewYorkwhenthispaperwaswritten.Correspondingauthor:ZoltanPozsar([e-mail];phone:[phone]).TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthepositionoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkortheFederalReserveSystem.`TheFederalReserveBankofNewYork,November,2009Short-TermFundingShort-toLong-TermCashMMDAsHouseholds,Businesses,GovernmentsCDsEquityFundingLong-TermInvestmentsEquityEquity`EquityShort-TermDebtInstrumentsRegulatedMoneyMarketUnregulatedMoneyMarketAgencyMBSAgencyDiscountNotesIntermediariesIntermediaries*ConformingmortgagesRRsOther*LiquidityPutsA1*ARS,MMMFsA1CPAAAABCPAA-BBBBDPEquityRRs*Conformingstudentloans2a-7MMMFsOther*A1*ARS,MMMFs,aswellasA1A1(AAA)ABSTranchesCPMTNsandtermABSCPA1ABCPABCPAAABDPBDPAA-BBBRRsRRsShort-TermSavingsEquityOther*Other**ConformingSBAloans*TOBsandVRDOsA1*ARS,MMMFsMoneyMarketPortfoliosCPABCPBDPRRsOther*A1AAAOffshore(non-2a-7)MMMFs*ARS,MMMFs,aswellasA1AAAAA-BBBA1MTNsandtermABSCPABCPAA-BBBLTDMTNsCPABCPEquityRepoEquitySupersCNs*ABCPBDPLTDHaircutsBDPRRsHouseholdsEquityO/CHigh-YieldCLOsRRsUltra-ShortBondFundsOther*HouseholdsandNonprofits(LBOLoans)Other*A1*MMMFsA1*TOBsandVRDOsCPAAAABCPAA-BBBBDP2ndLienEquityRRsEquityO/CO/CO/COther*CP*FHCaffiliateConsumerABS*ARS,MMMFs,aswellasA1ABCP(CreditCardABS)MTNsandtermABSCPBDPA1ABCPAAABDPAA-BBBRRsEquityO/CEquityOther*NonfinancialCorporatesO/C*ARS,MMMFsanBanksDWAAATAFAA-BBBFXSwapsLTDMTNsTSLFSupersCNs*Federal,StateTSLFNonfinancialBusinessesEquityTri-PartyClearingBanks*andLocalGovernmentsPDCFCPFFTALFAMLFMMIFFML,LLCEquityO/CO/CanBanksMLII,LLC*BoNYandJPMorganChaseMLIII,LLCLSAPsRoWO/CEquity(ForeignCentralBanks)EquityRMBS(1stlien,privatelabel)MTNsCashReinvestmentAccountsCPA1A1ABCPAAACPBDPAA-BBBABCPEquityBDPRoWGovernmentsRRs(SovereignWealthFunds)EquityO/CSubprimeABSOther**Donebycustodianbanks(2ndlien,subprime,HELOCs)TradingBook*MMMFs,MTNs,termABSandonanagentbasis.A1TOBsandVRDOsAAAAA-BBBEquityHaircutsCashReinvestmentAccounts*IssuedtocentralbanksCMBSandHigh-YieldCLOsA1inexchangeforinvestibeFX(LBOLoans)CPLong-TermSavingsA1AB