mckinsey英文咨询合同

INTHEUNITEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURTFORTHENORTHERNDISTRICTOFILLINOISEASTERNDIVISIONInre:UALCORPORATION,etal.,1Debtors.))))))Chapter11CaseNo.02-B-_________(JointlyAdministered)Honorable_________________APPLICATIONFORANORDERPURSUANTTO11U.S.C.§§327(A)AND328(A)ANDBANKRUPTCYRULE2014(a)AUTHORIZINGTHEEMPLOYMENTANDRETENTIONOFMcKINSEY&COMPANY,INC.UNITEDSTATESASMANAGEMENTCONSULTANTTOTHEDEBTORSTheabove-captioneddebtorsanddebtorsinpossession(collectively,the“Debtors”),herebyapplytotheCourt(the“Application”)fortheentryofanorderauthorizingthemtoretainandemployMcKinsey&Company(“McKinsey”)asmanagementconsultanttotheDebtors.InsupportofthisApplication,theDebtorsrelyontheAffidavitofGerhardJ.Bette,amanagementgroupmemberatMcKinsey,attachedheretoasExhibitA(the“McKinseyAffidavit”).InfurthersupportofthisApplication,theDebtorsrespectfullyrepresentasfollows:2Jurisdiction1.ThisCourthasjurisdictionoverthisApplicationunder28U.S.C.§§157and1334.Thismatterisacoreproceedingwithinthemeaningof28U.S.C.§157(b)(2).1TheDebtorsarethefollowingentities:UALCorporation,UALLoyaltyServices,Inc.,Confetti,Inc.,MileagePlusHoldings,Inc.,MileagePlusMarketing,Inc.,MyPoints.com,Inc.,Cybergold,Inc.,itarget.com,inc.,MyPointsOfflineServices,Inc.,UALCompanyServices,Inc.,UALBenefitsManagement,Inc.,UnitedBizJetHoldings,Inc.,BizJetCharter,Inc.,BizJetFractional,Inc.,BizJetServices,Inc.,UnitedAirLines,Inc.,KionLeasing,Inc.,PremierMeetingandTravelServices,Inc.,UnitedAviationFuelsCorporation,UnitedCogen,Inc.,MileagePlus,Inc.,UnitedGHS,Inc.,UnitedWorldwideCorporation,UnitedVacations,Inc.,FourStarLeasing,Inc.,AirWisServices,Inc.,AirWisconsin,Inc.,DomicileManagementServices,Inc.2ThefactsandcircumstancessupportingthisApplicationaresetforthintheAffidavitofFredricF.BraceinSupportofFirstDayMotions,filecontemporaneouslyherewith.22.VenueforthisproceedingandthisApplicationisproperinthisDistrictpursuantto28U.S.C.§§1408and1409.3.ThestatutorybasesforthereliefrequestedhereinareSections327(a)and328(a)oftheBankruptcyCode.Background4.TheDebtorshadnoalternativebuttocommencetheseChapter11cases.Theirpassengerrevenueshaveplungedfrom$16.9billionin2000toaprojected$11.8billionfor2002.Manyfactorshavecontributedtothisfinancialcrisis,includingaweakenedeconomy,decreaseddemandforbusinesstravel,theterroristattacksofSeptember11andtheresultinglingeringreluctancetofly,greaterroutepenetrationbylowcostcarriers,andthereadyavailabilityofairlineticketsatbargainbasementpricesovertheInternet.Althoughthesefactorshavecausedasharpandsustaineddeclineinrevenuesthroughouttheairlineindustry,theDebtors,whohistoricallyhaveenjoyedaleadingpositionamongfull-farebusinesscustomers,havebeenhitthehardest.5.Overthepasteighteenmonths,theDebtorshavetriedmightilytoremaincompetitive,laborandnon-laborcutcosts,generateadditionalliquidity,andincreaseefficienciesinallaspectsoftheirbusinesses.Recently,acoalitionoftheDebtors’unionsagreedtoarecoveryplanwithlaborconcessionstolowertheDebtors’costsandhelptheDebtorsavoidbankruptcy.Unfortunately,theDebtorswereunabletoraisecapitaltofinancetheiroperationsduringtheirrecoveryefforts,andtheAirTransportationSafetyBoard(the“ATSB”)didnotapprovetheDebtors’$1.8billionfederalloanguaranteeproposal.Inthefaceofaloomingcashflowandliquiditycrisis,theDebtorsthushadnochoicebuttoseekChapter11protection.36.AnexhaustivediscussionoftheDebtors’currentfinancialcrisis,thelong-termrootsofthatcrisis,andtheDebtors’plantoemergefromChapter11asanairlinewithsustainableprofitsiscontainedintheUnitedAirLines,Inc.InformationalBrieffiledcontemporaneouslyherewithandincorporatedbyreferenceherein.AsdescribedexhaustivelyinthatInformationalBrief,fortheDebtorstoemergefrombankruptcysuccessfully,theseproceedingswillhavetoaddresstheDebtors’collectivebargainingagreementswithitsunionizedemployees–becauselaborisbyfarUnited’slargestcost,becauseUnited’slaborcostsarenowthehighestintheindustry,andbecausethecollectivebargainingagreementsrestrictUnited’sabilitytoreduceitscostsandmaximizeitsrevenuesinwaysthatarenolongeraffordable.Moreover,thecovenantssetforthintheDebtors’proposeddebtorinpossessionfinancingrequirethatthecostsavingsbeginvirtuallyimmediately.7.Itbearsimmediateemphasisthat,incallingthisCourt’sattentiontotheunaffordabilityoftheDebtors’coststructure,theDebtorsarenotblamingtheiremployeesortheirunionrepresentativesfortheDebtors’currentcrisis.Tothecontrary,theDebtorscouldnotbemoregratefultotheiremployeesandtheirunions’leadershipfortheirgood-faitheffortsandunprecedentedcooperationintryingtoresolvetheDebtors’financialdilemmaoutsideofbankruptcy.Atthisjuncture,however,theonlyconceivablewayfortheDebtorstoreorganizeintoaprofitableandvibrantairlinecapableofprovidingstableemploymentwillbetoreducetheirlaborandothercostsdramatically,inpartthroughchangestoworkrulesthatplacetheDebtorsatanextraordinarycompetitivedisadvantage.8.Italsobearsevenfurtheremphasisthat,asbefore,theDebtors’preferredcourseofactionwouldbetoreachconsensualagreementsoutsideoftheSection1113processwithallofitsunionsaboutthechangesthatmustbemadetotheDebtors’collectivebargaining4agreement