金融市场与金融机构英文课件-(25)

Copyright©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.WEBCHAPTER25SavingAssociationsandCreditUnions©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-1ChapterPreviewConsumerbankingwasalmostnon-existentintheearly1800s.Commercialbankswerecommon,buttheirbusinesswasprimarilyrestrictedtocommercialloansandservices.But,inthelate1800s,anewtypeofinstitutionopened—thesavingsandloanassociation.Thisisthetopicofchapter25.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-2ChapterPreviewWeexaminetheroleofsavingsandloanassociations,mutualsavingsbanks,andcreditunion,collectivelyknownasthriftinstitutions.Webeginwiththeirhistoryandmoveintothenatureoftheindustrytoday.Topicsinclude:─MutualSavingsBanks─SavingsandLoanAssociations─SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisis─PoliticalEconomyoftheSavingsandLoanCrisis©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-3ChapterPreview(cont.)─SavingsandLoanBailout:FinancialInstitutionReform,Recovery,andEnforcementActof1989─TheSavingsandLoansIndustryToday─CreditUnions©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-4MutualSavingsBanksDepositorsaretheownersofthefirmStockinthebankisnotsoldorissued,butratherdepositorsownashareofthebankinproportiontotheirdepositsGenerallyhavefewerliabilitiesthanotherbanksbecausedepositsareownership,notaliabilityPrincipal-agentproblemstillpresent,butmanagerstenttobemorerisk-averse©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-5SavingsandLoanAssociationsCreatedbyCongressin1816topromotehomeownershipAbout12,000S&Lsinoperationbythe1920sRegulationwasatthestatelevel©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-6SavingsandLoanAssociationsTheGreatDepressionledtothefailureofthousandsofthriftinstitutionsandthelossof$200millioninpersonalsavingsTheFederalHomeLoanBankActof1932─createdtheFederalHomeLoanBankBoardIn1934,theFSLICwascreatedtoinsuredepositors©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-7SavingsandLoanAssociationsS&Lsweresuccessful,low-riskbusinessesformanyyearsfollowingthechanges.ThenextslideshowsthedistributionofS&Lassetsin2006.Notethatmostoftheassetsarestillheldasmortgages,truetotheiroriginalintent.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-8SavingsandLoanAssociations©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-9SavingsandLoanAssociationsvs.MutualSavingsBanksMutualsavingsbanksareconcentratedinthenortheast,whereasS&Lsarefoundthroughoutthecountry.MutualsavingsbanksinsuretheirdepositswiththestateortheFDIC.S&Lsmaynot.Mutualsavingsbanksarenotasheavilyinvestedinmortgagesandhavemoreflexibilityintheirinvestingpractices.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-10SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisisBy1979,inflationwasrunningat13.3%,butRegQrestrictedinterestondepositstoonly5.5%.Further,moneymarketaccountsoffereddepositorsmarketinterestratesontheirshort-termfunds.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-11SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisisFinancialderegulationandthepermissive1980sledtoseveralproblems:─Managerslackedexpertiseinnewproductlines─Rapidgrowthinlending,particularlyrealestate─Regulatorscouldnotkeeppacewiththegrowth─Themoralhazardproblemledtoexcessiverisk-taking─1981–1982wereparticularlybadyearforsomeareas,suchastheTexasrealestatemarket©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-12SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisisRatherthancloseinsolventS&Ls,regulatorsadoptedthepolicyofregulatoryforbearance,essentiallysidesteppingtheirresponsibilityusingtemporaryBand-Aids.Thispolicyledtofurtherrisk-taking,asinsolventS&Lshadnothingtolosebyextremerisk-taking.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-13SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisisTofurthertheproblems,insolventS&Lsofferedhigherratestotheirdepositorstoattractnewfunding.ThismeantthathealthyS&LshadtocompetewithinsolventS&Lsgoingforbroke.Needlesstosay,thiscausedfurtherproblemsfortheindustry.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-14SavingsandLoansinTrouble:TheThriftCrisisCompetitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987─AllowedtheFSLICtoborrow$10.8billiontocoverdepositors’losses(notnearlyenough)─DirectedtheFHLBBtocontinueregulatoryforbearanceLossesintheS&Lindustryapproached$20billionin1989alone.Thecollapseoftherealestatemarketinthelate1980sonlyworsenedtheproblem.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-15PoliticalEconomyoftheSavingsandLoanCrisisTherelationshipbetweenvoter-taxpayersandtheregulatorsandthepoliticianscreatesaparticulartypeofmoralhazardproblem—theprincipal-agentproblem.ThisideacanexplainpartoftheproblemduringtheS&LCrisis.©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-16PoliticalEconomyoftheSavingsandLoanCrisisRegulatorsandpoliticiansareultimatelyagentsforvoter-taxpayers.Toactontaxpayers’behalf,regulatorsseektominimizethecostofdepositinsurance:─RestrictS&Lsfromholdingassetsthataretoorisky─Requirehigherbankcapital─CloseinsolventS&Ls©2012PearsonEducation.Allrightsreserved.25-17PoliticalEconomyoftheSavingsandLoanCrisisHowever,regulatorshaveanincentiveto“hide”theproblemandhopethatthesituationcorrectsitself.RegulatorsarealsofundedthroughCongressionalappropriations,whichmeansthatpoliticiansmaybeabletoinfluencetheactionsofregulato