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NuclearPowerEngineering30120092Vol.30.No.1Feb.2009：0258-0926(2009)01-0020-06核电站实物保护系统的量化评估1211.3143002.310027-TM623A1[1]1997[2]23[3]181tatr2007-12-14；2008-03-18211Fig.1PromptDetectionAnalysisofOneIntrusionPath123456781tatrtr≦taP(I)33.1nxxnii∑==1avg1nxavgn()112avg−−=∑=nxxSnii2P(I)=()ARP|P(A)3P(A)=P(D)P(C)4()ARP|P(A)P(D)P(C)tatrx=tatrµx=E(tatr)=E(ta)E(tr)52xδ=var(tatr)=var(ta)+var(tr)6PE(ta)var(ta)Pn()()∑+==npiitEtE1a7E(ti)Pn()()∑+==npiitt1avarvar8xxN(x2xδ)()()π212exp22xxxxxfδδµ−−=∞x+∞9()()()∫∞=≥=0d0|xxfxPARP()xxxxxd2expπ21022∫∞−−=δµδ10[4]Vol.30.No.1.200922()⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+≈xxxxARPδµδµ7.1exp17.1exp|11()()()×≈=xxAPARPIPδµ7.1exp|()()CPDPxx⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+δµ7.1exp112()()()()()×+=∑=iniiAPARPAPARPIP211||()[]∏−=11j-1ijAP133.2建立入侵路径分析模型3.2.1[5][6]63.2.2核电站实物保护设施通用模型根据核电站实物保护系统中不同设施的区域位置、功能和所承担的作用，可把实物保护设施分成6个物理区域（图2）。3.2.32Fig.2GeneralModelofPhysicalProtectionSysteminNPP-433.3评估软件VB6.03[7]3.3.1233Fig.3AnalysisModelofIntrusionPath3.3.2333.3.3--4评估方法在假想核设施实物保护系统上的应用4.14434.2确定各元件参数[4]30%[4]160s4Fig.4SchematicDiagramforResearchReactorinMacArthurNuclearCenterγABCDEFGHIJ30cmKLMNO40cmP1Table1ParametersforPhysicalProtectionElements/s6±20.5012±40.5040±12010±3050±150.8545±1310.1×0.1×0.9)=0.9920±60.95DTS10±30.9050±151(0.1×0.1)=0.9930cm150±45060+180.9012±403±0.9025±700±00.9040cm200±60040±12018s88%4.3软件执行结果与改进分析162Vol.30.No.1.20092467.42%3利用该软件从实物保护系统三要素的探测、延迟、响应进行定量分析。4.3.1探测4.3.1.10.9081.16%20.3%4.3.1.20.9067.42%4.3.2延迟4.3.2.140s70s67.42%4.3.2.25s25s87.04%29.1%4.3.3响应4.3.3.160s50s80.84%19.9%4.3.3.20.880.9770.34%4.3%94.89%12（3）对于响应，更快更有效的响应对系统有效性的增加也有很大的贡献。3[7]5结束语--[1]OECD/NEA.EvaluationMethodologyforProliferationResistanceandPhysicalProtectionofGenerationIVNuclearEnergySystem[R].2006.65-68.[2]TangDan,YinXiandong,FangNi,etal.PhysicalProtec-tionSystemandVulnerabilityAnalysisPrograminChina[C].InternationalConferenceonPhysicalProtec-tion.Salzburg.2002.9.[3].[J]..2004,51:8~15.[4]GarciaMaryLynn.TheDesignandEvaluationofPhysicalProtectionSystems[M].1edition.Boston:Butterworth-Heinemann,2001.251~256.[5]TomRitchey.Ageneralmethodfornon-quantifiedmod-eling.16thEUROConferenceonOperationalAnalysis.Brussels.1998.25[6]TomRitchey.NuclearFacilitiesandSabotage:UsingMorphologicalAnalysisasaScenarioandStrategyDe-velopmentLaboratory[C].the44thAnnualMeetingoftheInstituteofNuclearMaterialsManagement.Phoenix.2003.[7]Garcia,MaryLynn.VulnerabilityAssessmentofPhysi-calProtectionSystems.1edition.Boston:Butterworth-Heinemann,2005.33~44,289~293.QuantitativeEvaluationofPhysicalProtectionSysteminNuclearPowerPlantSUNYa-hua1LIShi-ju2LIBIN1(1.ThirdQinshanNuclearPowerCo,Ltd,Haiyan,Zhejiang,314300,China;2.ZhejiangUniversity,Hangzhou,310027,China)Abstract:Basedonthepromptdetectionanalysis，thispaperintroducedoneanalysismodelofintrusionpathinnuclearpowerplantbymeansofmorphologyanalysisanddevelopedtheevaluationsoftwareforpathmodelanalysisofphysicalprotectionsystem.Quantitativeanalysisonthreeelements(detection,delay,andresponse)ofphysicalprotectionsystemwaspresentedwithanimaginaryintrusioneventexampleinMacAr-thurnuclearcenter.TheresultsindicatedthatthepathpromptdetectionanalysisworkedeffectivelytofindtheweakpointofthephysicalprotectionsysteminNPP，andmeantimewecanalsogetthehighcost-effectivenessimprovedmeasures.Itisaneffectiveapproachtoevaluatetheoverallperformanceofthesystem.Keywords:Nuclearpowerplant,Physicalprotectionsystem,Quantitativeevaluation,Morphologyanalysis,Imaginarynuclearfacility1979—20021947—19691965—1989