Babcock-v-Jackson-巴贝科克诉杰克逊案判决书

[*473]GeorgiaW.Babcock,Appellant,vMabelB.Jackson,asExecutrixofWilliamH.Jackson,Deceased,Respondent.CourtofAppealsofNewYorkArguedJanuary23,1963DecidedMay9,196312NY2d473CITETITLEAS:BabcockvJackson[*476]OPINIONOFTHECOURTFULD,J.OnFriday,September16,1960,MissGeorgiaBabcockandherfriends,Mr.andMrs.WilliamJackson,allresidentsofRochester,leftthatcityinMr.Jackson'sautomobile,MissBabcockasguest,foraweek-endtriptoCanada.Somehourslater,asMr.JacksonwasdrivingintheProvinceofOntario,heapparentlylostcontrolofthecar;itwentoffthehighwayintoanadjacentstonewall,andMissBabcockwasseriouslyinjured.UponherreturntothisState,shebrought[*477]thepresentactionagainstWilliamJackson,allegingnegligenceonhispartinoperatinghisautomobile.[1]Atthetimeoftheaccident,therewasinforceinOntarioastatuteprovidingthattheownerordriverofamotorvehicle,otherthanavehicleoperatedinthebusinessofcarryingpassengersforcompensation,isnotliableforanylossordamageresultingfrombodilyinjuryto,orthedeathofanypersonbeingcarriedin***themotorvehicle(HighwayTrafficActofProvinceofOntario[OntarioRev.Stat.(1960),ch.172],§105,subd.[2]).EventhoughnosuchbarisrecognizedunderthisState'ssubstantivelawoftorts(see,e.g.,Higginsv.Mason,255N.Y.104,108;Nelsonv.Nygren,259N.Y.71),thedefendantmovedtodismissthecomplaintonthegroundthatthelawoftheplacewheretheaccidentoccurredgovernsandthatOntario'sgueststatutebarsrecovery.ThecourtatSpecialTerm,agreeingwiththedefendant,grantedthemotionandtheAppellateDivision,overastrongdissentbyJusticeHalpern,affirmedthejudgmentofdismissalwithoutopinion.Thequestionpresentedissimplydrawn.Shallthelawoftheplaceofthetort[2]invariablygoverntheavailabilityofreliefforthetortorshalltheapplicablechoiceoflawrulealsoreflectaconsiderationofotherfactorswhicharerelevanttothepurposesservedbytheenforcementordenialoftheremedy?Thetraditionalchoiceoflawrule,embodiedintheoriginalRestatementofConflictofLaws(§384),anduntilrecentlyunquestioninglyfollowedinthiscourt(see,e.g.,Poplarv.Bourjois,Inc.,298N.Y.62,66;Kaufmanv.AmericanYouthHostels,5NY2d1016,modfg.6AD2d223),hasbeenthatthesubstantiverightsandliabilitiesarisingoutofatortiousoccurrencearedeterminablebythelawoftheplaceofthetort.(SeeGoodrich,ConflictofLaws[3ded.,1949],p.260;Leflar,TheLawofConflictofLaws[1959],p.207;Stumberg,PrinciplesofConflictofLaws[2ded.,1951],p.182.)Ithaditsconceptualfoundationinthevestedrightsdoctrine,namely,thatarighttorecoverforaforeigntortowesitscreationtothelawofthe[*478]jurisdictionwheretheinjuryoccurredanddependsforitsexistenceandextentsolelyonsuchlaw.(SeeHancock,TortsintheConflictofLaws[1942],pp.30-36;Reese,TheEverChangingRulesofChoiceofLaw,NederlandsTijdschriftVoorInternationaalRecht[1962],389.)AlthoughespousedbysuchgreatfiguresasJusticeHolmes(seeSlaterv.MexicanNat.R.R.Co.,194U.S.120)andProfessorBeale(2ConflictofLaws[1935],pp.1286-1292),thevestedrightsdoctrinehaslongsincebeendiscreditedbecauseitfailstotakeaccountofunderlyingpolicyconsiderationsinevaluatingthesignificancetobeascribedtothecircumstancethatanacthadaforeignsitusindeterminingtherightsandliabilitieswhichariseoutofthatact.[3]Theviceofthevestedrightstheory,ithasbeenaptlystated,isthatitaffectstodecideconcretecasesupongeneralitieswhichdonotstatethepracticalconsiderationsinvolved.(Yntema,TheHornbookMethodandtheConflictofLaws,37YaleL.J.468,482-483.)Moreparticularly,asappliedtotorts,thetheoryignorestheinterestwhichjurisdictionsotherthanthatwherethetortoccurredmayhaveintheresolutionofparticularissues.Itisforthisveryreasonthat,despitetheadvantagesofcertainty,easeofapplicationandpredictabilitywhichitaffords(seeCheathamandReese,ChoiceoftheApplicableLaw,52Col.L.Rev.959,976),therehasinrecentyearsbeenincreasingcriticismofthetraditionalrulebycommentators[4]andajudicialtrendtowardsitsabandonmentormodification.[5][*479]Significantly,itwasdissatisfactionwiththemechanicalformulaeoftheconflictsoflaw(VanstonCommitteev.Green,329U.S.156,162)whichledtojudicialdeparturefromsimilarlyinflexiblechoiceoflawrulesinthefieldofcontracts,grounded,likethetortsrule,onthevestedrightsdoctrine.Accordingtothosetraditionalrules,mattersbearingupontheexecution,interpretationandvalidityofacontractweredeterminablebytheinternallawoftheplacewherethecontractwasmade,whilemattersconnectedwiththeirperformancewereregulatedbytheinternallawoftheplacewherethecontractwastobeperformed.(SeeSwift&Co.v.BankersTrustCo.,280N.Y.135,141;see,also,Restatement,ConflictofLaws,§§332,358;Goodrich,ConflictofLaws[3ded.,1949],pp.342-343.)InAutenv.Auten(308N.Y.155),however,thiscourtabandonedsuchrulesandappliedwhathasbeentermedthecenterofgravityorgroupingofcontactstheoryoftheconflictoflaws.Underthistheory,wedeclaredintheAutencase,thecourts,insteadofregardingasconclusivetheparties'intentionortheplaceofmakingorperformance,layemphasisratheruponthelawoftheplace'whichhasthemostsignificantcontactswiththematterindispute'(308N.Y.,atp.160).ThecenterofgravityruleofAutenhasnotonlybeenappliedinothercasesinthisState,[6]aswellasinotherjurisdictions,[7]buthassupplantedthepriorrigidandsetcontractrulesinthemostcurrentdraftoftheRestate