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Chapter11.However,researchhasshownthatcountriesoftenreversedthestepsmentionedaboveandsterilizedgoldflows,thatissolddomesticassetswhenforeignreserveswererisingandboughtdomesticassetsasforeignreservesfell.Governmentinterferencewithprivategoldexportsalsounderminedthesystem.ThepictureofsmoothandautomaticbalanceofpaymentsadjustmentbeforeWorldWarIthereforedidnotalwaysmatchreality.然而，研究表明各国经常反道而行之，他们制止黄金的流动，也就是说，当外国储备升高时他们售出国内资产，而当外国储备下降时，他们购买国内资产。政府对私人黄金出口的干预也破坏了该体系。第一次世界大战前平衡自动的国际收支调整情形常常与现实不相吻合。2.Thegoldstandardregimehasconventionallybeenassociatedwiththreerulesofthegame.Thefirstruleisthatineachparticipatingcountrythepriceofthedomesticcurrencymustbefixedintermsofgold.Sincethegoldcontentinoneunitofeachcurrencywasfixed,exchangerateswerealsofixed.Thiswascalledthemintparity.Thesecondruleisthattheremustbeafreeimportandexportofgold.Thethirdruleisthatthesurpluscountrywhichisgaininggold,shouldallowitsvolumeofmoneytoincreasewhilethedeficitcountry,whichislosinggold,shouldallowitsvolumeofmoneytofall.金本位制按惯例与三条规则有关联。第一条规则是每个参加国其国内货币价格以黄金来确定。由于每一货币单位的黄金含量是固定的，所以汇率也是不变的。这叫做铸币平价。第二条规则是黄金须自由进出口。第三条规则为顺差国，即得到黄金的国家应允许其货币量增加，而逆差国，即失去黄金的国家则允许其货币量减少。3.Centralbanksexperiencingpersistentgoldoutflowsweremotivatedtocontracttheirdomesticassetholdingsforthefearofbecomingunabletomeettheirobligationtoredeemcurrencynotes.Thusdomesticinterestrateswerepushedupandcapitalwouldflowinfromabroad.Centralbanksgaininggoldhadmuchweakerincentivestoeliminatetheirownimportsofthemetal.Themainincentivewasthegreaterprofitabilityofinterest-bearingdomesticassetscomparedwith“barren”gold.经历持续黄金输出的央行为了避免不能履行其兑换现钞的职责而趋于减少其国内资产的拥有量。这样国内的利率会提高，资金会从国外流入。而获得黄金的央行取消自己黄金进口的动机要弱得多。其主要动机在于与“贫瘠”的黄金相比，有利可图的国内资产具有巨大的获利性。4.Giventhepricesofcurrenciesfixedintermsofgold,thepricelevelswithingoldstandardcountriesdidnotriseasmuchbetween1870and1914asovertheperiodafterWorldwarII,butnationalpricelevelsmovedunpredictablyovershorterhorizonsasperiodsofinflationanddeflationfollowedeachother.因为是根据黄金储备而确定货币的价格，在金本位制国家内部的价格水平在1870年到1914年间并未像第二次世界大战后时期那样上涨。但是，全国的价格水平在短时期内出现了像通货膨胀和通货紧缩相互交替时期的不可预见的波动。Chapter21.Theythoughtadevaluationwasasignofnationalweaknessandarevaluationwouldreducethecompetitivenessofacountry.他们（这些发达国家）认为，货币贬值表示一个国家经济不景气（疲软），而货币升值则会削弱一个国家的竞争能力。2.Theunwillingnessofindustrialnationstochangetheirparvaluesasamatterofpolicywheninfundamentaldisequilibriumhadtwosignificanteffects.First,itrobbedtheBrettonWoodssystemofmostofitsflexibilityandthemechanismforadjustingbalanceofpaymentsdisequilibria.Second,andrelatedtothefirstpoint,thereluctanceofindustrialnationstochangetheirparvaluewheninfundamentaldisequilibriumgaverisetohugedestabilizinginternationalcapitalflowsbyprovidinganexcellentone-waygambleforspeculators.