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(),.,.,,.:,,,Pareto0,:[1,2].,,.,.(principle2agent),,,,,(agencyproblem):(adverseselection),;(moralhazard),,,.(group),(free2rider)..20,(gametheory),.Ross,Harris,Raviv,Mir2rlees.Zenger(self2se2lection),,Mirrlees1996Nobel[14].,.,;,,(two2sidedmoralhazard),.,,(in2centivecompatible).,,;(interlization).Holmstrom,ShavellStiglitz[79].,?Harris&RavivPareto[2].,,Pareto..111998JOURNALOFMANAGEMENTSCIENCESINCHINAVol.1No.11998:,.:,:200433.(79670017).1e,H,,.H,3[10,11].,?,[7].,.,.Mirrlees,,,[5].[10,12].Harris&Raviv,Pareto:H[4].H,e.,,e.S=A+BW(x,e),,0A1,(,A=1).,Pareto.,AB?W(x,e).{z,y},z=e+x,,y,ye,0.,r,W(x)=z+ry?,()C,U0,()U,x()G(e)=EH{x(e,H)},E.R(r)=Var(x+ry)1{e,A,B,r},R(e)=G(e)-C(e),yr3=-Cov(x,y)Var(y)Pareto,,B3R(r3).1){e,A,B,r},S=A+B(e+x+ry)(participationconstraint)(incentivecompatibleconstraint)Up=E{x(e,H)-S}=(1-B)G(e)-A-Be,,Ua=E{[A+B(e+x+ry)-C(e)]}-12Var[A+B(e+x+ry)-C(e)]=BG(e)+A+Be-C(e)-12B2Var(x+ry)U0A,5Ua5e=0,B=C(e)1+G(e),Max{Up=(1-B)G(e)-A-Be}s.t.BG(e)+A+Be-C(e)-12B2Var(x+ry)=U0B=C(e)1+G(e)(1),Up=G(e)-U0-C(e)-12C(e)2(1+G(e))2Var(x+ry)Up,12C(e)2(1+G(e))2Var(x+ry),Var(x+ry)=Var(x)+r2Var(y)+2rCov(x,y)rr3=-Cov(x,y)Var(y)(2)2)B3,721:U=Up+Ua=G(e)-C(e)-12B2R(r3)5U5B=5U5e5B5e=0B3=[G(e)-C(e)][1+G(e)]2R(r3)[C(e)(1+G(e))-G(e)C(e)](3),G(e)0,C(e)0,G(e)0,C(e)0,G(e)-C(e)0B3R(r3).1B,A.;1,(2),y(),r3;yx(x),.2,R(r3),B.:,,,,,.211,Pareto.1(),,1(),:?Lazear&Rosen3Pareto:1;2;3[13].(teamwork),n.Groves&Radner(teamtheory)(perfect),n[14].Green&Stokey,:[15].,.X(e1,e1,,en;H1,H2,,Hn)=ni=1xi(ei,Hi)(4)ei,Hi,xii,n.,,Pareto.?e=(e1,e2,,en)ee-i=(e1,,ei-1,ei+1,,en)(5)H=(H1,H2,,Hn)X(e,H)eF(X,e),f(X,e).(z+ry)y,,H,G(y,e),g(y,e).,[16].1Ti(y),hipi,gSupp{g}y,eg(y,e)=hi(y,e-i)õpi(Ti(y),e)(6)Ti(y)yei.(6)i=1,2,,n,T(y)=(T1(y),T2(y),,Tn(y))ye.HolmstromiTi(y)Ti(y)y[17],1T(y)=(T1(y),T2(y),,Tn(y))ye,{Si(y)},Pareto,{Si(Ti(y))}Pareto{Si(y)}.,.xixj(1i,jn),821998,Green&Stokey[15].xixj(ji),fk(xk,ek)xkek,(4),f(X,e)=nk=1fk(xk,ek)(7),Ti(x)=xiXei.1,ixi(ei,Hi)Si(xi)Pareto.,,.Holmstrom,,,[17].xixj,,Hi=Ei+GHj=Ej+G(8)GN(L0,R0),EjN(Lj,Rj),EiN(Li,Ri)G.,Ti(x)=xiXei,xiei,,ei(informative)X,{Si(xi,X)}Pareto{Si(xi)}.X{x1,x2,,xn},.:xi?,xi(ei,Hi)=ei+Hi=ei+Ei+G(9),Ej,xjG,xjX.,xjxi,i,xj.,2EjRj(j=1,2,,n),Sj=R-1j,Ss=nj=1SjAj,Aj=SjSs.X=nj=1Ajxj,xiX{Si(xi,X)}Pareto.,X(e,H)ef(x,e)=kexp-12jSj(xj-ej-Lj-G)2+S0(G-L0)2dGK,S0=R-10.,i=1,2,,n,(6),1.,.,,Green&Stokey(rankorderedtournaments)[15].xiei,n,:[15].,,.,.3,,,,,.,.,Pareto.,,:;,,.,,Pareto:,,,..,,(),921:.1.R&D.,1997,52..,1992,(1):3RossS.TheEconomicTheoryofAgency:ThePrinci2palsProblem.AmericanEconomicReview,1973,63(5):4HarrisM,RavivA.OptimalIncentiveContractsWithImperfectInformation.JournalofEconomicTheory,1979,245MirrleesJA.TheOptimalStructureofIncentivesandAuthorityWithinanOrganization.BellJournalofE2conomics,1976,7(1):6ZengerTR.ExplainingOrganizationalDiseconomiesofScaleinR&D:AgencyProblemandtheAllocationofEngineeringTalent,Ideas,andEffortbyFirmSize.ManagementScience,1994,(6):7HolmstromB.MoralHazardandObservability.TheBellJournalofEconomics,1979,10(1):8ShavellS.RiskSharingandIncentivesinthePrincipalandAgentRelationship.TheBellJournalofEco2nomics,1979,10(1):9StiglitzJ.Incentives,Risk,andInformation:Notesto2wardaTheoryofHierarchy.TheBellJournalofEco2nomics,1975,6(2):10,..:,199511.,:,199712..:,199613LazearE,RosenS.RankorderTournamentsasOp2timumLaborcontracts.JournalofPoliticalEco2nomics,1981,89(5):14GrovesT,RadnerR.TheAllocationofResourcesinaTeam.JournalofEconomicTheory,1972,(4):15GreenJR.StokeyNL.AComparisonofTourna2mentsandContracts.JournalofPoliticalEco2nomics,1983,9(3):16DegrootM.OptimalStatisticalDecision.NewYork:McGrawHillBookCompany,197017HolmstromB.MoralHazardinTeams.BellJournalofEconomics,1982,13(3):ShareCropping&RelativePerformanceEvaluationMechanismandItsEfficiencyZhengShaolian,LuoPinliangManagementSchool,FudanUniversityAbstractAgentsrewardsystemiscriticaltoincentivesinteams,whichisoneofthemostimportantproblemsinincentivemechanismsdesigningtheory.Inthispaper,wefirstimprovethecompensationmechanismforagents’shareofriskinPareto’ssense,thenweoptimallydesignthesystemforshareofprofitamongagents,wealsodeveloparelativeperformanceevaluationsystemforagentsinagroup.Keywords:team,agent,incentive,rewardsystem,Pareto’sefficiency031998