竞争法(双语)课程07-antimonopoly--law3--ADP

JUFEYuLing1Part2AntimonopolyLaw:ChinesePerspectiveJUFEYuLingLearningObjectives(1)DefineDominantMarketPosition(2)DefineTyingandBundling(3)ExplainPredatoryPricing(4)ExplainRPM(5)PriceDiscriminationJUFEYuLing3Content1.DominantMarketPosition2.AbuseofaMarketDominantPosition3.TyingandBundling4.PredatoryPricing5.PriceDiscriminationJUFEYuLing4Chapter6AbuseofaMarketDominantPositionJUFEYuLing1.DominantMarketPosition(1)Definitiona)Itreferstotheundertaking(s)havingtheabilitytocontroltheprice,quantityorothertradingconditionsofproductsinrelevantmarket,ortohinderoraffectotherundertakingstoentertherelevantmarket.JUFEYuLingb)TheOriginalPowerofDominantPositionEconomicPowerIntellectualPropertyRightsAdministrativePowerJUFEYuLing(2)Factorstofindingdominantmarketposition(i)marketshareinrelevantmarket,andthecompetitionsituationoftherelevantmarket;(ii)abilitytocontrolthesalesmarketsortherawmaterialpurchasingmarkets;(iii)financialstatusandtechnicalconditionsoftheundertaking;(iv)thedegreeofdependenceofotherundertakings;(v)entrytorelevantmarketbyotherundertakings;(vi)otherfactorsrelatedtofindadominantmarketposition.7JUFEYuLing(3)Howtoassumeadominantmarketposition?a)Undertakingsthathaveanyofthefollowingsituationscanbeassumedtobehaveadominantmarketposition:(i)therelevantmarketshareofoneundertakingaccountsfor1/2orabove;(ii)thejointrelevantmarketshareoftwoundertakingsaccountsfor2/3orabove;(iii)thejointrelevantmarketshareofthreeundertakingsaccountsfor3/4orabove.8JUFEYuLing(b)DefensesUndertakingswithamarketshareoflessthan1/10willnotbedeemedasoccupyingadominantmarketpositioneveniftheyfallwithinthescopeofsecondorthirditem.WhentheUndertakingsassumedtohaveadominantmarketpositioncanprovethattheydonothaveadominantmarket,shallnotbeassumedtohaveadominantmarketposition.9JUFEYuLingone≥1/2two≥2/3three≥3/410JUFEYuLing2.AbuseofaMarketDominantPositionTheRequirementsofAbusing1)Undertakingsofadominantmarketposition2)Abusingbehaviors(i)sellcommoditiesatunfairlyhighpricesorbuycommoditiesatunfairlylowprices;(ii)sellcommoditiesatpricesbelowcostwithoutlegitimatereasons;(iii)refusetotradewithcounterpartywithoutlegitimatereasons;11JUFEYuLing(iv)requireitscounterpartytotradeexclusivelywithitortradeexclusivelywiththeappointedundertakingswithoutlegitimatereasons;(v)tieproductsorrequireasunreasonableconditionsfortradingwithoutlegitimatereasons;(vi)applydissimilarpricesorothertransactiontermstoequivalentcounterparties;(vii)otherconductsidentifiedasabuseofadominantpositionbyantimonopolyexecutionauthorities.12JUFEYuLingJUFEYuLingTyingandbundling[are]soubiquitousthatweforgettheyarethere....Tyingandbundling[are],roughlyspeaking,whatthemodernfirmdoes.It'stherationale.Itputsthingstogetherandofferstheminpackagestoconsumers.14JUFEYuLing15(1)DefinitionsBundlingTying•purebundling:sellingproductsonlyasabundle,notindividually•mixedbundling:sellingproductsasabundleandindividually•makingthesaleofonegood(thetyinggood)conditionalonthesaleofanothergood(thetiedgood)•Elements•certainformsofbundling•oftwoseparateproducts•throughcoercion(?)EconomicconceptLegalconceptJUFEYuLingChinaTyingisthepracticeofmakingthesaleofonegood(thetyinggood)tothedefactoordejurecustomerconditionalonthepurchaseofaseconddistinctivegood(thetiedgood).Itisoftenillegalwhentheproductsarenotnaturallyrelated.Ex.abookstorerequiringthecustomerbuyanunpopularbookbeforeallowingthemtopurchaseabestseller.16JUFEYuLing(2)Whytotie?1)toexcludecompetitors2)toraisethecostofcompetitors3)tofacilitatetheconspiracywiththecompetitors17JUFEYuLing18(3)EconomicAnalysisChicagoSchool•Recognitionofefficiencies•reductioninproduction/distributioncosts•productimprovement•qualityassurance/compatibility•pricing•Limitedmotivetoleverageamonopolyintoanothermarketsinglemonopolyprofittheorem•Tyingis(almost)alwaysbenignClassicalTyingApproach•Leveragetheory:afirmextendsitsdominancethroughtyingandisabletoearnasecondmonopolyprofit•“Tyingdeemedtoservenolegitimatebusinesspurpose”•Tyingis(almost)alwaysharmfulPost-Chicago•ChicagoSchooldidnotaddressoligopolisticmarkets•Anti-competitivescenarios•foreclosureofthecompetitivemarket•protectionofthemonopolymarket•others?•TyingisfrequentlybenignbutcanbeharmfulincertaincircumstancesJUFEYuLingInviewoftheirpotentialefficiencies,manyeconomistsbelievethat,ingeneral,tyingandbundlingaremorelikelytobeprocompetitivethananticompetitive.19JUFEYuLing20(4)ErrorCostAnalysis(1)ActualImpactLegalStandardHarmfulNotHarmfulIllegalCasesthatarebothharmfulandillegalCasesthatarenotharmfuleventhoughtheyviolatethelegalruleLegalCasesthatareharmfuleventhoughtheydonotviolatethelegalruleCasesthatarebenignandlegalKeyFactors•frequencyofharmfulcases•rateoffalseacquittalsandfalseconvictions•errorcostsJUFEYuLing21ErrorCostAnalysis(2)PerSeLegalityRuleofReasonPerSeIllegalityCourtofAppealsinMicrosoftIIICommissiondecisioninMicrosoftModifiedPerSe-JeffersonParishPerSeapproachinHiltiandTetraPakIIStandardofproofforcompetitiveharmEClawU.S.lawEconomicAnalysisChicagoSchoolPost-ChicagoClassicalApproachJUFEYuLing22(5)L