JUFEYuLing1Part2AntimonopolyLaw:ChinesePerspectiveJUFEYuLingWhyhasgovernmentbeeninstitutedatall?Becausethepassionsofmanwillnotconformtothedictatesofreasonandjusticewithoutconstraint.——AlexanderHamiltonJUFEYuLingLearningObjectives(1)DefineExtraterritorialApplicationofAML(2)CompareDifferentEnforcementModels(3)ExplainTheImportanceOfDeterrenceJUFEYuLing4Content1.AntimonopolyLawJurisdiction2.EnforcementAgencies3.EC’sCurrentOverallEnforcementResults4.InvestigationintotheSuspiciousMonopolisticConducts5.LegalLiabilitiesJUFEYuLing5Chapter6AntimonopolyLawEnforcementJUFEYuLing1.AntimonopolyLawJurisdictionJUFEYuLing(1)AboutEnforcement1)Definitionofenforcement(alsocalledcomingintoforceorenactment)referstotheprocessbywhichlegislation,orpartoflegislation,andtreatiescometohavelegalforceandeffect.2)GeneralrequirementsTocomeintoforce,atreatyoractneedstoreceivetherequirednumberofvotesorratifications.Comingintoforcegenerallyincludespublicationinanofficialgazettesothatpeopleknowthelawortreatyexists,whichgenerallyreleasesitintothepublicdomain.JUFEYuLing(2)AntimonopolyLawTerritorialJurisdiction1)Generallyspeaking,antimonopolylawisakindofmunicipallaw.Article2ThisLawisapplicabletomonopolisticconductineconomicactivitieswithintheterritoryofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.JUFEYuLing2)Butmoreandmorecountrieshaveendowedantimonopolylawwithextraterritorialeffect,suchastheU.S.andEU.Extraterritorialjurisdictionisthelegalabilityofagovernmenttoexerciseauthoritybeyonditsnormalboundaries.JUFEYuLing3)ExtraterritorialApplicationOfChinaANLArticle2ThisLawisapplicabletomonopolisticconductoutsidetheterritoryofthePeople’sRepublicofChinathathastheeffectofeliminatingorrestrictingcompetitiononthedomesticmarketofChina.JUFEYuLing4)ExtraterritorialApplicationOfU.S.AntitrustLawa)1909--AmericanBananaCo.v.UnitedFruitCo.,213U.S.347(1909)•SupremeCourtfirstconsidersextraterritorialapplicationoftheShermanActanddeterminesthatstrictterritorialityapplies.JUFEYuLingb)1945--UnitedStatesv.AluminumCo.ofAmerica(Alcoa),148F.2d416(2dCir.1945)SecondCircuit,actingasthecourtoflastresort,rejectsthestrictterritorialapproachinAmericanBanana.JUFEYuLingc)III.1982--ForeignTradeAntitrustImprovementAct(FTAIA),15U.S.C.§6a–CongressenactsFTAIAtoclarifytheextraterritorialapplicationoftheShermanAct.FTAIAisdesignedtoplacelimitationsontheapplicationoftheShermanActinsituationswhereU.S.commerceisnotaffected.JUFEYuLingFTAIAstatesthatSections1through7oftheShermanActwillnotapplytotradeorcommerce(otherthanimporttradeorimportcommerce)withforeignnationsunless:•suchconducthasadirect,substantial,andreasonablyforeseeableeffectand•sucheffectgivesrisetoaclaimundertheprovisionsofsection1to7oftheShermanAct.JUFEYuLingd)2004--Hoffman-LaRocheLtd.v.EmpagranS.A.,124S.Ct.2359(2004)Plaintiffswereforeignpurchasersthatallegedtheywereinjuredbythedefendantdomesticandforeignvitaminmanufacturersanddistributors’pricefixingconspiracy.Theplaintiffs’argumentthattheFTAIAexceptionrequirementthatthedomesticeffectatissue“givesrisetoaclaim”undertheShermanActshouldbereadliterallyandnotrequirethatittogiverisetotheinstantplaintiffs’claimortheclaimatissue.JUFEYuLingTheCourtheldthatAnyambiguityintheFTAIAshouldbeconstrued“toavoidunreasonableinterferencewiththesovereignauthorityofothernations.”“Itwasunreasonabletoapplyourlawstoforeignconductwherethattheresultingforeigninjurywasindependentofanydomesticinjury.”Thecourtrejectedtheplaintiffs’argument.JUFEYuLing(3)AntimonopolyLawSubject-matterJurisdiction1)Subject-matterjurisdictionisanauthorityoverthesubjectofthelegalquestionsinvolvedinthecase.2)AMLSubject-matterJurisdiction:casesrelatedtomonopolisticconductsfaircompetitioninthemarketeconomicefficiencytheinterestsofconsumersandsocialpublicinterest,socialistmarketeconomyJUFEYuLing3)theAMLexplicitlyprovidesthatthelegislationisnotapplicabletoabusiness’slawfulconductinaccordancewithitslegitimateIPrights.theallyorconcertedactionsofagriculturalproducersandruraleconomicorganizationsintheeconomicactivitiessuchasproduction,processing,sales,transportationandstorageofagriculturalproducts.18JUFEYuLing2.EnforcementAgencies(1)TheU.S.EnforcementModel1)IntheUnitedStates,therearebothstateandfederalantitrustlaws.2)Enforcementoftheselawstakes3forms:a)Thefederalgovernment,viaboththeADandtheFTC,canbringcivillawsuitsenforcingthelaws.DOJalonemaybringcriminalantitrustsuitsunderfederalantitrustlaws.(AT&T/Microsoft)JUFEYuLingb)Stateattorneysgeneralmayfilesuitstoenforcebothstateandfederalantitrustlaws.c)Privatecivilsuitsmaybebrought,inbothstateandfederalcourt,againstviolatorsofstateandfederalantitrustlaw.Federalantitrustlaws,aswellasmoststatelaws,providefortrebledamagesagainstantitrustviolatorsinordertoencourageprivatelawsuitenforcementofantitrustlaw.20JUFEYuLingWhyCongressAuthorizedPrivateAntitrustLawsuits?Hawaiiv.StandardOilCo.ofCal.,405U.S.251,262(1972):Everyviolationoftheantitrustlawsisablowtothefree-enterprisesystemenvisagedbyCongress.Thissystemdependsonstrongcompetitionforitshealthandvigor,andstrongcompetitiondepend