Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:ExternalitiesandPublicGoods18CHAPTERCopyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods2of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER18OUTLINE18.1Externalities18.2WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure18.3StockExternalities18.4ExternalitiesandPropertyRights18.5CommonPropertyResources18.6PublicGoods18.7PrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsChapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods3of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1●externalityActionbyeitheraproduceroraconsumerwhichaffectsotherproducersorconsumers,butisnotaccountedforinthemarketprice.●marginalexternalcostIncreaseincostimposedexternallyasoneormorefirmsincreaseoutputbyoneunit.●marginalsocialcostSumofthemarginalcostofproductionandthemarginalexternalcost.NegativeExternalitiesandInefficiencyChapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods4of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1NegativeExternalitiesandInefficiencyWhentherearenegativeexternalities,themarginalsocialcostMSCishigherthanthemarginalcostMC.ThedifferenceisthemarginalexternalcostMEC.In(a),aprofit-maximizingfirmproducesatq1,wherepriceisequaltoMC.Theefficientoutputisq*,atwhichpriceequalsMSC.ExternalCostFigure18.1Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods5of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1NegativeExternalitiesandInefficiencyIn(b),theindustry’scompetitiveoutputisQ1,attheintersectionofindustrysupplyMCIanddemandD.However,theefficientoutputQ*islower,attheintersectionofdemandandmarginalsocialcostMSCI.ExternalCost(continued)Figure18.1Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods6of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1PositiveExternalitiesandInefficiency●marginalexternalbenefitIncreasedbenefitthataccruestootherpartiesasafirmincreasesoutputbyoneunit.●marginalsocialbenefitSumofthemarginalprivatebenefitplusthemarginalexternalbenefit.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods7of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1PositiveExternalitiesandInefficiencyFigure18.2ExternalBenefitsWhentherearepositiveexternalities,marginalsocialbenefitsMSBarehigherthanmarginalbenefitsD.ThedifferenceisthemarginalexternalbenefitMEB.ThepriceP1resultsinalevelofrepair,q1.Alowerprice,P*,isrequiredtoencouragetheefficientlevelofsupply,q*.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods8of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.EXTERNALITIES18.1Figure18.3SulfurDioxideEmissionsReductionsTheefficientsulfurdioxideconcentrationequatesthemarginalabatementcosttothemarginalexternalcost.Herethemarginalabatementcostcurveisaseriesofsteps,eachrepresentingtheuseofadifferentabatementtechnology.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods9of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.WAYSOFCORRECTINGMARKETFAILURE18.2Figure18.4TheEfficientLevelofEmissionsTheefficientleveloffactoryemissionsisthelevelthatequatesthemarginalexternalcostofemissionsMECtothebenefitassociatedwithlowerabatementcostsMCA.Theefficientlevelof12unitsisE*.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods10of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.WAYSOFCORRECTINGMARKETFAILURE18.2AnEmissionsStandard●emissionsstandardLegallimitontheamountofpollutantsthatafirmcanemit.Figure18.5StandardsandFeesTheefficientlevelofemissionsatE*canbeachievedthrougheitheranemissionsfeeoranemissionsstandard.Facingafeeof$3perunitofemissions,afirmreducesemissionstothepointatwhichthefeeisequaltothemarginalcostofabatement.Thesamelevelofemissionsreductioncanbeachievedwithastandardthatlimitsemissionsto12units.Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods11of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.WAYSOFCORRECTINGMARKETFAILURE18.2AnEmissionsFee●emissionsfeeChargeleviedoneachunitofafirm'semissions.StandardsversusFeesFigure18.6TheCaseforFeesWithlimitedinformation,apolicymakermaybefacedwiththechoiceofeitherasingleemissionsfeeorasingleemissionsstandardforallfirms.Thefeeof$3achievesatotalemissionslevelof14unitsmorecheaplythana7-unit-per-firmemissionsstandard.Withthefee,thefirmwithalowerabatementcostcurve(Firm2)reducesemissionsmorethanthefirmwithahighercostcurve(Firm1).Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoods12of35Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.WAYSOFCORRECTINGMARKETFAILURE18.2Figure18.7TheCaseforStandardsWhenthegovernmenthaslimitedinformationaboutthecostsandbenefitsofpollutionabatement,eitherastandardorafeemaybepreferable.Thestandardispreferablewhenthemarginalexternalcostcurveisste