国经练习6

Chapter6:NontariffTradeBarriersCHAPTER6NONTARIFFTRADEBARRIERSMULTIPLE-CHOICEQUESTIONS1.Theimpositionofatariffonimportedsteelforthehomecountryresultsin:a.Improvingtermsoftradeandrisingvolumeoftradeb.Highersteelpricesandfallingsteelconsumptionc.Lowerprofitsfordomesticsteelcompaniesd.Higherunemploymentfordomesticsteelworkers2.Whichofthefollowingreferstoamarket-sharingpactnegotiatedbytradingpartnerstomoderatetheintensityofinternationalcompetition?a.Orderlymarketingagreementb.Localcontentrequirementsc.Importquotad.Triggerpricemechanism3.SupposetheUnitedStatesandJapanenterintoavoluntaryexportagreementinwhichJapanimposesanexportquotaonitsautomakers.Thelargestshareoftheexportquota’s“revenueeffect”wouldtendtobecapturedby:a.TheU.S.governmentb.Japaneseautomakersc.Americanautoconsumersd.Americanautoworkers4.Supposethegovernmentgrantsasubsidytodomesticproducersofanimport-competinggood.Thesubsidytendstoresultindeadweightlossesforthedomesticeconomyintheformofthe:a.Consumptioneffectb.Redistributioneffectc.Revenueeffectd.Protectiveeffect1Chapter6:NontariffTradeBarriers5.Tariffsandquotasonimportstendtoinvolvelargersacrificesinnationalwelfarethanwouldoccurunderdomesticsubsidies.Thisisbecause,unlikedomesticsubsidies,importtariffsandquotas:a.Permitlessefficienthomeproductionb.Distortchoicesfordomesticconsumersc.Resultinhighertaxratesfordomesticresidentsd.Redistributerevenuefromdomesticproducerstoconsumers6.Supposethegovernmentgrantsasubsidytoitsexportfirmsthatpermitsthemtochargelowerpricesongoodssoldabroad.Theexportrevenueofthesefirmswouldriseiftheforeigndemandis:a.Elasticinresponsetothepricereductionb.Inelasticinresponsetothepricereductionc.Unitelasticinresponsetothepricereductiond.Noneoftheabove7.Becauseexportsubsidiestendtoresultindomesticexporterscharginglowerpricesontheirgoodssoldoverseas,thehomecountry’s:a.Exportrevenueswilldecreaseb.Exportrevenueswillrisec.Termsoftradewillworsend.Termsoftradewillimprove8.Whichtraderestrictionstipulatesthepercentageofaproduct’stotalvaluethatmustbeproduceddomesticallyinorderforthatproducttobesolddomestically?a.Importquotab.Orderlymarketingagreementc.Localcontentrequirementd.Governmentprocurementpolicy9.TheimpositionofadomesticcontentrequirementbytheUnitedStateswouldcauseconsumersurplusforAmericansto:a.Riseb.Fallc.Remainunchangedd.Noneoftheabove10.Domesticcontentlegislationappliedtoautoswouldtendto:a.SupportwagelevelsofAmericanautoworkersb.LowerautopricesforAmericanautoworkersc.EncourageAmericanautomakerstolocateproductionoverseasd.IncreaseprofitsofAmericanautocompanies11.Comparedtoanimportquota,anequivalenttariffmayprovidealesscertainamountofprotectionforhomeproducerssince:a.Atariffhasnodeadweightlossintermsofproductionandconsumptionb.Foreignfirmsmayabsorbthetariffbyofferingexportsatlowerpricesc.Tariffsareeffectiveonlyifhomedemandisperfectlyelasticd.Quotasdonotresultinincreasesinthepriceoftheimportedgood2Chapter6:NontariffTradeBarriers12.Empiricalstudiesshowthatbecausevoluntaryexportquotasaretypicallyadministeredbyexportingcountries,foreignexporterstendto:a.Raisetheirexportprices,thuscapturingmuchofthequota’srevenueeffectb.Lowertheirexportprices,thuslosingmuchofthequota’srevenueeffectc.Raisetheirexportprices,thussellingmoregoodsoverseasd.Lowertheirexportprices,thussellingfewergoodsoverseas13.Concerningtherestrictiveimpactofanimportquota,assumethereoccursanincreaseinthedomesticdemandfortheimportproduct.Aslongasthequotafallsshortofwhatwouldbeimportedunderfreemarketconditions,theeconomy’sadjustmenttotheincreaseindemandwouldtaketheformof:a.Adecreaseindomesticproductionoftheimportgoodb.Anincreaseintheamountofthegoodbeingimportedc.Anincreaseinthedomesticpriceoftheimportgoodd.Adecreaseindomesticconsumptionoftheimportgood14.AssumetheU.S.hasacompetitiveadvantageinproducingcalculators,whiletherestoftheworldhasacompetitiveadvantageinsteel.SupposetheU.S.andtherestoftheworldenterintoanagreementtolowerimportquotasbelowexistinglevelsoncalculatorsandsteel.WhichofthefollowingwouldleastlikelyoccurfortheU.S.?Risinglevelsof:a.ConsumersurplusforAmericanbuyersofsteelb.ProducersurplusforAmericansteelmakersc.ProductionintheAmericancalculatorindustryd.ProducersurplusforAmericancalculatorproducers15.Afirmthatfacesproblemsoffallingsalesandexcessproductivecapacitymightresorttointernationaldumpingifit:a.Canchargehigherpricesinmarketsthatareelastictopricechangesb.Earnsrevenuesonforeignsalesthatatleastcovervariablecostsc.Cansellatthatpricewheredomesticandforeigndemandelasticitiesequated.Isabletoforceforeignpricesbelowmarginalproductioncosts16.Aproducersuccessfullypracticinginternationaldumpingwouldcharge:a.Arelativelyhigherpriceinthemoreinelasticmarketb.Arelativelyhigherpriceinthemoreelasticmarketc.Thesamepriceinallmarkets,regardlessoftheirelasticitiesd.Differentpricesinallmarkets,regardlessoftheirelasticities17.ThepracticeofCanadianfirmsdumpingtheirproductsinSwedenposesaproblemforeconomicpolicymakerssincedumpingtendsto:a.FavorSwedishconsumersoverCanadianconsumersb.FavorSwedishproducersoverCanadianproducersc.Becomewides