上市公司财务舞弊监督失效假说及其实证检验

华中科技大学博士学位论文上市公司财务舞弊监督失效假说及其实证检验姓名：袁春生申请学位级别：博士专业：企业管理指导教师：夏新平;袁建国20080425II234IIIAbstractAtthebeginningofthe21stcentury,somanyworldwidefinancialfraudsinprominentcompanieshappenedoneafteranother,whichmakesitaseriouschallenge:howcanwecurelistedcompanies’financialfrauds.Themainpurposeofthispaperistoprovidetheoreticandempiricalstudyonthecausesforthenon-effectivenessofmonitoringmechanismforlistedcompanies’financialfraudsinChina.Focusingoncorporatemonitoringmechanism,thispaperillustratesthatmonitoringisoneessentialfunctionofcorporategovernance.Bycomparativelyanalyzingtheeffectsofcorporategovernanceondeterenceoffinancialfraudswiththatofinternalaccountingcontrolsystem,itispointedoutthatthemainreasonoffinancialfraudsinChineselistedcompaniesisnon-effectivemonitoringmechanismattheaspectofcorporategovernance.Andthenthispaperdevelopsresearchhypothesesandprovidesempiricalevidencesabouttheeffectsofdirectandindirectmonitoringmechanismsonfinancialfraudsinpubliccompanies.Thisanalysisframeworkcanprovidereferencableparadigmforfuturedeepresearchondeterminationsoffinancialfrauds.Theresultsofempiricaltestsontherelationshipbetweendirectsupervisalmechanismsandfinancialfraud,whichcanprovidereferencesolutionsforChina’slistedcompanygovernancereform,areconsistentwiththehypothesisthatthepooreffectivenessofinternalgovernancemechanismisthedirectcauseofcorporatefinancialfrauds.(1)Thefunctionofshareholdermeetingonpreventingfraudsislimitedandtheroleofshareholdersisdependentonownershipstructure.What’smore,howownershipconcentrationworksonpreventingfinancialfraudsdependsonthetypeofactualcontrollers,whichisanimportantdeterminationoffinancialfrauds.Therein,ownershipconcentrationturnsoutnottobeeffectivetopreventfinancialfrauds.(2)Themonitoringfromindependentdirectorshasnoeffectsonfrauds,aswellasboardofdirectorsmeetingandauditingcommittee.ThelikelihoodoffinancialfraudsishigherinthecorporatewiththechairmanofboardofdirectorsalsoisCEO.Soitmaintainsthatthechairmanofboardofdirectorspossessesaleadingpositionandthepowerofotherdirectorsisverylimited.(3)Thesizeofsupervisoryboard,thefrequencyofsupervisoryboardmeeting,andtheIVownershippercentageofmembersinthesupervisoryboardarenotrelatedtothelikelihoodoffinancialfrauds.Theseresultssupportthefactthatthemonitoringfromthesupervisoryboardisinefficientondeterringcorporatefraudulentbehavior.(4)Thesupervisionfromindependentauditorsorsecuritiessupervisionbureausisnegativelyrelatedtotheprobabilityoffinancialfraudssignificantly.Furthermore,securitiessupervisionbureausandindependentauditingaregovernancemechanismswhichcanbesubstitutesforeachother.(5)Thedirectrelationshipbetweenboardsizeandfinancialfraudsisnegative.What’smore,withenlargingboardsize,itsmarginalmonitoringeffectscanbeenhancedinthebeginningandthenbecomesmaller;corporateperformanceisnegativelyrelatedtofrauds,andtheindirectlinksbetweenboardsizeandthelikelihoodoffinancialfraudsisnegative,whichmeansthelargerBODsizeis,thehighercorporateperformanceis,thelowerthelikelihoodofcorporatefinancialfraudsis.Moreover,thispaperfirstlystudiestheeffectsofmanageriallabourmarketcompetition,controlrightsmarket,andinvestorlegalprotectiononthelikelihoodoffinancialfrauds.Themainfindingsareasfollows:(1)Dependedonmanageriallabourmarketcompetition,whichisanimportantdeterminationoffinancialfrauds,managementcompensationandreputationhavenosignificanteffectsonfinancialfrauds;(2)Asforcontrolrightsmarket,itisnotothershareholdersbutonlythesecondlargestshareholdercandisciplinethelargestshareholder’sbehaviorefficiently;(3)Manageriallabourmarketcompetitionisasubstitutedmechanismofmanagementcompensationandcontrolrightsmarket,whichmeans,topmanagersmustbepaidhigherinordertoinducemanagerstobehaveinwaysconsistentwithshareholders’goalsinundevelopedlabourmarket;(4)Therelationshipbetweenlegalprotectionforinvestorsandfinancialfraudsisnegative,andtheimprovementoninvestors'legalprotectionhasanegativeinfluenceonthelikelihoodoffrauds.Thepoliticalillustrationoftheseresultsisthattheimprovementoflegalsystemisanimportantinstitutionalarrangementusedtostrengtheninvestors’protectionandpreventlistedcompaniesfromfinancialfrauds.TheevidencesabovearehelpfultocomprehendhowtheeconomicandlegalinstitutionsbringaboutfinancialfraudsinChina.Keywords:FinancialFraudCorporateGovernanceDirectMonitoringIndirectMonitoringInvestorProtection111.11.1.111720100192919331934200111EnronSEC19972001301102004193419965.666.572005200120042.571.5720062DechowSloanSweeney1996SEC9%120120401-0.011400.07AndersonYohn20021997-1999161-3.5%-3.8%-11%-8%Palmroseetal20041995-1999403-9.2%-4.6%40006%SEC.E.LynnE.Turner1000800Rezaee200511423.7477.166.6720032001200532..1776197019702020203070200220062002Faccio20014Johnson20001998200620062005200520052005200420052005200611.1.2Chenetal2006Allenetal2005ShleiferandVishny19971200751.21.2.11720192912361.2.217220062005820031.31.3.11-1910111.3.2121-11abc231234LaportaetalLLSV199719982002LLSV1997199820021322.12.1.1112.2050Albrecht19953GONEGONEBologua1993120042005141993GGreedOOpportunityNNeedEExposure4Bologua1995GONE5Rezae