FinancialCrises经济危机

MACROECONOMICSandtheFINANCIALSYSTEM©2011WorthPublishers,allrightsreservedPowerPoint®slidesbyRonCronovichN.GregoryMankiw&LaurenceM.BallFinancialCrises19CHAPTER1CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesInthischapter,youwilllearn:commonfeaturesoffinancialcriseshowfinancialcrisescanbeself-perpetuatingvariouspolicyresponsestocrisesabouthistoricalandcontemporarycrises,includingtheU.S.financialcrisisof2007-2009howcapitalflightoftenplaysaroleinfinancialcrisesaffectingemergingeconomies2CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesCommonfeaturesoffinancialcrisesAssetpricedeclinesinvolvingstocks,realestate,orotherassetsmaytriggerthecrisisofteninterpretedastheendsofbubblesFinancialinstitutioninsolvenciesawaveofloandefaultsmaycausebankfailureshedgefundsmayfailwhenassetsboughtwithborrowedfundslosevaluefinancialinstitutionsinterconnected,soinsolvenciescanspreadfromonetoanother3CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesCommonfeaturesoffinancialcrisesLiquiditycrisesifitsdepositorsloseconfidence,abankrundepletesthebank’sliquidassetsifitscreditorshavelostconfidence,aninvestmentbankmayhavetroublesellingcommercialpapertopayoffmaturingdebtsinsuchcases,theinstitutionmustsellilliquidassetsat“firesale”prices,bringingitclosertoinsolvency4CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesFinancialcrisesandaggregatedemandFallingassetpricesreduceaggregatedemandconsumers’wealthfallsuncertaintymakesconsumersandfirmspostponespendingthevalueofcollateralfalls,makingitharderforfirmsandconsumerstoborrowFinancialinstitutionfailuresreducelendingbanksbecomemoreconservativesincemoreuncertaintyoverborrowers’abilitytorepay5CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesFinancialcrisesandaggregatedemandCreditcrunch:asharpdecreaseinbanklendingmayoccurwhenassetpricesfallandfinancialinstitutionsfailforcesconsumersandfirmstoreducespendingThefallinagg.demandworsensthefinancialcrisisfallingoutputlowerfirms’expectedfutureearnings,reducingassetpricesfurtherfallingdemandforrealestatereducespricesmorebankruptciesanddefaultsincrease,bankpanicsmorelikelyOnceacrisisstarts,itcansustainitselfforalongtime6CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesCASESTUDYDisasterinthe1930sSharpassetpricedeclines:thestockmarketfell13%on10/28/1929,andfell89%by1932Over1/3ofallbanksfailedby1933,duetoloandefaultsandabankpanicAcreditcrunchanduncertaintycausedhugefallinconsumptionandinvestmentFallingoutputmagnifiedtheseproblemsFederalReserveallowedmoneysupplytofall,creatingdeflation,whichincreasedtherealvalueofdebtsandincreaseddefaults7CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesFinancialrescues:emergencyloansTheself-perpetuatingnatureofcrisesgivespolicymakersastrongincentivetointervenetotrytobreakthecycleofcrisisandrecession.Duringaliquiditycrisis,acentralbankmayactasalenderoflastresort,providingemergencyloanstoinstitutionstopreventthemfromfailing.Discountloan:aloanfromtheFederalReservetoabank,approvedifFedjudgesbanksolventandwithsufficientcollateral8CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesFinancialrescues:“bailouts”Govtmaygivefundstopreventaninstitutionfromfailing,ormaygivefundstothosehurtbythefailurePurpose:topreventtheproblemsofaninsolventinstitutionfromspreadingCostsof“bailouts”direct:useoftaxpayerfundsindirect:increasesmoralhazard,increasinglikelihoodoffuturefailuresandneedforfuturebailouts9CHAPTER19FinancialCrises“Toobigtofail”Thelargertheinstitution,thegreateritslinkstootherinstitutionsLinksincludeliabilities,suchasdepositsorborrowingsInstitutionsdeemedtoobigtofail(TBTF)iftheyaresointerconnectedthattheirfailurewouldthreatenthefinancialsystemTBTFinstitutionsarecandidatesforbailouts.Example:ContinentalIllinoisBank(1984)10CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesRiskyRescuesRiskyloans:govtloanstoinstitutionsthatmaynotberepaidinstitutionsborderingoninsolvencyinstitutionswithnocollateralExample:Fedloaned$85billiontoAIG(2008)Equityinjections:purchasesofacompany’sstockbythegovttoincreaseanearlyinsolventcompany’scapitalwhennooneelseiswillingtobuythecompany’sstockControversy:govtownershipnotconsistentwithfreemarketprinciples;politicalinfluence11CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesTheU.S.financialcrisisof2007-2009Context:the1990sandearly2000swereatimeofstability,called“TheGreatModeration”2007-2009:stockpricesdropped55%unemploymentdoubledto10%failuresoflarge,prestigiousinstitutionslikeLehmanBrothers12CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesThesubprimemortgagecrisis2006-2007:housepricesfell,defaultsonsubprimemortgages,hugelossesforinstitutionsholdingsubprimemortgagesorthesecuritiestheybackedHugelendersAmeriquestandNewCenturyFinancialdeclaredbankruptcyin2007LiquiditycrisisinAugust2007asbanksreducedlendingtootherbanks,uncertainabouttheirabilitytorepayFedfundsrateincreasedaboveFed’starget13CHAPTER19FinancialCrisesDisasterinSeptember2008After6calmmonths,afinancialcrisisexploded:FannieMae,FreddieMacnearlyfailedduetoagrowingwaveofmortgagedefaults,U.S.Treasurybecametheirconservatorandmajorityshareholder,promisedtocoverlossesontheirbondstopreventalargercatastropheLehmanBrothersdeclaredbankruptcy,alsoduetolossesonMBSLehman’sfailuremeantdefaultsonallLehman’sborrowingsfromotherinstitutions,shockedtheentirefinancialsystem14CHAPTER19Financi