连锁店的定价策略[文献翻译]

原文：Chain-StorePricingforStrategicAccommodationThechainstorehasbeenoneoftheprincipalfactorsinthemovementtowardsthesimplificationofdistributivefunctions.Assuch,ithascausedpronouncedconcernamongmanufactures,jobbers,andretailers.Ithasbeenthesubjectoflitigation,ofrecrimination,andofendlessdiscussion.Themanufacturerhashesitatedtomakefulluseofthechainstoresystemasanoutlet,becauseofhisdesirenottooffendthemembersofhisregulardistributivesystems.Thejobberhasmadeopenwaruponthechainbecauseithasfranklyattemptedtosupplanthim,andtoindependentretailerhasoftenfailedtorecognizethedecisivelineofdivisionbetweenpricemerchandisingandservicemerchandising.Everyconcernwhichultimatelymarketsitsproductstotheconsumerisvitallyaffectedbythestatusofchainretailing;moreparticularlywiththepositionwhichitwilloccupyinthefuture.Thefollowingpagescontainabriefresumeofthepresentchainstoresituationinthefieldsofretailingwhereithasbecomewellestablished.TrendsofdevelopmentThemostrapidgrowthofthechainstorehastakenplaceinthegrocery,drug,drygoods,tobacco,andconfectionerylines.Itisessentialtounderstandthereasonsforthis:1.Thepublicdemandintheselinesiswelldefined;isnotsubjecttogreatfluctuationintimesofbusinessdepression;andineachcasethereisa“repeatmarket.”2.Thearticleshandledfallmainlyintheclassofnecessities,orsemi-necessities.Thatis,theyareregardedasessentialbyaproportionofthemarketlargeenoughtoinsureasteadydemand.3.Becauseofthestandardcharacterofthestocks,andthebroaddemand,ahighrateofturnovermaybemaintained,whichallowsthechaintomakeasmallbutsteadymarginofprofitatfrequentintervals.4.Buyingorpurchasingisstandardizedandcentralizedatheadquarters.5.Sincearticlesareofsmallunitvalue,andnotbulkyorheavy,thechainstoreisabletooperateonacashandcarrybasis-afactorofgreatimportanceinchainstoregrowth.6.Merchandisingislargelyamatterofdisplayandpriceadvertising.7.Standardizationofmethodshasmadeitpossibletocentralizemanagementatheadquartersandcontrolmemberstoresundermanagerswho,whiletheymayhaveapecuniaryinterestinsalesmadebytheirstores,havenothingtosayabouttheconductingofthem..Ouranalyticfocusinthispaperisthegeographicscopeofpricing.Specifically,isitbetterforachain-storeretailertosetpricesaccordingtolocalmarketconditions(reflectingdifferencesincost,demandandcompetition)orsetcommonpricesthatapplyacrossallitsstores,i.e.adoptauniformpricingpolicy?Arelikelyfirmdecisionsonthisinlinewithconsumerpreferences?IncontrasttotheentrydeterrenceissueconsideredbySelten(1978),MilgromandRoberts(1982)andKrepsandWilson(1982),welooktoseewhetherpricingpolicy,otherthandeterringentry,mightinsteadbeemployedstrategicallytoaccommodateentrywhenitisinevitable.Thegeographicscopeforpricingisaveryrealissueformultipleretailers.Itisevidentthatinpracticesomechain-storegroupsadoptuniformpricingwhileothersdonot.Insomesectors,allmultipleretailerspriceidenticallyacrosstheirstores,e.g.UKelectricalgoodsretailers(MMC,1997a,b).Whileinothersectors,localpricingispractisedtotheextentthatproductpricesmightvaryconsiderablyfromonestoretoanother,e.g.theFTCfoundthatforofficesupplysuperstoresaveragepricesvariedbyasmuch16%dependingontheextentoflocalcompetitionintheUS.Moreover,thispricingpolicydistinctionappliesnotjusttodifferentsectorsbutcanapplywithinthesamesector,e.g.amongstUKsupermarketswhere,oftheleadingfifteengroups,eightpriceduniformlywhilesevenpricedaccordingtolocalconditions(CompetitionCommission,2000).Yet,inthesedaysofcomputer-basedpricingsystems,itcanhardlybesaidthatticketingcostsarehigh,orthatlocaldemandandcostconditionscannotbeeffectivelygauged.Hence,choosingauniformpricemustbeseenasaconsciousact.Ofcourse,uniformpricingmightnotbepracticablewhenretailingcostsaresubstantiallydifferentfromoneareatoanother.Nevertheless,formanymultipleretailersbothlocalanduniformpricingmightbefeasiblebutachoicehastobemadeonwhichtoadopt.Thisleadstotwoquestions,firstwhyitmighteverbepreferablefortheincumbenttoimposeaconstraintonitsownbehaviour,andsecondthecircumstancesunderwhichtheconstraintisdesirable.Ourkeyinsightonthefirstquestionisasfollows:Afirmwillfinditselfmoreundercompetitioninsomemarketsthanothers.Bypracticinguniformpricing,itsoftenscompetitionbetweenitselfandrivalplayers.Thisentailssettingahigherpriceinthosemarketssubjectto(more)competition,attheexpenseoflowerpricesinmarketswhereitisnotsubject(orislesssubject)tocompetition,comparedwithapracticeofmarket-specificpricing.Thehigherpriceinturnmakestheactiononewhichrivalsfindattractive,soitdoesnotrequireagreement.Thusifthemarketsundercompetitionareimportantenoughtothefirm,itsnetgainispositive.Henceourpaper’sprimefocusisontheparametersassociatedwiththenatureandintensityofcompetitionthatmightinfluencethischoice.Thereissomecommonalityinthisissuewithrelatedquestionsonthird-degreepricediscriminationinoligopoly(e.g.Holmes,1989).Morespecifically,theissuesraisedheretieinwithwhyoligopolisticfirmswouldwishtolimitorevenentirelyavoidpricediscrimination,e.g.Winter(1997)andCorts(1998),oradoptpracticeswhichprovidethesameoutcome,notablycontemporaneousMFCclauses,e.g.DeGraba(1987)andBesankoandLyon(1993