ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)38,Jones所有权性质、股权激励、代理成本JEL:J33,M527060202606300974200834391993CEO100%2000500%20001999430765A20051998786A2003200243010362005199920014620032002430200134200620012003QHallLiebman1998HallMurphy2000CEOCEOChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)40JensenMeckling19761200220050.97%2.05%45%20083441JensenMeckling1976Jensen19862001AngColeLin2000DepkenNguyenSarkar2006MorckShleiferVishny1988entrenchmenteffectsU05%5%25%25%McConnellServaes199020002005200520032005ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)42ShirleyWalsh2000200620001%25%5%2%45815%195%MorckShleiferVishny19885%12345%5%20083443200220054581-1CSMARWindWind2002200320042005Total83387488988934852592752812811096N109211491170117045812004200620072007AngColeLin2000100%DepkenNguyenSarkar2006AngColeLin2000ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)44JensenMeckling1976QJonesccfeeR12345678////int/////ititititititititititititititititititOfeeTArecTAinvtTAppeTAATAlongATApayblWTApreparationTAsaleTAαββββββββε=+++++++++(1)ititOfeeTArecinvtppeintAlongApayblW11itεititccfeeRε=3ccfeeRJones1.20083445JensenMeckling1976ShleiferVishny19972.3.Maug1998McConnelServaes1990BebchukFried20032005blockindRMpaysalelev2123414012345678_()_5%(_5%)itititititititititititititccfeeRaadceohceohdRadceohdceohceohdRablockaindRaMpayaprivateasalealevu=++×+++++++2ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)46ccfeeRJones1ceohdceohdR=/_dceoh10_5%dceoh5%10blockindRMpay00sate10private10sale-39.299-0.12940.004710.085-33.079-0.03220.002511.884ccfeeRtotal-39.299-0.10230.003711.884Mpay05235103813679630000indR00.31350.33330.67block(%)2.2542.165540.27850.00000.000880.00000.071750.00000.020510.00000.45412ceohdRtotal0.00000.007800.00000.45412ceohd35413374071800059033813_dceoh16.15%ceohdRceohd315%45.4%CEO200834472005242Durbin-Watson5%White_dceoh1_5%dceoh10%5%4ceohdR2412Maug1998McConnelServaes1990320064ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)48012345678_()_5%(_5%)itititititititititititititccfeeRaadceohceohdRadceohdceohceohdRablockaindRaMpayaprivateasalealevµ=++×+++++++tt25.04030.96***25.11031.11***_dceoh-0.178-1.240_5%dceoh1.1941.790*ceohdR1.2970.060_5%dceohceohdR4.9730.228block0.0061.782*0.0061.755**indR-0.860-1.242-0.863-1.247Mpay-0.048-1.901*-0.048-1.888*private-0.460-3.600***-0.455-3.554***sale-1.188-30.29***-1.192-30.54***lev-0.265-4.302***-0.263-4.278***2.AdjR0.1830.183DW−2.0842.084WhiteP0.9600.980注:*、**、***分别表示双边t检验在10%、5%、1%水平上显著。525200632008344901234567__5%itititititititititccfeeRaadceohadceohablockaindRaMpayasalealevµ=++++++++tt19.61013.610***27.62028.280***_dceoh-0.582-1.992**-0.059-0.360_5%dceoh1.7152.287**block0.0070.9900.0051.372indR0.6340.477-1.372-1.697*Mpay-0.027-0.526-0.063-2.167**sale-0.982-13.560***-1.293-27.480***lev-0.159-1.168-0.281-4.087***2.AdjR0.1450.2045%4Jones1234ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)50123200522005220073200412007120051720003200612200732006102001920061200834512003820035Ang,J.S.,R.A.ColeandJ.W.Lin,2000,AgencyCostsandOwnerchipgStructure,JournalofFinance,55,81-106.Bebchuk,LucianAryeandJesseM.Fried,2003,ExecutiveCompensationasanAgencyProblem,JournalofEconomicPerspectives,17(summer),71-92.Hall,B.andJ.Liebman,1998,AreCEOsReallyPaidLikeBureaucrats?,QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,113,653-691.Hall,B.andK.Murphy,2000,OptimalExercisePricesforExecutiveStockOptions,AmericanEconomicReview,90,209-214.Jensen,M.,1986,AgencyCostsofFreeCashFlow,CorporateFinance,andTakeovers,AmericaEconomicsReview,76,323-329.Jensen,M.C.andW.H.Meckling,1976,TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructure,JournalofFinancialEconomics,3,305-360.Maug,Ernst,1998,LargeShareholdersasMonitors:IsThereaTrade-OffbetweenLiquidityandControl?,TheJournalofFinance,1(Feb.),65-91.McConnel,J.J.andH.Servaes,1990,AdditionalEvidenceonEquityOwnershipandCorporateValue,JournalofFinancialEconomics,27,595-612.Morck,R.,A.SleiferandR.W.Vishny,1988,ManagerialOwnershipandMarketValuation:AnEmpiricalAnalysis,JournalofFinancialEconomics,58,292-315.Shleifer,AndreiandRobertW.Vishny,1997,ASurveyofCorporateGovernance,JournalofFiance,52,133-152.Shirley,M.andP.Walsh,2000,PublicandPrivateOwnership:TheCurrentStateoftheDebate,Workingpaper,theWorldBank.Singh,M.andW.N.Davidson,2003,AgencyCosts,OwnershipStructureandCorporateGovernanceMechanisms,JournalofBankingandFinance,27,793-816.ChinaManagementStudiesvolume3(4)52EquityIncentiveandAgencyCostsHuangZhizhongBaiYunxiaAbstract:UsingdiscretionaryexpensesrateestimatedbyJonesModelasproxiesforagencycost,thispaperinvestigatestheimpactsofownershipcharacterandstocksheldbytopmanagersonagencycost.Wefindthatagencycostsarelowerinprivateownedfirmsthattopmanagersholdsuitableshares.Thissuggeststhatequityincentiveschemecouldbeaneffectivewaytoreducetheagencycostsofthelistedcompaniesinourcountry.Keywords:ownershipstructure,equityincentive,agencycostsJEL:J33,M52