战略经济学(四)

EconomicsofStrategy对外经济贸易大学国际商学院Chapter3VerticalBoundariesoftheFirmBesanko,Dranove,ShanleyandSchaeferVerticalChainBeginswiththeacquisitionofrawmaterialsEndswiththesaleoffinishedgoods/servicesIncludessupportservicessuchasfinanceandmarketingOrganizingtheverticalchainisanimportantpartofbusinessstrategyVerticalBoundariesoftheFirmWhichstepsoftheverticalchainaretobeperformedinsidethefirm?Whichstepsoftheverticalchaintobeout-sourced?Choicebetweenthe“invisiblehand”ofthemarketandthe“visiblehand”oftheorganization(MakeorBuy)VerticallyIntegratedFirmsInaverticallyintegratedfirm,manyofthestepsintheverticalchainareperformedin-house.Example:UIBESomefirmschoosetooutsourcemanyoftheverticalchaintasksandbecomeverticallydisintegrated.Example:NikeMakeversusBuyDecisiondependsonthecostsandbenefitsofusingthemarketasopposedtoperformingthetaskin-houseOutsidespecialistsmayperformataskbetterthanthefirmcanIntermediatesolutionsarepossible(Examples:Strategicallianceswithsuppliers,Jointventures)上游下游SupportServicesAccountingFinanceLegalSupportMarketingPlanningHumanResourceManagementSupportServicesSupportservicescanbemajorsourcesofvaluecreation–UPS–Logistics–Toyota–HumanResourceManager–Nike-MarketingDefiningBoundariesFirmsneedtodefinetheirverticalboundariesConsiderations–Economiesofscaleachievedbymarketfirms–Valueofmarketdiscipline–Easeofcoordinationofproductionflowsin-house–TransactionscostswhendealingwithmarketfirmsSomeMake-or-BuyFallaciesFirmshouldmakeratherthanbuyassetsthatprovidecompetitiveadvantagesOutsourcinganactivityeliminatesthecostofthatactivityBackwardintegrationcapturestheprofitmarginofthesupplierBackwardintegrationinsuresagainsttheriskofhighinputpricesItmakessensetotieupthedistributionchannelinordertodenyaccesstotherivalsReasonstoBuyratherthanMakeMarketfirms(outsidespecialists)mayhavepatents/proprietaryinformationthatmakeslowcostproductionpossibleMarketfirmscanachieveeconomiesofscalethatin-houseunitscannotMarketfirmsaresubjecttomarketdiscipline,whereasin-houseunitsmaybeabletohidetheirinefficienciesbehindoverallcorporatesuccess(Agencyandinfluencecosts)EconomiesofScaleMake-or-BuyinInsuranceBuyinginsuranceutilizeseconomiesofscaleavailabletoinsurersLargefirmswithsufficientcapitalcan“self-insure”案例：Self-InsurancebyBritishPetroleumBPself-insureslargelossesbutbuysinsuranceforsmalllossesWhyAgencyandInfluenceCostsTheincentivestobeinefficientandinnovativeareweakerwhenataskisperformedin-houseAgencycostsareparticularlyproblematicifthetaskisperformedbya“costcenter”withinanorganization忽视代理成本优于消除代理成本ItisdifficulttointernallyreplicatetheincentivesfacedbymarketfirmsInfluencecostsInadditiontoagencycosts,performingataskin-housewillleadto“influencecosts”aswell“InternalCapitalMarkets”allocatesscarcecapitalAllocationscanbefavorablyaffectedbyinfluenceactivitiesResourcesconsumedbyinfluenceactivitiesrepresent“influencecosts”为什么在过去几十年里，GM在拥有世界上最高生产量的同时，它的许多零部件供应部门的成本也是最高的ReasonstoMakeCostsimposedbypoorcoordinationReluctanceofpartnerstodevelopandsharevaluableprivateinformationTransactionscostthatcanbeavoidedbyperformingthetaskin-houseEachproblemcanbetracedtodifficultiesincontractingRoleofContractsFirmsoftenusecontractswhencertaintasksareperformedoutsidethefirmContractslist–thesetoftasksthatneedtobeperformed–theremediesifonepartyfailstofulfillitsobligationContractsContractsprotecteachpartytoatransactionfromopportunisticbehaviorofother(s)Contracts’abilitytoprovidethisprotectiondependson–the“completeness”ofcontracts–thebodyofcontractlawCompleteContractAcompletecontractstipulateswhateachpartyshoulddoforeverypossiblecontingencyNopartycanexploitothers’weaknessesTocreateacompetecontractoneshouldbeabletocontemplateallpossiblecontingenciesOneshouldbeableto“map”fromeachpossiblecontingencytoasetofactionsOneshouldbeabletodefineandmeasureperformancesOneshouldbeabletoenforcethecontractCompleteContract(Continued)Toenforceacontract,anoutsideparty(judge,arbitrator)shouldbeableto–observethecontingency–observetheactionsbytheparties–imposethestatedpenaltiesfornon-performanceReallifecontractsareusuallyincompletecontractsIncompleteContractsIncompletecontracts–Involvesomeambiguities–Neednotanticipateallpossiblecontingencies–DonotspelloutrightsandresponsibilitiesofpartiescompletelyFactorsthatPreventCompleteContractingBoundedrationalityDifficultiesinspecifying/measuringperformanceAsymmetricinformationBoundedRationalityIndividualshavelimitedcapacityto–Processinformation–Dealwithcomplexity–PursuerationalaimsIndividualscannotforeseeallpossiblecontingenciesSpecifying/MeasuringPerformanceTermslike“normalwearandtear”mayhavedifferentinterpretationsPerformancecannotalwaysbemeasuredunambiguouslyAsymmetricInformationPartiestothecontractmaynothaveequalaccesstocontract-relevantinformationOnepartycanmisrepresentinformationwithimpurityContractLawContractlawfacilitatestransactionswithincompletecontractsPartiesneednotspecifyprovisionsthatarecommontoawideclassoftransactionsLimitationsofContractLawDoctrinesofcontractlawareinbro