平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)11

Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:©2008PrenticeHallBusinessPublishing•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PricingwithMarketPower11CHAPTERChapter11:PricingwithMarketPower2of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER11OUTLINE11.1CapturingConsumerSurplus11.2PriceDiscrimination11.3IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing11.4TheTwo-PartTariff11.5Bundling11.6AdvertisingChapter11:PricingwithMarketPower3of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CAPTURINGCONSUMERSURPLUS11.1CapturingConsumerSurplusFigure11.1Ifafirmcanchargeonlyonepriceforallitscustomers,thatpricewillbeP*andthequantityproducedwillbeQ*.Ideally,thefirmwouldliketochargeahigherpricetoconsumerswillingtopaymorethanP*,therebycapturingsomeoftheconsumersurplusunderregionAofthedemandcurve.ThefirmwouldalsoliketoselltoconsumerswillingtopaypriceslowerthanP*,butonlyifdoingsodoesnotentailloweringthepricetootherconsumers.Inthatway,thefirmcouldalsocapturesomeofthesurplusunderregionBofthedemandcurve.●pricediscriminationPracticeofchargingdifferentpricestodifferentconsumersforsimilargoods.Chapter11:PricingwithMarketPower4of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2First-DegreePriceDiscrimination●reservationpriceMaximumpricethatacustomeriswillingtopayforagood.●first-degreepricediscriminationPracticeofchargingeachcustomerherreservationprice.AdditionalProfitfromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationFigure11.2Becausethefirmchargeseachconsumerherreservationprice,itisprofitabletoexpandoutputtoQ**.Whenonlyasingleprice,P*,ischarged,thefirm’svariableprofitistheareabetweenthemarginalrevenueandmarginalcostcurves.Withperfectpricediscrimination,thisprofitexpandstotheareabetweenthedemandcurveandthemarginalcostcurve.●variableprofitSumofprofitsoneachincrementalunitproducedbyafirm;i.e.,profitignoringfixedcosts.Chapter11:PricingwithMarketPower5of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2First-DegreePriceDiscriminationFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationinPracticeFigure11.3Firmsusuallydon’tknowthereservationpriceofeveryconsumer,butsometimesreservationpricescanberoughlyidentified.Here,sixdifferentpricesarecharged.Thefirmearnshigherprofits,butsomeconsumersmayalsobenefit.WithasinglepriceP*4,therearefewerconsumers.TheconsumerswhonowpayP5orP6enjoyasurplus.PerfectPriceDiscriminationTheadditionalprofitfromproducingandsellinganincrementalunitisnowthedifferencebetweendemandandmarginalcost.ImperfectPriceDiscriminationChapter11:PricingwithMarketPower6of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2Second-DegreePriceDiscrimination●second-degreepricediscriminationPracticeofchargingdifferentpricesperunitfordifferentquantitiesofthesamegoodorservice.●blockpricingPracticeofchargingdifferentpricesfordifferentquantitiesor“blocks”ofagood.Second-DegreePriceDiscriminationFigure11.4Differentpricesarechargedfordifferentquantities,or“blocks,”ofthesamegood.Here,therearethreeblocks,withcorrespondingpricesP1,P2,andP3.Therearealsoeconomiesofscale,andaverageandmarginalcostsaredeclining.Second-degreepricediscriminationcanthenmakeconsumersbetteroffbyexpandingoutputandloweringcost.Chapter11:PricingwithMarketPower7of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2Third-DegreePriceDiscrimination●third-degreepricediscriminationPracticeofdividingconsumersintotwoormoregroupswithseparatedemandcurvesandchargingdifferentpricestoeachgroup.CreatingConsumerGroupsIfthird-degreepricediscriminationisfeasible,howshouldthefirmdecidewhatpricetochargeeachgroupofconsumers?1.Weknowthathowevermuchisproduced,totaloutputshouldbedividedbetweenthegroupsofcustomerssothatmarginalrevenuesforeachgroupareequal.2.Weknowthattotaloutputmustbesuchthatthemarginalrevenueforeachgroupofconsumersisequaltothemarginalcostofproduction.Chapter11:PricingwithMarketPower8of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2Third-DegreePriceDiscrimination●third-degreepricediscriminationPracticeofdividingconsumersintotwoormoregroupswithseparatedemandcurvesandchargingdifferentpricestoeachgroup.CreatingConsumerGroups(11.1)Chapter11:PricingwithMarketPower9of41Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.PRICEDISCRIMINATION11.2Third-DegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingRelativePrices(11.2)Third-DegreePriceDiscriminationFigure11.5Consumersaredividedintotwogroups,withseparatedemandcurvesforeachgroup.Theoptimalpricesandquantitiesaresuchthatthemarginalrevenuefromeachgroupisthesameandequaltomarginalcost.Heregroup1,withdemandcurveD1,ischargedP1,andgroup2,withthemoreelasticdemandcurveD2,ischargedthelowerpriceP2.Marginalcostdependsonthetota