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RTBTHEBUSINESSROUNDTABLERTBTheBusinessRoundtableAnAssociationofChiefExecutiveOfficersCommittedtoImprovingPublicPolicyStatementonCorporateGovernanceSeptember1997AWhitePaperfromTHEBUSINESSROUNDTABLE©September1997StatementonCorporateGovernanceFOREWORDTheBusinessRoundtableisrecognizedasanauthorita-tivevoiceonmattersaffectinglargecorporationsand,assuch,iskeenlyinterestedinaproperunderstandingofthepurposeofcorporategovernance.PastpublicationsofTheBusinessRoundtablethathaveaddressedcorporategover-nanceissuesincludeTheBusinessRoundtable’sstatementonCorporateGovernanceandAmericanCompetitiveness(March,1990),StatementonCorporateResponsibility(October,1981)andTheRoleandCompositionoftheBoardofDirectorsoftheLargePubliclyOwnedCorporation(January,1978).Inthecurrentpublication,TheBusinessRoundtablesummarizesitscurrentviewsongovernanceissues,thusupdatingandbuildingontheworkofthepast.TheBusinessRoundtablenoteswithpridethat,inthesevenyearssinceitslastpublicationoncorporategover-nance,manyofthepracticessuggestedforconsiderationbyTheBusinessRoundtablehavebecomemorecommon.Thishasbeentheresultofvoluntaryactionbythebusinesscommunitywithoutnewlawsandregulationsandreflectsthepositiveimpactofinterestedstockholders.TheBusinessRoundtablebelievesitisimportanttoallowcorporategovernanceprocessestocontinuetoevolveinthesamefashionintheyearsahead.StatementonCorporateGovernanceTABLEOFCONTENTSI.INTRODUCTION......................1II.FUNCTIONSOFTHEBOARD............4ManagementSelectionandCompensation..........5ApprovalofMajorStrategiesandFinancialObjectives........................6AdvisingManagement.........................6RiskManagement,ControlsandCompliance.......7SelectionofBoardCandidates...................7BoardEvaluation............................9III.STRUCTUREANDOPERATIONSOFTHEBOARD......................10BoardComposition.........................10CommitteeStructure........................14BoardCompensation........................16Operations................................17IV.STOCKHOLDERMEETINGS............20AgendasandConductoftheMeeting............20ManagementandStockholderProposals..........20StatementonCorporateGovernanceStatementonCorporateGovernance1I.INTRODUCTIONTheBusinessRoundtablewishestoemphasizethattheprincipalobjectiveofabusinessenterpriseistogenerateeconomicreturnstoitsowners.Althoughthelinkbetweentheformsofgovernanceandeconomicperformanceisdebated,TheBusinessRoundtablebelievesthatgoodcorporategovernancepracticesprovideanimportantframeworkforatimelyresponsebyacorporation’sboardofdirectorstosituationsthatmaydirectlyaffectstockholdervalue.Theabsenceofgoodcorporategovernance,eveninacorporationthatisperformingwellfinancially,mayimplyvulnerabilityforstockholdersbecausethecorporationisnotoptimallypositionedtodealwithfinancialormanage-mentchallengesthatmayarise.Manydiscussionsofcorporategovernancefocusonques-tionsofformandabstractprinciple:Shouldacorporationhaveanon-executivechairmanoftheboard?Shouldtheboardhavealeaddirector?Shouldtherebealimitonthenumberofboardsonwhichadirectorserves?TheBusinessRoundtableconsiderssuchquestionsimportant.Indeed,muchofthisStatementisdevotedtodiscussingthem.However,TheBusinessRoundtablewishestoemphasizethatthesubstanceofgoodcorporategovernanceismoreimpor-tantthanitsform;adoptionofasetofrulesorprinciplesorofanyparticularpracticeorpolicyisnotasubstitutefor,anddoesnotitselfassure,goodcorporategovernance.Examplesofthispointabound.Acorporationwiththebestformalpoliciesandprocessesforboardinvolvementmaybeatriskifthechiefexecutiveofficerisnotgenuinelyreceptivetorelevantboardinputorifknowledgeabledirec-torshesitatetoexpresstheirviews.Acorporationcanhaveexcellentcorporategovernancestructuresandpolicieson...thesubstanceofgoodcorporategovernanceismoreimportantthanitsform;adoptionofasetofrulesorprinciplesorofanyparticularpracticeorpolicyisnotasubstitutefor,anddoesnotitselfassure,goodcorporategovernance.2TheBusinessRoundtablepaper,butiftheCEOandthedirectorsarenotfocusedonstockholdervalue,itmaybelesslikelythecorporationwillrealizethatvalue.Directorscansatisfythemostdemandingtestsforindependence,butiftheydonothavethepersonalstatureandself-confidencetostanduptoanon-performingCEO,thecorporationmaynotbesuccessful.Ontheotherhand,acorporationthatlacksmanyoftheso-called“bestpractices”forcorporategovernance,orthatdoesnotmemorializeitspracticesinformaldocuments,maynonethelessperformwellifitsdirectorsandmanage-mentarehighlyablepeoplewhoarededicatedtoadvancingtheinterestsofstockholders.Oneofthereasonswhypeoplefocusontheformal,structuralaspectsofcorporategovernanceisthatdoingsopermitsevaluationsthatappeartobeobjectiveandverifi-able.Formalattributesofgoodcorporategovernancecanbetabulatedtocomparecorporategovernancepracticesacrossthespectrumofcompanies.Suchcomparisonsdohavevalue,butitwouldbeamistaketolosesightoftheirlimitations.The“soft,”subjectivefactorsincorporategovernance—suchasthequalityofdirectorsandthepersonalitiesofCEOsanddirectors—receivelessatten-tionfromscholarsandjournalistsbutarecriticalintherealworldofcorporatebeh