联盟潮流的逻辑性——集群竞争扩张

THELOGICOFALLIANCEFADS:WhyCollectiveCompetitionSpreadsbyBenjaminGomes-CasseresForthcominginMitchellP.KozaandArieY.Lewin,eds.,StrategicAlliancesandFirmAdaptation:ACoevolutionPerspective(M.E.Sharpe,2001).AssociateProfessorofInternationalBusinessGraduateSchoolofInternationalEconomicsandFinanceBrandeisUniversityWaltham,MA02254-9110Tel:[phone]Fax:[phone]E-mail:[e-mail]©BenjaminGomes-Casseres2001PleasedonotciteorcopywithoutpermissionTHELOGICOFALLIANCEFADSAlliancesoftenseemtospreadinwaves.Inmanybusinesses,aperiodofincreasingallianceformationhasbeenfollowedbyaslowdown.Inthecomputerhardwareindustry,forexample,theformationofalliancesincreaseddramaticallyinthefirsthalfofthe1980sanddeclinedinthesecondhalf(seeFigure1).Anewwaveofallianceformationseemedtostartintheearly1990s.Similarboomsandbustsinallianceformationappearedtohaveoccurredinotherindustries,althoughnocomprehensivedataexisttoshowthisconclusively.Intheearly1990s,therewerewavesofallianceformationinthetelecommunications,airline,health-care,andcommercialrealestateindustries,tonameafewexamples.Biotechnologyalliancesweremostpopularinthemid-1980s.Earlier,thelate1970sandearly1980ssawalliancewavesintheautomobile,aircraft,andchemicalsindustries.HistoricaldataontheforeignoperationsoflargeU.S.manufacturingfirmsindicateanincreaseintheuseofjointventuresinthelate1950s,followedbyasharpdeclineinthe1960s(Gomes-Casseres,1988).Theseobservationsraisetworelatedquestions.First,whydidfirmsintheseindustriesincreasetheiruse-3-ofalliancesataboutthesametime?Thisclusteringoffirmbehaviorcausestherateofallianceformationtorisefortheindustryasawhole.Second,whydidtheriseinallianceformationcometoahaltandevendeclineafterafewyears?Justastherisesinallianceformationoffirmsinanindustryaretypicallycorrelated,sotooseemtobethedeclines.Asaresult,weseetheformationofallianceswaxandwaneintheindustry.InGomes-Casseres(1996)Iofferedanexplanationforthispattern,basedonfield-basedresearchintheinformationtechnologyindustry.Ifoundthataftertechnicalandcompetitivechangeshadcausedsomefirmsinanindustrysegmenttoadoptalliances,theirimmediaterivalswerelikelytofollow.Furthermore,thisprocesswasacceleratedbecausefirmshadanincentivetopre-empttheirrivalsinformingalliances.Thewaveofallianceformationcontinueduntilsloweddownbyascarcityofremainingpotentialpartners.Asidefromthese“external”forcesonallianceformation,Ialsofound“internal”driversandconstraints,rootedintheworkingsofeachfirm’salliancenetwork.Inparticular,thegrowthofafirm’salliancenetworkfirstyieldedeconomiesfromspecializationandlatergeneratedgovernancecoststhatlimitedfurthergrowth.Thisarticleusesthefielddatatoevaluatethreealternativeinterpretationsofthewave-likespreadofalliancesthatarebasedonrecentliteratureonorganizationalchange.Indoingso,itaimstoelucidatetheboundaryconditionsbetweentheseinterpretations,aswellasprovideamorecomprehensiveexplanationforalliancewaves.Furthermore,thearticlewillshowthat,atleastinthecaseofalliancestrategies,theforcesthatconstraintheadoptionofthestrategyinlaterstagesofthecyclearenotsimplymirror-imagesoftheforcesthatoriginallydroveadoption(cf.Greve,1995).Supplementarytheoriesareusefulinexplainingthedeclineinallianceformationarepresented.Thestructureofthispaperisasfollows.Thenextsectionintroducesaseriesoftheoreticalargumentsthatmayexplainthedynamicsofalliancewaves.Thesectionafterthatreviewsbrieflytwoindustrycasestudiesofallianceformation.Thelastsectionevaluatesthetheoreticalexplanationsinthelightofthecaseevidence.Theconclusionpresentsimplicationsforfurtherresearch.Thedatausedinthepapercomefromtwofieldsofinformationtechnology:(1)thereducedinstruction-setcomputing(RISC)industryand(2)thepersonaldigitalassistants(PDA)industry.Botharefieldsofintensetechnologicalandcommercialinnovationandrivalrythatemergedinthelate1980sandblossomedintheearly1990s.Duringthisperiod,therewerefivemajorplayersintheRISCindustry(IBM,Hewlett-Packard,Motorola,SunMicrosystems,andMipsComputerSystems)andsixinthePDAindustry(Apple,Hewlett-Packard,AT&T,Sharp,Casio,andAmstrad).Iormyco-authoronarelatedpaper(Gomes-CasseresandLeonardBarton,1997)conductedinterviewsatallthesecompaniesanddevelopedadatabasethatincludes177RISCalliancesand74PDAalliances.FurtherdetailsondatacollectionmethodsareintheAppendix.TerminologyandUnitsofAnalysisThetermallianceisusedheretocoverarangeofinter-firmagreementsthataredeeperthanarm's-4-lengthbutfallshortofmerger.Whethertheytaketheformofajointventure,ajointR&Dproject,amarketingagreement,orsomeotherform,therefore,alliancesdefinedhereasanorganizationalmechanismtogovernanincompletecontractbetweentwoseparatefirmswithoutgivingeitherfirmcompletecontroloverdecisionmaking.(Gomes-Casseres,1996;ContractorandLorange,1988;andHartandHolmström,1987).Formostofthediscussionthatfollows,theunitofanalysisaregroups(ornetworks)offirmslinkedtogetherthroughalliances,andwhichcompetecollectivelyagainstothergroupsandagainstsinglefirms.Thesecompetingnetworksofalliesareconceivedofasbeingsub-groupsinalargerfabricofcompetitionandcollaborationintheindustry(Nohriaand