国际气候合作与排放权交易制度研究

华中科技大学博士学位论文国际气候合作与排放权交易制度研究姓名：林云华申请学位级别：博士专业：西方经济学指导教师：刘海云20060501I2080,NAFTAMEAsWTOIIMEAsWTO20082012PAMsIIIIVAbstractClimatechangewhicharisedin1980’sisaworldwidelong-termcomplexproblem,andmakesanotableimpactonthefutureandfundamentalinterestsofcountriesallovertheworld.Internationalcooperationinclimatechange(ICCC)wasmadebroadlytodecreaseclimatechangeandreducetheemissionofgreenhousegases(GHG)forthepastyears.ItisthekeyofICCCthathowtocoordinatetradeandenvironmentanddesignemissionstradingsystem.Therefore,thedissertationdemonstratesinthefollowinglogicsequence.Firstly,theseverenessandimportanceofcopingwithclimatechangeandstrengtheningICCCandacademicresearcheswereintroduced.Secondly,thedissertationanalyzesthenatureofgameofICCC,explorestherelationshipbetweentradeandenvironmentinICCCtheoretically,reviewsvarioustheoriesofemissionstradingsystem,andinterpretstheframeworkofinternationalemissionstradingsystemstipulatedintheKyotoProtocol.Lastly,empiricalevidencesonICCCandemissionstradingsystemweregiventopredicttheprospectofICCC.Then,thedissertationputforwardacomprehensiveplantoperfecttheKyotoProtocol,aswellasthepoliciesandproposalsforChinaonhowtoparticipateinICCCanddesignnationalemissionstradingsystem.Fromtheviewpointofgame,ICCCisaprocessofinternationalcollectivedecision-makingandakindofgamewiththeexistenceofuncertainty,whichinfluencesbroadlyandstrategicallyonallparticipates’benefits.Bynature,ICCCislaunchedtoprotectglobalclimateandrearrangeinternationalpoliticsandeconomyinaneworder.AfterLiteraturereviewing,thedissertationturntobringforwardgametheoriesandinternationalcooperationtheoriestofindoutthepayoffstructureandgametacticsofICCCparticipatesinthecaseofsixgameparadigms.Thus,thedissertationrevealsthemechanism,conflictofinterestandvariouspatternsofICCC,whichresultsinnewpadsVandframeworksthatwillhelpsourcountrytoparticipatein.Asanimportantpartofinternationalenvironmentcooperation,ICCCwasalsoconfrontedwiththedifficultyincoordinatingtherelationshipbetweentradeandenvironment.Togetherwiththoseusualstandpointsthattradeandtheenvironmentcouldcoexist,thereexistsapparentinconsistencybetweenthemtheoreticallyandempirically.Byintroducingthetheoryofcombiningtradeandenvironment,thedissertationanalyzesthegametacticsofinterest-drivenparticipatesinICCC,andexploresthemethodsofenvironmentalpollutioncontrolintheframeworkofinternationaltradetreaties.Therefore,thedissertationdemonstratestheoreticallythatitisaneffectiveselectiontobringenvironmentintotradeliberationnegotiationtoclarifytherelationship.Afterthat,empiricalevidencesofNAFTAandEuropeanUnionwereraisedtofindouttheapproachesofregionalenvironmentalcooperation.ThereasonsandcountermeasuresofthelatentConflictbetweenMEAsandWTOarealsodiscussedinthedissertation.Toclarifytherelationship,thedissertationraisedfourprinciplesofinternationallaws,i.e.,equality,accumulation,mutual-honour,divisionoflaborandneutrality.Ontheotherhand,somemeasurementsthatcouldbetakenareasfollows:tocreatelong-termdialoguemerchanism,totakeactivestepsforMEAs,todesignmorefeasibileandoverallapproach,tofocusongroundlevelworkonthetwosides’commoncharacters.Uptodate,itisthemajordifficultywithwhichICCCwasconfrontedthathowtoadoptcollectiveactiontoovercometheprisoners’dilemmaandoptimizethesupplyandallocationofcommoninterests.Duetothefactthattheinternationalinstitutiondeterminesthepayoffstructureandequilibriumoutcomeofthegame,itseemstobeareasonablemeasurementtosetupaperfect,steadyandefficientinternationalinstitution.Asaninternationalinstitution,theKyotoProtocolresultedfromICCC.ThethreemechanismsandtheframeworkofinternationalemissionstradingsystemstipulatedbytheKyotoProtocolshowclearlythedirectionsofICCC,andhelptopromoteeconomicandtradecooperation.Atthesametime,howtocreateandperfectinternationalemissionstradingVIsystempriortothefirstimplementationperiod(from2008to2012)oftheKyotoProtocolisthemainproblemforinternationalsociety.So,thedissertationturnstofocusonthetheories,policiesandpracticesofemissionstrading.Toexploretheoreticbasisofemissionstrading,thedissertationreviewsfirstlythetheoryofexternality,thetheoryoftragedyofthecommons,thetheoryofscarceresources,schooloftitlerights,theCoaseTheorem,andfreemarketenvironmentalism,etc.Secondly,byintroducingenergyforummodelsandcost-effectivepollutioncontrolmathematicsmodel,thedissertationsupportscosteffectsofemissionstrading.Thirdly,thelegalframeworkofemissionstradingisalsodiscussed.Lastly,theauthorcomparesthemanagementcostsandeffectsofemissionstradingwiththoseofotherenvironment-controleconomicinstruments.Onthepolicytoolofemissionstrading,thedissertationanalyzespolitical,economicandtechnologicaldifficultiesaccompaniedwithinternationalemissionstradingsystem.Theconclusionseemstobeakindofcomprehensiveplan,whichcombinesCoaseapproach,PiguapproachandPAMswitheachother.Onthepracticeofemissionstrading,thedissertationbrieflyintroducestradablepermitsystemsinUSAgasemissionstradingprogrammersinEuropeanUnion,nationalCO2emissionstradingsysteminJapan,aswellasemissionstradingexperimentsinChina.Intheend,thedissertatio