国际商务谈判英文版最新版教学课件第11章

PartThreeApplicationsandSpecialScenarios—Chapter11—SocialDilemmas11-1TypesofNegotiationSituations•Explicitnegotiationsaresituationsinwhichpeopleseektoreachmutualagreementviabindingcontract.11-2•Incontrast,manynegotiationsareconductedbyactionsandpledges,intheabsenceofabindingcontract–wecallthesesituationstacitnegotiations.•ThedistinctionbetweenthesetwodifferenttypesofnegotiationsituationswasfirstarticulatedbythefamousmathematicianJohnNash.(Exhibit11-1)11-3TypesofNegotiationSituationsExhibit11-1:TwomajortypesofnegotiationsituationsCooperativeNegotiationsNoncooperativeNegotiations•Contractisexplicit.•Mutualunderstanding(peopleknowwhattheyaregettingbeforetheyagree).•Peoplenegotiateviaproposalsandcounterproposalsandcanusewordstoexplainandjustifytheiroffers.•Peopleusuallycometothetablevoluntarily.•Contractistacit.•Peopleoftendonotknowwhatotherswilldo.•Peoplenegotiatethroughtheirbehaviorsandactions(ratherthantheirpromisesofwhattheywilldo).•Peopleareoftenpulledintonegotiationswithoutwantingtobeinvolved.TypesofNegotiationSituationsIntacitnegotiations:11-4•Negotiatorsareinterdependentwithrespecttooutcomes,butmakeindependentdecisions.•Negotiators’outcomesaredeterminedbytheactionstheytakeandtheactionstakenbyothers.•Peoplecanbehaveeitherinacooperativefashion(cooperativegames)orcompetitivefashion(noncooperativegames).TypesofNegotiationSituations•Thesituationthatresultswhenpeopleengageinbehaviorsthatmaximizeself-interestsbutleadtocollectivedisasteriscalledasocialdilemma.11-5•Examplesofsocialdilemmasareabiddingwar,negativecampaigning,andgreenhousegases.TypesofNegotiationSituations11-6Inthischapter,wediscussseveraltypesofsocialdilemmas,eachdepictingreal-worldsituationsthatmightfaceanegotiator,suchas:•Theprisoner’sdilemma•Theultimatumdilemma•Thedictatorgame•Thetrustdilemma•Thevolunteerdilemma•Multipartydilemmas•EscalationdilemmaThePrisoner’sDilemma11-7•Wheneachpersonintheprisoner’sgamepursuesthecourseofactionthatismostrationalfromtheirpointofviewandintheirindividualself-interest,theresultismutualdisaster.(Exhibit11-2)•Thechoicesthatplayersmakeinthisgameareeithercooperationordefection.11-8ThePrisoner’sDilemmaExhibit11-2:ConsequencesofThelmaandLouise’sbehaviorsThePrisoner’sDilemma:Tit-for-Tat11-9The“tit-for-tat”strategy–whyitworksandwhyitmaximizesoverallgains:•Notenvious–neveraimstobeatitsopponent•Nice–alwaysbeginstheinteractionbycooperating•Tough–conveysthemessagethatthenegotiatorcannotbetakenadvantageof•Forgiving–thenegotiator’sresponsewillneverbegreaterthanwhatitreceived•Simple–counterpartyquicklyfiguresoutwhattoexpectfromaplayerwhofollowsitThePrisoner’sDilemma11-10Howcananescalatingspiralofdefectionbebroughttoanend?Considerthefollowingstrategies:•Makepromises.•Makesituationalattributions.•Takeonestepatatime.•Gettingevenandcatchingup•Makeyourdecisionsatthesametime.UltimatumDilemma11-11•Inanultimatumbargainingsituation,oneperson(theproposer)makesafinaloffer(anultimatum).•Iftheotherparty(theresponder)acceptstheoffer,thentheproposerreceivesthedemandandtheresponderagreestoacceptwhatwasofferedtohimorher.•Iftheofferisrefused,thennosettlementisreachedandthenegotiatorsreceivetheirrespectivereservationpoints.UltimatumDilemma11-12Severalfactorsdeterminethelikelihoodthattheresponderwillaccepttheoffermadebytheproposer:•Completeversusincompleteinformation•Framing•Deadlines•Feelingsandemotions•SocialidentityDictatorGame11-13•Inthedictatorgame,theproposermakesasuggestedsplitofresourcesforherselfandtheresponder.•Therespondermustacceptthesplit.•Onthesurface,itwouldseemthatinsuchasituationtheproposerwouldkeepeverythingforherself,giventhatthattheresponderhasnosayinthematter.•Astrikingnumberofproposers(dictators)choosetogivetheresponderanon-zeroallocation.TheTrustGame11-14•Inthetrustgame,thefirstmoveismadebytheproposer’spartner,thetrustor,whomustdecidehowmuchofhisorherinitialendowmenttotrusttheproposerwith,inhopesofreceivingsomeofitback.•Therulesofthegamespecifythegiftthatthetrustormakestothetrusteewillbeincreasedbysomefactor.•Behaviorintrustgamesinvolvespossibledeceptionifthepartneristrusting.TheTrustGame11-15Thetrustgameaffectsandisaffectedbyseveralfactors,including:•Bindingversusnonbindingcontracts•Socialnetworksandreputations•Relationshipthreat•Self-blameandregret•RestoringbrokentrustVolunteerDilemma11-16•Thisisaschemainwhichonepersoninagroupmustsacrificetheirintereststobenefitthegroup.•Communicationincreasesvolunteeringandtheactofvolunteeringstrengthensgroupties.•Feelingsofobligationtoone’sgroup,expectationofextrinsicrewards,andidentifyingwithone’sorganizationallsignificantlyincreasevolunteerism.MultipartyDilemmas11-17Peoplebehavemorecompetitivelyingroupsthanintwo-personsituations–why?•Thecostsofdefectionarespreadout.•Multipartysocialdilemmasareriskierthanprisoner’sdilemmas.•Multipartysocialdilemmasprovideanonymitythatprisoner’sdilemmasdonot.•Peopleinmultipartysocialdilemmashavelesscontroloverthesituation.MultipartyDilemmas:TragedyofTheCommons11-18•Thehallmarkcharacteristicofsocialdilemmasisthattherationalpursuitofself-interestisdetriment