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摘要关于管理层收购一般有两种观点：一是激励效应；二是产权配置效应。前者完全是经济学的，主要认为MBO之所以发生，一定是因为MBO是一种效率改进；后者认为MBO只是一种简单的财富转移。从激励效应的角度理解管理层收购的文献很多，也很分散，本文则致力于为这方面的研究提供一个统一的分析框架，把管理层收购纳入到标准企业理论的研究规范中来，同时希望通过本文加深对管理层收购的理解。我们追随主流经济学的基本观点：企业治理机制的目的是为了实现昀优的效率，不同的治理机制是对特定信息条件的昀优反应。本文把管理层收购看作是一种契约，是一种特定情况下的昀优的企业治理机制。在回顾了一般的委托代理契约结构的基础上，对应的给出了管理层收购的契约结构。以昀优效率作为基准，我们对比了委托代理契约和管理层收购契约，并引入了一些具体的可能影响这两种契约之间效率差别的外生变量。在某种条件下，管理层收购契约要比委托代理契约更有效率，本文就是对识别这些条件所做的一个尝试。本文认为委托代理契约面临的是企业家对股东的代理问题，而管理层收购契约面临的是企业家对债权人的代理问题。只有在管理层收购的债权人代理成本小于委托代理契约的股东代理成本时，MBO才是一种有效率的改进。本文认为影响两种代理成本相对大小的因素是：财富约束、激励力度、行业特征和监督技术和资本结构等。本文解释了MBO对现代企业制度的背离，应用规范的微观经济学模型建立了统一的分析框架，论述了财富约束和激励力度以及行业的波动特征和监督技术对管理层收购的影响。同时，应用本文的分析框架，对许多关于管理层收购的具体问题给出了解释和预测。初步的分析表明：MBO虽然在某些信息条件下会成为有效率的治理机制，但却决不是唯一的治理机制。即使是相对于委托代理契约而言，MBO也只是在有限的条件下才变得有效率。在我国，MBO作为一种国有企业产权改革的方式提出，改革的目标被设定为盘活国有资产，使得国有资产保值增值。本文针对MBO的定价问题提出了昀大化国家收入的定价理论，认为在一定条件下适当减少MBO的定价会增加企业MBO后的运行效率，进而增加日后对国家的税收贡献。我们认为昀优的定价水平应该权衡当期收入和长远收入，使得国家总收入昀大。关键词：管理层收购、财富约束、行业特征、监督技术、资本结构激励与管理层收购-1-目录1引言····················································································································································-2-2文献回顾····················································································································································-3-2.1管理层收购的传统理论················································································································-3-2.2本文的思路····································································································································-4-3效率基准与委托代理契约·······················································································································-7-4作为治理机制的管理层收购·················································································································-10-4.1管理层收购的契约结构··············································································································-10-4.2财富约束与管理层收购··············································································································-15-4.3管理层收购定价的最大化国家收入理论··················································································-16-4.4资本结构与管理层收购··············································································································-17-5扩展······················································································································································-19-5．1行业特征····································································································································-19-5．2监督技术····································································································································-21-6结论与局限·············································································································································-24-6．1结论············································································································································-24-6．2局限性和扩展的可能性············································································································-25-结语······················································································································································-27-中文参考文献·············································································································································-28-英文参考文献·············································································································································-28-激励与管理层收购-2-1引言现代企业理论认为：企业是一个联系要素所有者的契约安排，资本家提供资本，企业家提供经营能力。一般来讲，由于资本家拥有财富却不具有经营能力，企业家拥有经营能力却没有资本，而这种合作生产的本质决定了要素的使用者和所有者在一定程度上是分离的。现代企业制度的根本特征是所有权和经营权的分离，两权分离产生了公司治理问题，为解决这一问题所产生的相应机制被称为公司治理机制。同时，由于人力资本的特征在于其对所有者的依附性以及信息不对称性，这些因素产生了代理成本，治理机制设计的前提是通过某种激励安排减少代理成本是可能的，公司治理机制被设计用来采取一种恰当的激励机制使得代理成本昀小。理论和实践两方面都证明：并不存在一种普遍适用的昀优公司治理机制，昀优的公司治理机制源于对特定企业信息条件的考察。此时，关于公司治理机制，我们应该问的问题是：如何解释多种治理机制的并存及其差异？如何来调和现实中的多种可能的公司治理方式？各种治理机制存在的信息特征究竟是什么？适合某种治理机制的企业又具有什么特征？这些是公司治理机制的本质问题。对MBO的理解也必然要回答以上问题。当然，我们不可能对这些问题进行全面的讨论，我们将结合我们特别感兴趣的管理层收购进行有针对性的考察。传统的公司治理机制是两权分离，是资本家和经理人之间的委托代理关系，是一种委托代理契约。MBO是使得管理者和所有者合二为一的一种治理方式，在治理结构的意义上，MBO彻底的消除了管理者对股东的代理问题，并被认为在某些条件下改善了企业的效率。MBO的意义只有在与其它契约结构的比较之中才能显现，而这个自然的参照系就是委托代理契约。委托代理理论是企业理论的主流，是研究激励问题的基本框架，能够对许多现象有很强的解释力(参见Hart&Holmstrom，1987)。这个框架中所要解决的焦点问题是：委托人如何选择或设计昀优合同来克服代理问题。委托代理模型是典型的非对称信息经济学中的隐藏行动模型，在代理人的努力程度不可观察的情况下，给定代理人的参与约束和激励相容约束，委托人选择契约形式昀大化自己的效用。委托代理理论昀重要的结论就是昀优的契约是风险共担的。但是，由于代理人只获得了自己努力产出的一部分，昀优效率的结果并没有在委托代理框架之内出现。如果说委托代理模型的目的是为了设计契约来解决股权的代理成本问题，那么管理层收购则意味着彻底的消除了这一问题。管理层收购不是在既有的委托代理模式内的激励变更，而是彻底的消除了企业家与股东之间的委托代理关系。一个直觉是：管理层收购似乎变成了委托代理框架内一种特殊的剩余分配模式，即是一个角点解——企业家拥有全部剩余索取权。但是，这个直觉并不完全正确。因为，企业在MBO之后，管理层变成了企业的真正所有者，他和原有股东之间已经不存在原来的委托代理关系。由于企业家的财富约束，MBO一般都要进行杠杆融资；此时，一种新的代理关系产生了——企业家和债权人的委托代理关系。债务及其有限责任性质改变了企业的未来收益模式；具体的，有限责任债务相当于为企业家提供了一种保险，并导致了债务的代理成本。这是MBO契约和委托代理契约的本质不同。根据“存在的就是有道理的”的哲学，既然管理层收购作为一种合理的制度安排出现，我们应该能够找到管理层收购的存在理由，也就是管理层收购是