controlrightsininternetportalalliances(激励

OwnershipandcontrolrightsinInternetportalalliances,1995-1999DanielW.ElfenbeinJoshLernerPresentedbyYangJuzhengGuanghuaSchoolofManagement,PekingUniversityRANDJournalofEconomics,Vol.34,2003ModernTheoryoftheFirmBackgroundIntroductionTheoryofIncompleteContractsTheoryofIncompleteContractsBoundariesoforganizations(Hart1995)Organizationofactivitieswithinafirm(Aghion&Tirole1997)Designofrelationshipsbetweenfirms(Hart&Moore1999)Modelswearegoingtotest…StandardGrossman-Hart-MoorePropertyRightsFramework…assetsinabilateralrelationshipshouldbeownedbythepartywhosemarginalefforthasthegreatestimpactonprojectsuccess…Aghion&Tirole’sModelofContractingInnovations…relativebargainingpowerisanimportantdeterminantoftheallocationofpropertyrights…DataSelectionMorethan100alliancecontractsbetweenInternetportalsandotherfirmsasincompletecontracts.•Unforeseencontingencies•Costofwritingcontracts•CostofenforcingcontractsInternetasaturbulentanduncertainenvironmentAhighspeedofdevelopmentandchange…MajorConclusions:1/2Thedivisionofownershipdisplayedapatternconsistentwiththepredictionsoftheincompletecontractingliterature,suchasGrossman&Hart1986.Theownershipofcriticalelementssuchasthewebsiteaddressandthecustomerdatawastypicallyassignedtothepartywhoseeffortwasmostcriticaltothesuccessoftheagreement.MajorConclusions:2/2Theallocationofcontrolrightsappearedmostsensitivetothebargainingpowerofthetwocontractingparties.Note:controlrightsaresensitivetobargainingpower,butownershipisnot!ThisdivisionofcontrolwasconsistentwithAghion&Tirole1994.Theoreticalliteraturesoftendon’tmakeacleardistinctionbetweenthem.Inportalagreements,controlwasassignedinasomewhatdifferentmannerthanownership:relativefinancialandproductmarketstrengthismostcritical.Ownershipvs.ControlTheoreticalModel1Contractsbecomeincompletewhenthere’sactionsunobservableorunverifiablewhichinresultmakesthemunenforceable.(Grossman&Hart&Moore)PropertyRightsApproachExanteallocationofownershipExpostgainsfromtradeBargainingPowerIncentivetoInvestTheoreticalModel2Exceptionsexistthatexanteallocationofownershipandspecifiedcontrolrightsmaynotmaximizeexpostsurplus,oneofwhichisfromAghion&Tirole1994.R&DAlliancebetweenaresearchunitandacustomerLiquidityconstraintoftheresearchunitSuccessstemfromresearchunit’seffortandcustomer’sresourcesTwopolarcases:exantebargainingpowerbelongsto:1.researchunitvs.2.customer1.Ownershipoftheresearchoutputwillbeefficientlyallocated2.PossibleallocationfailurebecauseoftheliquidityconstraintPortalAlliancesPortalsareInternetsitesthatprovide(directlyorindirectly)abroadarrayofserviceandlinkagestousers.Classifiedcollectionsoflinkstootherwebsites;Searchengines;Contentandservices,suchasstockprice,news,auctionsonlineande-mailsetal.PortalAllianceWin-WinAllianceDirectcompensationthatportalsreceiveforthead,promotionsandotherservicestheyprovidetoalliancepartners.Indirectbenefitfromthealliancesbyincreasingtheappealoftheportal’ssitebydeepeningitscontentandextendingitsfeatures.Allianceswerealsousefulforthepartnerfirms,whethertheywerecontent,serviceortechproviders.Portalallianceswereonemethodofattractingusersandalsoenabledthepartnertoacquirecustomerdata,etal.IncompleteContractsBothparties’effortdecisionswerelikelytoimpactthevalueofthealliancesandmanyoftheseeffortdecisionswerenon-contractible.e.g.Portals’ongoingeffortstoupgradeandexpandtheirsitescouldchangethevalueforthepartner.e.g.Incontentagreements,partnerfirmscontrolledthefrequencyandqualityofupdatesthatmattermuch.Inmanyalliancesbothpartieshadopportunitiestobehaveopportunisticallyincompetingforcustomers.Assetownershiplikelyprovidedimportantincentivestothecontractingparties.TypicalOwnershipofaportalURL(UniformResourceLocator)ServerUserInformationDatabaseTheownershiparrangementdeterminethatifthealliancebrokedown,whatcouldtheownercontinuetoget.What’smore…Inadditiontoassetownership,whichprovidesresidualcontrolrights,specifiedcontrolrightsareexaminedintheanalysis.Tworeason:1.Specifiedcontrolrightsareimportantinthedesignofportalalliances.2.Specifiedcontrolrightsnarrowthescopeofresidualcontrolrights.DataSet106contractsbetweenportalsandotherfirmsenteredintobetween1995-1999,primarilyfromRecap/ITSupplementalfinancialinfowasfromCompustatandWorldscopeContractingparties’webtraffic,suchasthereachofthewebsites,thenumberofdayspervisitorpermonth,etal.fromMediaMatrixDistributionofObsbyYear0510152025303540455019951996199719981999NumberofContractsSignedinYearEffortRequiredbyTwoPartiesMeanMedianStanDevMinMaxSitedevelopment-.65-1.66-11Maintenance&hosting-.58-1.69-11Customerservice-.56-1.54-11Orderfulfillment-.50-1.56-11Billing-.46-1.59-11Sumofabovefive-2.75-32.30-55Wecodeas+1iftheportalwasrequiredtomakethegreatereffort,-1ifthepartner.TrafficonInternetPropertiesMeanMedianStanDevMinMaxReachofportal29.5%31.2%19.8%.8%67.1%Reachofpartner4.9%1.5%10.2%.2%55.3%Daysperviewer-monthforportal3.303.211.361.106.50Days….forpartner1.671.46.681.004.50Minutesperviewer-monthforportal19.3414.1015.674.2073.90Minutes…forpartner8.877.306.431.4036.70Financ