公司治理与高阶经营团队

公司治理與高階經營團隊ISU企四B策略管理Lecture102009.12.02公司治理定義TherelationshipamongstakeholdersthatisusedtodetermineandcontrolthestrategicdirectionandperformanceoforganizationsMechanismsbywhichstakeholdersofacorporationexercisecontrolovercorporateinsidersandmanagementsuchthattheirinterestsareprotected(John&Senbet,1998)使企業體透過法律的制衡管控與設計，在企業所有權與經營權分離的組織體系當中，有效監督其組織活動，以及如何健全其組織運作，防止脫法行為之經營舞弊，以實現企業社會責任之高度目標（OECD）ImplicationsfromDefinitions(1)Protectwho’sinterest?Stakeholder（利害關係人)orShareholder(股東）Whatarethepurposesforboard?IdentifyingwaystoensurethatstrategicdecisionsaremadeeffectivelyReflectingandenforcingthecompanyvaluesEnsuringthattheinterestoftop-levelmanagersarealignedwiththeinterestsoftheshareholdersImplicationsfromDefinitions(2)SeparationofOwnershipandManagementAgencytheory（代理理論）Managersaretheagentoffirm’sowners(principle)ManagerialopportunismThemechanismofaligningtheinterestofmanagersandfirm’sownersAgencycost&GovernancemechanismThecontrolroleofdirectorsImperfectmeansofcontrollingmanagerialopportunismImplicationsfromDefinitions(3)代理理論代理理論討論的是當主理人（principle）必須委託代理人（agent）執行特定事務時，代理人因為投機主義或自己利益考量，可能與主理人利益發生不一致現象，進而可能造成主理人利益的損失大型現代公司因為所有權與經營權分離，造成經理人員（代理人）與股東（主理人）之間可能存在代理問題，是多數代理理論所討論的代理關係。ImplicationsfromDefinitions(4)利害關係人利益會受到企業營運所影響的成員內部利害關係人：如股東、員工、管理者、董事會成員…外部利害關係人：顧客、供應商、政府、社區、銀行、特定社會大眾…確認誰是利害關係人，並且以其重要性，加以管理各國法令保護利害關係人的規定與程度均有所不同CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:OwnershipConcentrationLarge-blockshareholdersOwnatleast5%ofacorporatesharesFamily,Founder,Institution,Managers…OwnershipandMonitoring股權愈分散，監督力愈薄弱，經理人員會愈傾向採取投機行為進行高度非相關多角化盲目擴大企業的規模在職消費股權集中，監督力就比較好嗎？利益收斂觀點V.S.掠奪觀點CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:OwnershipConcentrationInstitutionalOwners（機構股東，或法人股東）TheactiveroleforinstitutionalownersTheincentivesofinstitutionalownersTheattitudeofinstitutionsintakeoverManagerialOwners（經營權與所有權集中）LinkthemanagerialpaywiththeperformanceofafirmTheattitudeofmanagersinagencytheoryandstewardshiptheory（管家理論）當經營權與所有權集中時，經理人員就好像股東的管家一樣，切實守護公司資產CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:BoardofDirectors（董事會）AgroupofelectedindividualsActintheowners’interestsbyformallymonitoringandcontrollingthecorporation’sTMTClassificationsofDirectorsInsiders,relatedoutsiders,outsidersThecompositionsofdirectorsTheEffectivenessoftheBoardThecollectivefunctionofboard董事會特質Composition（組成）Inside&outsidedirectors,Male&female…Characteristics（特徵）Agevariation,Backgrounddiversity…Process（董事會運作過程）Howtheboardisheld?Trust&conflictamongdirectorsStructure（董事會結構）Specialization,formality,centrality…董事會角色ServiceServiceforStakeholderorshareholderStrategicContributionEstablishtheMajorStrategicDirectionsControlMonitorTMT,CEOsuccession,CEOCompensationBusinessEthicsMaintaintheethicsandCorporateValueCorporateGovernanceMechanisms:高階經理人薪酬設計AkindofGovernanceMechanismBasedontheargumentofagencytheorySeekstoaligntheinterestsofmanagersandownersthroughsalaries,bonuses,andlong-termincentivecompensationCompensationcommitteeLevelofpayvarybyregionsDeficitofcompensationbasedonstockorstockoptionsCorporateGovernanceMechanisms:市場治理機制MarketforCorporateControlTakeover,mergerandacquisitionOftenTriggerbypoorperformanceDeficiencyofexternalcorporatecontrol管理者抵抗惡意收購的技巧Goldenparachute（金色降落傘）Poisonpill（毒藥丸）Greenmail（綠色郵件）InternationalCorporateGovernance:GermanyNoAgencyProblemTheownerandthemanagerarethesameBankisatthecenter:Monitoring&ControllingTwo-tieredBoardStructureManagementboard:Executivethefunctionofdirection&managementSupervisorytier:Appointmenttothemanagementboard,executedbyunionmembers,employees…InternationalCorporateGovernance:JapanTheImportanceofObligation,FamilyandConsensusKeiretsu（經連）asasystemofrelationshipinvestments（和台灣的集團企業類似）EmployeeisonememberofthecompanyfamilyConsensusamongTMTorBoardofdirectorsBankplaysimportantroleBank-basedfinancingandmonitoringThechangingofcorporategovernanceinJapanInternationalCorporateGovernance:AmericaTheSeparationofOwnershipandManagementTheagencyproblemTheImportantRoleofCEOIndividualismcultureTheCommitteeinBoardofDirectorsTheRestrictedRoleofBankinCorporateGovernanceInternationalCorporateGovernance:Comparison美國英國加拿大法國德國股權分散非常高高低中等低股權比例個人退休基金共同基金退休基金共同基金家族企業公司公司政府銀行公司董事身份經理人外部董事經理人外部董事所有者經理人外部董事所有者員工所有者員工股東權力低低中等高高接管威脅高高中等低低融資方式股票股票股票/債券債券/股票債券CorporateGovernanceinTaiwanTheFamily-ownedstructureThenon-separationofOwnershipandmanagementThemonitoringandcontrollingroleofboardofdirectorsisrestrictedCEOsuccessionisrestrictedonthefamilymembershipTherelationshipamongshareholders,directorsandmanagersisdifferentfromAmericaStewardshiptheoryisusefulornot?CorporateGovernanceinTaiwanTheDominanceoftheFamilyinthebusinessistotallydeclinedoriscontingentontheindustrystructure家族不一定在所有的產業當中都吃得開TheindependentdirectorisusefulinTaiwan’sbusinessenvironmentornotHowtoprotecttheminorshareholders’right（小股東權益）如何透過制度設計，降低大股東（家族）與小股東之間的資訊不對稱程度（informationasymmetry）理想董事會運作調查（1）理想的董事會規模(1)3或5人（9.8%）(2)7或9人（59.1%）(3)11或13人（19.6%）(4)15人以上（6.4%）(5)其他（5.1%）您認為董事組成應該包括哪些人(1)大股東（87.0%）(2)公司高階主管，如總經理（87.4%）(3)獨立外部董事（6