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FamilySystemversusEconomicSystem:ChineseFamilyBusinessNetworksinTaiwanWenyiChuAssociateProfessorNationalTaiwanUniversity85,Lane144,KeelungRoad,Sec.4Taipei,TaiwanPhone:([phone]Fax:[phone]E-mail:[e-mail]omicSystem:ChineseFamilyBusinessNetworksinTaiwanABSTRACTAnimportantorganizationalfeatureofChinesefamilyfirmsisthattheyareorganizedthroughanetworkofsmallandmedium-sizedfirmsinter-linkedtooneanotherthroughtiesofkinshipandpersonalrelationships.Basedontheconceptofinstitutionaloverlaps,thisresearcharguesthatthemanagementofChinesefamilybusinessnetworksinTaiwanissimultaneouslyinfluencedbytwodifferentfactors:family/interpersonalfactors,andeconomic/strategicfactors.Byusingdatacollectedfrom122affiliatedcompaniesoftwenty-eightfamilybusinessnetworksinTaiwan,thisresearchfoundthattheinternalorganizationsoffamilybusinessnetworksareinfluencedbothbyfamilybusinessconsiderationsandeconomicefficiencyconsiderations,buttheinfluenceofeconomicfactorsismoresignificant.ThisresearchshowsthatalthoughTaiwanesefamilybusinessnetworkshavenotcompletedthetransformationfromentrepreneurialcontroltoprofessionalmanagement,mostfamilybusinessnetworkshaveadoptedaninternalorganizationthatfollowssomebasiceconomicrationalesproposedintheWesternliterature.1FamilySystemversusEconomicSystem:ChineseFamilyBusinessNetworksinTaiwanIntroductionInrecentdecadesthemostimportantinnovationsinbusinessmanagementareemerginginthefast-growingregionoftheworld–theSoutheastAsia.Inthisregion,mosteconomiesaredominatedbyoverseasChinesefamilybusinesses(Seagrave,1995;WeidenbaumandHughes,1996),especiallyinthethreeoverseasChineseeconomies:Taiwan,HongKong,andSingapore.OverseasChinesefamilybusinesseshavegainedawidereputationforcostefficiency,responsiveness,flexibility,andglobalcompetitiveness(Carney,1998).TheirsignificanteconomicperformancehasalsosetsoffanemerginglineofstudiesontheinstitutionalandeconomicstructureofEastAsiancapitalismaswellastheorganizationalcharacteristicsofChinesefamilyfirms(e.g.Hamilton&Biggart,1988;WeidenbaumandHughes,1996).MostexistingstudiesonChinesefamilyfirmsfollowtheinstitutionalperspectivetoexamineorganizationalisomorphisminChineseeconomiccommunities.Scholarsarguethat,duetosomehistorical,political,socialandculturebackgrounds,overseasChinesefamilyfirmstendtobesmallinsize,onlyengageinfewstagesofthevalue-addedactivities,andrelyheavilyonpersonalrelationsandpersonaltrusttoreducetransactionaluncertaintiesandrisks(HamiltonandBiggart,1988;HamiltonandKao,1990;Kao,1993;Orru,BiggartandHamilton,1991;Redding,1996;Whitley,1990;Wong,1996).Therefore,animportantorganizationalfeatureofChinesefamilyfirmsisthe“weakorganizations,stronglinkages”(Redding,1996)patternofoperations:firmsareorganizedthroughanetworkofseveralsmallandmedium-sizedfirmsthatareinterlinked,connectedtooneanotherandsocreatingcooperativenetworksoffirmsthrough2kinshipcircleandtiesofcommonorigins.ManyscholarshaverecognizedfamiliesandnetworksasthebasicsocialinstitutionsofTaiwan’sbusinesses(e.g.Greenhalgh,1988;HamiltonandKao,1987;Kao,1996).Althoughtheseexistingstudiesprovidesomeanswersonhowinstitutional/contextualenvironmentsmakethefamilybusinessnetworkadominantformofbusinessorganizationsamongoverseasChinesebusinesses,fewresearcheffortshavebeengrantedtotheinternaladministrativearrangementsofChinesefamilybusinessnetworks.Forinstance,arethecontrolstylesoftheparentalfoundingentrepreneurandthesecondgenerationdifferent?Doprofessionalmanagersandfamilymanagersreceivethesamelevelofdecision-makingautonomy?Towhatleveldotheinternalorganizationsfitexternalstrategicandindustrialrequirementsfacingfirms?AsFukuyama(1995)andDuncanandFlamholtz(1982)pointedout,thegreatestdifficultyfacingChinesefamilybusinessesisthetransitionfromentrepreneurialmanagementtoprofessionalmanagement.However,infamilybusinesses,thecomplexofemotionsandbusinessneedsmaketheseissueofcorporategovernanceparticularlydifficulttoanswer(Magretta,1998),andthehighemphasisofpersonaltiesandpersonaltrustmayobstaclethetransitionofChinesefamilybusinessfirms(Carney,1998).Therefore,thepurposeofthisstudyistoempiricallyexaminetheinternalorganizations,specifically,thelevelofcentralizationanddecentralization,ofChinesefamilybusinessnetworksinTaiwan.ThisstudyaimstoprovideanswersonhowtheinternalorganizationsofTaiwanesefamilybusinessnetworksareinfluencedbyfamily/personalfactorsandby3economic/strategicfactors.TheoreticalFoundationsThisresearchemploystheconceptof“institutionaloverlap”offamilyfirmsproposedbyLansberg(1983).AccordingtoLansberg,differentfromtypicalmodernfirmsthatarecharacterizedbytheseparationofownershipandcontrol(Fama,1980;FamaandJensen,1983),familyownershipandfamilycontrolco-existandinfluencethechoiceofcorporategovernanceinfamilybusinessorganizations.Therefore,familybusinessorganizationsexistontheboundariesoftwoqualitativelydifferentsocialinstitutions–thefamilyandthebusiness.Eachinstitutiondefinessocialrelationsintermsofuniquesetofvalues,norms,andprinciples,andhasitsownrulesofconduct.Asafamilyinstitution,organizationd