创造适合中国中小企业发展的政府融资项目_英文_

50China&WorldEconomy/50-65,Vol.12,No.2,2004CreatingGovernmentFinancingProgramsforSmall-andMedium-SizedEnterprisesinChinaWilliamD.BradfordChaoChen*Thegrowthofsmall-andmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)isakeyingredientforthesustainableeconomicdevelopmentofChina.Thequestionthatthispaperinvestigatesis:WhattypesoffinancingprogramsarethemostappropriateforthegovernmentofChina,ifitwantstomakemorecapitalavailabletoSMEs?Thispaperseekstobeinformativeinthreerespects.First,weintroduceandutilizeatheoreticalframeworkfordeterminingtheeffectivenessofgovernmentprogramsthatprovidefinancingtoSMEs.ThekeyvariableindeterminingtheeffectivenessofaprogramishowsimilarSMEsloansaretootherinvestmentsthatthelenderscanmake.Second,thispaperdescribestwotypesofU.S.governmentprogramsthathaveoperatedtoassistfinancingofsmallbusinesses,andtheexperienceoftheseprograms.Third,thispaperrelatestheoutcomesoftheU.S.programstothetheorypresented,anddiscussestheimplicationsforthegovernmentandSMEsofChina.LoancharacteristicprogramsthatchangeriskofSMEloans,suchasloanguaranteeprograms,areconcludedtobemoreappropriatethanloansubsidiesorportfoliorestrictions,giventhatChinesebanksarerelativelyexperiencedatsuccessfullylendingtoSMEs.I.IntroductionItiswidelyrecognizedthatthegrowthofsmall-andmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)isakeyingredientforthesustainableeconomicdevelopmentofanation.Cavalluzzo,*WilliamD.Bradford,endowedprofessorofBusinessandEconomicDevelopment,SchoolofBusiness,UniversityofWashington,U.S.A.E-mail:[e-mail];ChaoChen,professorofFinanceanddirector,CenterforChinaFinanceandBusinessResearch,CaliforniaStateUniversity,U.S.A.E-mail:[e-mail]usrefereeandHung-gayFung(theEditor)fortheirhelpfulcommentsandsuggestions.TheyalsothankseminarparticipantsatPekingUniversityand2001CAFAConferenceparticipantsatTsinghuaUniversity.51CreatingGovernmentFinancingProgramsforSmall-andMedium-SizedEnterprisesinChinaCavalluzzo,andWolken(2002),forexample,concludethatsmallenterprisesserveasanimportantengineofgrowthintheU.S.economy.InChina,asaresultoftheeconomicreformsandmarketopeningmeasures,SMEshaveenjoyedremarkabledevelopmentandhavegrowntobecomeanimportantforceincontributingtowardssustainedandrapidgrowthoftheChineseeconomy.Asof2003,therewereover39.8millionSMEsinChina,theycomprised99percentoftotalbusinessentities,earned60percentoftotalbusinessrevenuesandprovided75percentoftotalemploymentinChina.Furthermore,theaverageannualgrowthrateofindustrialoutputforSMEsinChinawasabout30percentcomparedwithabout20percentforallmanufacturingenterprisesin1999through2002(seeLiandCheng,2003).ZhouandZhang(2002)arguethatSMEswillplayaveryimportantroleintheeconomicgrowthinChina.Inparticular,ChineseSMEsaretypicallyclassifiedunderthelabeloflabor-intensivefirms,sotheymayabsorbasubstantialexcesslabortoreducetheunemploymentrate.However,SMEsinChinaarefacingproblemsanddifficultiesthatrestricttheirabilitytogrowandcontributetotheChineseeconomy.OnemajorproblemishowSMEscanmoreeasilyobtainfinancinginChina’sfinancialmarketstostartandsupportgrowth(SmallandMediumIndustriesDevelopmentCorporation,1998).Thefinancingofentrepreneurshipandsmallbusinessisacommonissuethateachnationmustsolvewithsolutionsthatareappropriatefortheeconomic,legalandsocialcircumstancesofthatnation.Zhang(2002)arguesthatcommercialbanksinChinatendtofocusonthelong-termrelationshipwithgoodqualitylargefirmswhileignoringtherelationshipwithSMEs.SinceSMEshaveweakertransparency,SMEshavelessaccesstobankingfinancing.TheSMEsarefrequentlythetargetsofcreditrationingoflargebanks.Currently,thegovernmentownsmostofthecommercialbanksinChinaandtherewereonlyfivepubliclylistedcommercialbanksinChinaattheendof2003.Thepriorityoftheirloandecisionsistofollowgovernmentpolicyandpreventtheloansfrombecomingnon-performing.Thedefaultriskoflargerstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)tendstobelowerthanthesmallerenterprises,andmanagerswillbelesslikelybeingblamedforcorruptionasaresultofmakingaproblemloantolargeSOEs.Therefore,therisk-aversemanagershavelessincentiveforprovidingleveragetoSMEs.Inaddition,thecorruptionproblemsand“guan-xi”aretwomajorobstaclesofofferingloanstoSMEsinChina.1Thequestionthatthispaperinvestigatesis:WhattypesoffinancingprogramsarethemostappropriateforthegovernmentofChina,ifitwantstomakemorecapitalavailabletoSMEs?Thispaperseekstobeinformativeinthreerespects.First,weintroduceandutilize1Thesearealsoseriousproblemsforpubliclylistedfirms.52WilliamD.BradfordChaoChen/50-65,Vol.12,No.2,2004atheoreticalframeworkfordeterminingtheeffectivenessofgovernmentprogramsthatprovidefinancingtoSMEs.Thetheoryis“country-neutral”,andthekeyvariableishowsimilarSMEsloansaretootherinvestmentsthatthelenderscanmake.Second,thispaperdescribestwotypesofU.S.governmentprogramsthathaveoperatedtoassistfinancingofsmallbusinesses,andtheexperienceoftheseprograms.Third,thispaperrelatestheoutcomesoftheU.S.programstothetheorypresented,anddiscussestheimplicationsforthegovernmentandSMEsofChina.Theproblemofprovidingmorecredittoaparticulargrouporsectoroftheeconomyissimilartotheprobleme