战略经济(竞争分析)07-战略宣言

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2018-12-30

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EconomicsofStrategySlideshowpreparedbyRichardPonarulCaliforniaStateUniversity,ChicoChapter7StrategicCommitmentBesanko,Dranove,ShanleyandSchaefer,4thEditionStrategicCommitmentStrategiccommitmentsaredecisionsthathavelongrunimpactandarehardtoreverse(Example:Installationofadditionalproductioncapacity)Thesedifferfromtacticalmoveswhichareeasytoreverseandhaveonlyashortrunimpact(Example:Astorecuttingthepriceoncertainitems)StrategicCommitmentToachievethedesiredresult,thecommitmentshouldbe–Visible–Understandable–CredibleTobecredible,thecommitmentshouldbeirreversibleCommitmentValueofAnnouncementsIfafirmhasanestablishedreputationatstake,evenannouncementofintentiontoactcanhavecommitmentvalueIfthefirmfailstomatchactionstowords,itsreputationwillsufferSmallerandnewerfirmscannotuseannouncementstoindicatecommitmentReversibleandIrreversibleMovesReversiblemovesaremorelikelytobematchedbyrivalsthanirreversiblemovesEvidencefromtheairlineindustrysupportsthisviewAirlinesquicklyrespondtopricecutsbyrivalsthantomoveslikeacquisitionofanothercarrierStrategicCommitmentandCompetitionStrategiccomplementsandstrategicsubstitutesareconceptsonhowafirmreactstoprice/quantitychangebyacompetitorToughcommitmentsandsoftcommitmentsareconceptsthatcaptureactionsbyafirmthatputsitscompetitorsatadisadvantageStrategicComplementsWhenafirm’sactioninducestherivaltotakethesameactiontheactionsarestrategiccomplementsInBertrandduopolymodelpricesarestrategiccomplementsApricecutistheprofitmaximizingresponsetocompetitor’spricecutStrategicSubstitutesWhenafirm’sactioninducestherivaltotaketheoppositeactionstheactionsarestrategicsubstitutesInCournotduopolymodelquantitiesarestrategicsubstitutesAquantityincreaseistheprofitmaximizingresponsetocompetitor’squantityreductionSoftCommitmentsandToughCommitmentsTheimmediateeffectofatoughcommitmentisanadverseimpactontherivalExample:Afirminvestsinanewprocessthatreducesunitcostsothatitcanloweritsprice,forcingtherivaltoloweritspriceToughcommitmentconformstothetraditionalviewofcompetitionSoftCommitmentsandToughCommitmentsTheimmediateeffectofasoftcommitmentisafavorableimpactontherivalTounderstandwhysoftcommitmentsmaymakesense,weneedtolookatboththedirectandthestrategiceffectsTwoEffectsofCommitmentsAcommitmentmayhaveadirectandastrategiceffectonthefirm’sprofitabilityDirecteffectisthechangeinthepresentvalueofprofitsassumingthattherival’stacticsareunaffectedbythecommitmentThestrategiceffectisthefurtherchangeinthepresentvalueofthefirm’sprofitsduetotherivaladjustingitstacticsTheValueofSoftCommitmentAfirmthatmakesasoftcommitmenttoraiseitspricemayexperienceanegativedirecteffectonitsprofitabilityIftheoptimalresponseoftherivalistoraiseitsprice,thestrategiceffectcanbebeneficialIfthestrategiceffectissufficientlylarge,thenetbenefitfromthecommitmentwillbepositiveAnAnalysisofSoftandToughCommitmentsInthefirststageafirmmakeseitherasoftcommitmentoratoughcommitmentForeachofthetwocases,thesecondstagecompetitionbetweentherivalswillbeeitherCournotorBertrandScenariostobeAnalyzedBertrandToughCournotToughBertrandSoftCournotSoftSecondStageFirstStageCournotAfterSoftCommitmentCournotAfterSoftCommitmentFirm1shiftsitsreactionfunctiontotheleft,committingtoproduceless(thanpre-commitmentlevel)foreverylevelofrival’soutputRival’sreactionhurtsFirm1bymakingitsoutputfallfurtherFirm2producesmorethanwhatitproducedwithoutFirm1’ssoftcommitmentBertrandAfterSoftCommitmentBertrandAfterSoftCommitmentFirm1commitstochargeahigher(thanthepre-commitmentlevel)priceforeverypricelevelpickedbytherivalFirm2’sreactionprovidesaevenhigherprice(forbothfirms)BothfirmsbenefitfromFirm1’ssoftcommitmentCournotAfterToughCommitmentCournotAfterToughCommitmentFirm1commitstoahigherthanpreviousoutputforeveryoutputchoiceoftherivalFirm2’sreactionfunctionmakestheequilibriumoutputofFirm1evenhigherFirm2produceslessthanwhatitproducedwithoutthetoughcommitmentfromFirm1BertrandAfterToughCommitmentBertrandAfterToughCommitmentFirm1commitstoalowerpricebyshiftingitsreactionfunctiontotheleftFirm2’sreactionfurtherlowerstheequilibriumpriceBothfirmsenduphurtbyFirm1’stoughcommitmentStrategicEffectsoftheCommitmentsFirm1’sCommitmentSecondStageCompetitionStrategicEffectonFirm1SoftCournotNegativeSoftBertrandPositiveToughCournotPositiveToughBertrandNegativeCantheNegativeStrategicEffectbeForestalled?Ifthedirecteffectispositiveandthestrategiceffectnegative,canthefirmforestallthelatter?Example:Thenetpresentvalueofcostreducingcommitmentispositive.Canthenegativestrategiceffectbeavoidedbyrefusingtolowertheprice?CantheNegativeStrategicEffectbeForestalled?Iftheprofitmaximizingstrategy(afterthecommitment)istolowertheprice,rivalwillassumethatthefirmwilldosoItisdifficulttoconvincearivalthatyourfirmwillactagainstitsowninterestinthesecondstageATaxonomyofStrategicCommitmentsFirm1’sStrategyCommitmentPostureCommitmentActionTop-DogStrategyToughMakeSubmissiveUnderdogToughRefrainSuicidalSiberianSoftMakeLeanandHungryLookSoftRefrainWhenSecondStageActionsareStrategicSubstitutesATaxonomyofStrategicCommitm