网络外部性与产品垄断定价策略研究(1)

Vol120,No11JournalofIndustrialEngineeringPEngineeringManagement200611,2,2(11,200052;,210096):,,,,,,,;,:;;:F27312:A:100426062(2006)0120067205:2004206203:(70172001):(1973),,,,;:,0,,,,,;(),,,,,,,(),,,,WindowsOffice,,(Coase)[16]Bensaidandlesne(1996),[7]:,,(Coase),,Mason(2000)BensaidLesne(1996),[8],,Cabral,SalantWoroch(1999),[9],,,(2002)[10],,,[10],,[10],,Windows,,GSMGPRSCDMA,3G,,;,,,,;,,[10],761(),[0,1],,,,,,1,01,12,,(12),,1U1(,p1,D1,D2)=+(D1+D2)-p1;0(1)D1,D212,0,=e-rt1P(1+r)[0,1),r,pii=1,2,2U2(,p2,D1,D2)=[+(D1+D2)-p2];0(2)(1)(2),,12(1-)D1121,212,202,,,12200,[0,20),;[20,12),2;[12,1],1,:U1(12,p1,D1,D2)=U2(12,p2,D1,D2)U2(20,p2,D1,D2)=0D1=1-12,D2=12-20+(1-20)(3)(1)(2)(3):D1=1--p1+p2(1-)(1-),D2=(1-)+(1--)p1-(1+---)p2(1-)(1-)(1--)12=p1-p2-(1-)D11-,20=p2-(D1+D2)2,,c,=(p1-c)D1+(p2-c)D2=1--p1+p2(1-)(1-)(p1-c)+(p2-c)(1-)+(1--)p1-(1+---)p2(1-)(1-)(1--)(4)p1p255p1=(1-)(1+c)-2p1+p2(1-)(1-)+p21--(1-)(1-)(1--)=0(5)55p2=p1(1-)(1-)+(1-)(1+c)+(1--)p1-2(1+---)p2(1-)(1-)(1--)=0(6)p31=p32=1+c2(7)D31=1-c2(1-)(8)D32=(1-c)2(1-)(1--)(9)3=(1-c)2+-(1+)4(1-)(1--)(10)12=1-2+c2(1-),(11)20=1-2(1+)+c2(1--)(12),14:1:,;,p31p32,,,U1(12,p1,D1,D2)U2(12,p2,D1,D2)U1(12,p1,D1,D2)06p1-p2=(1+c)(1-)202:,,,,;,,(8)(10),86:,3:,,,,,,,,,4:c,c1,p31=p32=1+c2c,(CoaseConjecture),,E2mail(Coasianconjecture),,,,,,,,,Tirole(1988)[11](Coasiandynamics):(1);(2)(),3,,,WindowsOffice,,D1,,,D2,c1c2,c1c2,(),p1p2,,:=(p1-c1)D1(p1,E[D2(p2)])+(p2-c2)D2(D1(p1),p2)(13),E[D2(p2)],E[],,,55p1=(p1-c1)5D1p1+D1+(p2-c2)5D25D15D15p1=0(14)55p2=(p1-c1)5D15E[D2]5E[D2]5p2+D2+(p2-c2)5D25p2=0(15),=5D25D1=5D15E[D2]1=5Di5pipiDi,i=1,2p31(1+11)=(1+1)[c1(1+2-2)+c2]1+2+1(1+2(1-2))(16)p32(1+12)=(1+2)[c2(1-1+1)+c1][1+2+1(1+2(1-2))](17),5p315=1[-2c12(1+2)+c2(1+2+1(1+2+22))][1+2+1(1+2(1-2))]2(18)5p325=1[-2c21(1+1)+c1(1+2+1(1+2+22))][1+2+1(1+2(1-2))]2(19)i,c1,c20,,1)-1i0,,5p3i502)i=-1,,5p3i503)i-1,,c1=c20=1,5p3i50,96Vol120,No1120061,,,,5:5:,5p3i50,D2D1,D2,D1(16),5D15E[D2]=0,p321+12=c2(20)(15),5p15D1p311+11=c1-(p32-c2)(21)p311+11+(p32-c2)=c1(22)p31p32(21),,,(15)D2=-(p2-c2)5D25p2,D2,5D25p20,p2-c2(21),p32-c20,(),,;,(),(),(22),(22)4,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,[1]EconomidesN.Desirabilityofcompatibilityintheabsenceofnetworkexternality[J].TheAmericanEconomicReview,1989,79(5):11651182.[2]EinhornMA.MixandMatchcompatibilitywithverticalproductdimensions[J].RANDJournalofEconomics,1992,23:535547.[3]BentalB.andSpiegelM.Networkcompetition,productquality,andmarketcoverageinthepresenceofnetworkexternalities[J].TheJournalofIndustrialEconomics,1995,43(2):197209.[4]DePalmaA,LeruthLandRegibeauP.Partialcompatibilitywithnetworkexternalitiesanddoublepurchaseinformation[J].EconomicsandPolicy,1999,11:209227.[5]ThumM.Networkexternalities,technologicalprogress,andthecompetitionofmarketcontracts[J].InternationalJournalofIndustrialOrganization,1994,12(2):269290.[6]Gal2OrE.Nonlinearpricing2oligopolycase[M].UniversityofPittsburgh,GraduateSchoolofBusiness,WP2425,1981.[7]BensaidB.andLesneJP.Dynamicmonopolypricingwithnetworkexternalities[J].InternationalJournalofIndustrialOrganization,1996,14(6):837856.[8]MasonR.NetworkexternalitiesandtheCoaseconjecture[J].EuropeanEconomicReview,2000,44(10):19811992.[9]CabralLMB,SalantDJ.andWorochGA.Monopolypricingwithnetworkextenralities[J].InternationalJournalofIndustrialOrganization1999,17:199214.[10],.[J].,2002,(8):2229.[11],.[M].:,1997.07:MonopolyPricingStrategywithNetworkExternalityPANXiao2jun1,CHENHong2min2,HOUHe2yin2(1.ManagementSchoolofShanghaiJiaotongUniversity,Shanghai,200052,China;2.ManagementSchoolofSoutheastUniversity,Nanjing210096,China)Abstract:Sincenetworkexternalitiesmaybeeffectontheconsumerpsexpect,monopolyfirmpspricingstrategyandprofits,soitisimportanttoamonopolyfirmhowtosupplytheconsumerproductsindifferentstagesandsetareasonablepriceinordertogainmaximumprofitwhentheproductshavethenetworkexternalitycharacter.Toexploretheproblem,thispaperstudythemonopolyfirmpspricingstrategiesbyconstructofa22stagedynamicmodelaboutamonopolyfirmintwocases:monopolysupplythesameproductsanddifferentproducts.Itisshownthatifthemonopolyfirmssupplythesameproducts,thepriceoffirststageislargerthanthediscountvalueofthesecondps;ifthemonopolysupplythedifferentproducts,thepricewithnetworkexternalityislowerthanwithoutnetworkexternality.Keywords:networkexternality;monopolyfirm;dynamicpricingstrategy:17Vol120,No1120061