中国上市公司CEO继任的实证研究(1)

EmpiricalStudyofCEOSuccessioninChinesePublicTradedEnterprisesAbstractAnexaminationof172CEOsuccessionsinP.R.Chinaduring2001revealsthatexternalsuccessionsaremorelikelyinfirmswithpoorperformance,infirmswithlowinsidedirectorproportiononboard,infirmswithoutsidedominantshareholder,andinfirmswithlessinternalsuccessorcandidates.Dominantshareholderisfoundtohavegreatinfluenceuponthetypeofsuccessorchosen,andthisresulthasimplicationsforcorporategovernancestructurenotonlyinChinesetransitionalcontextbutalsoinWesternmarketeconomies.Inaddition,predecessor’sinfluenceuponthetypeofsuccessorchosenisfoundtoberatherlimited.KeyWords:executivesuccession;corporategovernance;transitionaleconomyResearchArea：BusinessandOrganizationManagement2中国上市公司CEO继任的实证研究摘要本文通过对于2001年172家中国上市公司的CEO继任事件的研究，揭示了新任CEO是从企业内部选拔还是从外部空降是与公司的业绩、内部董事占董事会的比例、控股股东的类别和公司内部候选人的充裕程度是显著相关的。本研究发现控股股东对于中国上市公司新任CEO的选拔具有非常显著的影响，这对于探讨转型经济中的企业治理结构是非常有意义的。另外本研究还发现公司前任CEO对于下任的影响并不是非常的显著。本文采用相关分析和logit回归。关键词:领导更迭、企业治理、转型经济研究领域：工商管理与管理经济学3EmpiricalStudyofCEOSuccessioninChinesePublicTradedEnterprisesTheimportanceofchiefexecutiveofficersuccessionExecutivesuccessionhaslongbeenafocusoforganizationalresearch,andmuchofthatresearchhasexaminedchiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)succession.Thisemphasisisunderstandable,giventhewidespreadbeliefthatanorganization’sCEOhasasubstantialimpactonitsperformance(Lauterbach,Vu&Weisberg,1999)andabeliefthatthephenomenonofCEOsuccessionissignificantlydifferentfrompersonnelreplacementatlowerhierarchicallevels(Rowan,1983).Ofthevarietyofsuccessorcharacteristicsthatcouldbepotentiallyexamined,researchershavesingledoutpreviousorganizationalaffiliationasespeciallycritical(Friedman&Olk,1989;Reinganum,1985).CEOsuccessororiginreferstowhetheranincumbentCEOwasanemployeeofthefirmheorsheleadsatthetimeofappointment(Kesner&Sebora,1994).PreviousstudiesonCEOsuccessionusuallyassumethatfirmsoperateinamarketeconomy.StudiesinatransitionalcontextlikeChinahavebeenverysparse.Economicenvironmentinthetransitionaleconomydiffergreatlyfromthatofthemarketeconomy,butlittleisknownaboutCEOsuccessionpracticeinthetransitionalenvironment.Forexample,inChinathecorporatizationprocessofState-ownedEnterprisesdidnotstarteduntil20yearsago,andduringthatprocessthegovernmenteithertransferredtheownershipoftheseformerstate-ownedenterprisestothecompanyitselforsoldtheownershipofthecompanytoothercompanies.Duetotheshorthistoryofownershiptrading,theownershipofChinese4enterpriseswasrelativelyconcentrated.ComparedwiththeextremelydispersedcorporateownershipstructuresinAnglo-Americancontext,thiskindofownershipstructureisexpectedtohavesomeuniqueimpactuponorganization’scriticalmanagementdecisionsuchasCEOsuccessorchosen.Fororganizationalresearcher,suchatransitionoffersauniqueopportunitytoexpandWesterntheoryonantecedentsthatinfluenceCEOsuccessionmanagement.ThepurposeofthisstudyistosuggestasetoftheoreticalhypothesesinthesourceofCEOappointmentsinthetransitionalcontext.Followingthepaststudies,IexaminedtheantecedentsofCEOsuccessororiginfromthefollowingfiveperspectives:pre-successionperformance,boardcomposition,ownershipstructure,predecessorinfluence,andtheabundanceofinternalcandidates.ButIdivergedfrompreviousstudiesinthatIexploredtheinfluenceofownershipstructurethroughexaminingthetypeofdominantshareholders.Asstatedabove,theownershipofChineseenterprisesisratherconcentrated,andthusdominantshareholderisexpectedtohavetheincentiveandabilitytoinfluenceCEOsuccessorchoice.THEORETICALDEVELOPMENTInsidevs.OutsideSuccessionPastresearchexaminingsuccessororiginhasgenerallyconcludedthatinsidersuccessionrepresentsthemaintenanceofpastpracticeandthusislessdisruptivetoanorganizationthandoesoutsidersuccession(Dalton&Kesner,1983).LauterbachandWeisberg(1996)arguedthatinternalsuccessorhasdevelopedtheexistingcorporatestrategywithincumbent5management,andthatheorsheismorelikelytokeeponcurrentstrategies,corporateculture,andcontrolstructure.Incontrast,topmanagersbroughtfromoutsidetheorganizationarethoughttohavebroaderperspectivesandapenchantforchange.HelmichandBrown(1972)claimedthatanexternalsuccessioncouldachievemoredrasticchangesinthecompanybecausetheexternalmanagerisnotbindbyoldpoliciesandimplicitcontractswithinthefirm.FirmPerformanceOnevariablethathasbeenexaminedfairlyextensivelyasapotentialdeterminantofinsider-outsiderCEOsuccessionhasbeenorganizationalperformance.DaltonandKesner(1985)suggestedthatsuccessfulorganizationsmaybeinclinedtomaintaintheircurrentstrategy.Bycontrast,poorperformancetypicallymakesorganizationsmoreopentochangeinthestatusquo(Boeker,1989),andundersuchconditionsownersandotherstakeholdersaremorelikelytourgethatchangesbemade.Asstatedearlier,insidesuccessionisgenerallyassociatedwith“maintenancestrategies”andoutsidesuccessionisassociatedwith“organizationalchange”.Thus,poorlyperformingcompaniesmaywellchooseoutsidesuccessors,andorganizationswithacceptableorbetterperformancemaybeinclinedinsteadtochooseinsiders.Empiricalevidenceis,however,mixed.FriedmanandSingh(1989)didn’tfindanysignificantrelationbetweenpastperformanceandthesuccessor’