在严重失衡状态下，发达国家不愿改变其货币面值作为一项政策有两个重大影响。首先它使布雷顿森林体系失去了大部分弹性功能和国际收支失衡的调节功能。其次，仍与第一点有关，这些发达国家在严重失衡时不情愿改变其货币的面值为投机商提供了极好的单向赌博的机会，因此，也就大大地提高了国际资本流通的不稳定性。3.TheIMFarticlesalsocalledforconvertibilityoncurrentaccounttransactiononlybecausethedesignersoftheBrettonWoodssystemhopedtofacilitatefreetradewhileavoidingthepossibilitythatprivatecapitalflowsmighttightentheexternalconstraintsfacedbypolicymakers.国际货币基金组织的条款也提倡经常账户货币的可兑换性，仅因为是布雷顿森林体系的设计者们希望为自由贸易提供方便，同时，避免私人资本流动可能收紧政策制定者所面临的外部约束。4.ThemostsignificantchangeintroducedintotheBrettonWoodssystemduringthe1947-1971periodwasthecreationofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)tosupplementtheinternationalreservesofgold,foreignexchange,andthereservepositionintheIMF.Sometimescalledpapergold,SDRsareaccountingentriesinthebooksoftheIMF.1947至1971年间作为最为重大的改革机制而引入布雷顿森林体系的是特权提取款，以补充国际黄金储备，外汇储备以及在国际货币基金组织的储备净值。特权提取款有时也称为纸黄金，在国际货币基金组织的的账户里作为会计分录。5.Alternativepolicieswereadoptedbutresultedinverylimitedsuccess.Theyincludedtheincreaseofshort-terminterestratestodiscourageshort-termcapitaloutflows,thedecreaseofthelong-terminterestratestostimulatedomesticproduction,interventionsinforeignexchangemarkets,andanumberofdirectcontrolsovercapitaloutflows.尽管采取了多种政策但收效极其有限。这些政策包括提高短期利率以阻止短期资金的外流，降低长期利率以刺激国内生产，干预外汇市场，以及一系列直接控制资金外流的措施。6.Inshort,theimmediatecauseofthecollapseoftheBrettonWoodssystemwasthehugebalanceofdeficitsoftheUnitedStatesintheearly1970sandtheinabilityoftheU.S.todevaluethedollar.Thus,theBrettonWoodssystemlackedanadequateadjustmentmechanismthatnationswouldbewillingandabletouseasamatterofpolicy.ConsequentlytheU.S.balanceofpaymentsdeficitpersistedandthisunderminedtheconfidenceinthedollar.Therefore,thefundamentalcauseofthecollapseoftheBrettonWoodssystemistobefoundintheinterrelatedproblemsofadjustment,liquidity,andconfidence.总之，布雷顿森林体系崩溃的直接原因在于20世纪70年代初美国国际收支的巨大赤字及其美国贬值美元的无能为力。因此，布雷顿森林体系缺乏一种合适的各成员国都愿意并且能够用做策略的调节机制。后来美国的国际收支赤字持续无变，这就破坏了人们对美元的信心。结果，在调节、流通和信心相互关联的种种难题中找到了布雷顿森林体系崩溃的根本原因。Chapter31.Atthesametime,therehasbeenamovementawayfromagold-basedinternationalmonetarysystem.TheroleofgoldhasdiminishedasaresultoftheJamaicaAccords.Theofficialpriceofgoldwasabolished.One-sixthofthegoldpaidintotheIMFinquotaswastobereturnedtomembers,one-sixthtobeauctionedbytheIMFtoprivatebuyerswiththeproceedsbeingusedtobenefitthedevelopingcountries.TheIMFwastoretaintheremainingtwo-thirds.Finally,gold