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©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.:(19732),,,,;(19732),,,1,2(1.,310012;2.,430060):1002,,,,,,:;;:F830191:A:100424892(2005)0420072206BerleMeans1932200,,,,,,Mehran,CEO[1]MorckShleiferVishny1980,[2]0-5%,TobinpQ;5%-25%,TobinpQ;25%,TobinpQMcConnellServaes1976-1986Morck,TobinpQU[3]HermalinWeisbachGriffith,CEO,Morck[4][5]BarnhartRosenstein,,Morck[6],19961997100(,)(ROE),[7]1998791,274(117)20057CollectedEssaysonFinanceandEconomicsNo.4(General,No.117)July.2005©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.[8](2000),,1998799,(),()[9],1999-20012653,(ROA),CEOTobinpQ[10],,,,,,,,,()2003,,,,:(1)ABH,,BH,A;(2),1(,),1060,1060,3,1002,1002,637,365,SPSS1010(),(ROE)(ROA)(,1999;,2000),,TobinpQ(),,DemsetzLehn(1985)AgrawalKnoeber(1995),,:1.TobinpQ(),2.(1)(CGOK)l,0;(2)(CGBL)37©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.[11],,,,,,,,,,,,,(Weston,1977),,,,3.(1)(Reg),1;0;(2)(lnAsset);(3)(KQXZ),()(),1;()(),011PearsonTobinpQCGBLCGQKReglnAssetKQXZTobinpQ10109533(01003)-01018(01566)01024(01455)-0148433(01000)-01001(0176)CGBL1-0108833(01005)-01029(01364)-0110133(0101)-0115933(01000)COQK101007(01833)-01048(01132)01023(01465)Rog10124633(01000)01047(01137)lnAsset10112933(01000):1.p;2.331%(2-tailed)1,TobinpQ,1%,,CGQKTobinpQ,,(lnAsset)(KQXZ),,(lnAsset)(KQXZ),,TobinpQRegTobinpQ,,5%Reg(KQXZ)(),,(),(CGBL,)(),Pearson,,4720054©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.(CGQK)()tPTobinpQ067511279651011746540913271127291001173119950157401566:0,13,675,472,203,(12108057)(11185262),(010020808)TobinpQ(1127338),1%5%,,,(),,,,,,,,,,,,3()tPCGBL0203010311933011232659147201002080801014849231355501001InAsset0203111852620184259614721210805701817924-3129001001TobinpQ0203112859220116213271472112733800117993512101901031:0,1(),,,TonbinpQ=0+1CGBL+2CGQK+3Reg+4lnAsset+5KQXZ+(1)4(1)57,67582469,11084%19803711016%(Morck,1988),©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.(TobinpQ)(1)(2)tt214633333715482145633371355CGBL011692101501156311932CGBL2-01657-114057CGQK-1158E-03-01155-6129E-04-01062Reg01121333513930112133351399LnAsset-01101333-181422-01101333-18131KQXZ-01028833-21156-0102333333-21199AdjR20125801259DW1191011909F701712333591313333:1.1002;2.33333310%5%1%(2-tailed)4,F701172,DW11910,01258,,,,(CGBL),5%t,TobinpQ,,(CGQK),TobinpQ,,(KQXZ),,(lnAsset),1%,,,,(Reg)TobinpQ,,()MorckShleiferVislny(1988),,TobinpQ=0+1CGBL+2CGBL2+3CGQK+4Reg+5lnAsset+6KQXZ+(2)4(2)(2),(1),(2)(F591313),(DW11909),(01259),CGBL,CGBL2,TobinpQU,5%t,(,),,:,,6720054©1994-2010ChinaAcademicJournalElectronicPublishingHouse.Allrightsreserved.:,(),,,:,,;,,,:[1]Mehran.ExecutiveCompensationStructure,OwnershipandFirmPerformance[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1995,Vol.138:163-184.[2]Morck,Shleifer,Vishny.ManagementOwnershipandMarketValuation[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1988,Vol.120:292-315.[3]McConnellandServaes.AdditionalEvidenceonEquityOwnershipandCorporateValue[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1990,Vol.127:595-612.[4]Hermalin,Weisbach.TheEffectofBoardCompositionandDirectIncentiveonFirmPerformance[J].FinancialManagement,1991,Winter:101-112.[5]Griffith.CEOOwnershipandFirmValue[J].ManagerialandDecisionEconomics,1999,Vol.120:1-8.[6]Barnhart,Rosenstein.BoardCompensation,ManagerialOwnershipandFirmPerformance:AnEmpiricalAnalysis[J].FinancialReview,1998,Vol.133:1-16.[7],,.[A]..[C].:,2000.[8].[J].,2000,(3).[9].[J].,2000,(1).[10],.[J].,2003,(11).[11]Jensen,andMeckling.TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostandOwnershipStructure[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1976,Vol.13:305-360.StudiesoftheRelationshipBetweenShareholdingsofInsidersandtheGovernanceEfficiencyofChinaListedCompaniesLUOMing2min1,CAIJi2fu2(1.SchoolofAccounting,ZhejiangUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Hangzhou310012,China;2.SchoolofAccounting,ZhongnanUniversityofEconomicsandLaw,Wuhan430060,China)Abstract:Thispaperexaminestherelationshipbetweenshareholdingsofinsidersandgovernanceefficiencyofthelistedcompanies.Regressionresultsof1002ShanghaiandShenzhenlistedcompaniesobservationsin2003showthat,asanincentivemechanism,shareholdingsofinsidersplayanactiveroleincorporategovernance.However,therearesomedefectsinourinsidershareholdingsystem,especiallyinstate-ownedcompanies.Finally,weputforwardsomesuggestions.Keywords:shareholdingsofinsiders;governanceefficiency;incentiveeffect(:)77