A-0FinancialIncentives–PerspectivesandImplementationGuidanceA-1CONTENTS•Perspectivesonfinancialincentives•Implementationguidelines•ExhibitsA-2PerspectiveDetailIncentiveprogramsshouldbeprominent,especiallyinsupportofgrowthandsignificantimprovementsinperformanceFinancialincentiveshaveasignalingfunctionandmanagersinanyorganizationveryquicklyworkoutwhatisimportantandhowperformancelinkstorewards,andtheirbehaviorwill,intime,clearlyreflectthoselinkagesRewardprogramsshouldbelinkedtohowvalueiscreatedandthelevelofriskandbeuncappedIfacompanyexpectsitsmanagerstotakealotofrisks,thenitshouldconsiderhighlyleverageincentivesandinsurepropermanagementcontractsareinplaceasacounterbalanceIfacompanyexpectsitsmanagerstotakesome,butnottomuchrisk,themmoreconventionaltypesofperformancepayarelikelytobemoreappropriate“Sharingtheprize”byuncappingrewardprogramsshouldbeunderpinnedbyrigorousanalysistoensurethatnobody“givesawaythestore”MeaningfuldifferentiationisacriticalaspectofanyrewardprogramAtcompaniesinthetopquintileofperformance,thetotalcompensationoftopperformersis30%ormorehigherthanthatpaidtoaverageperformersAtgrowthcompanies,annualfinancialincentivesareover200%oftargetlevels,whilecompanieswithlowergrowthgenerallycaptheirpayoutsat150%Executivesconsiderdifferentiatedpayslightlymoreimportantthantotalpay.Highperformers,notsurprisingly,feltthatthiswasparticularlyimportantTopcompaniespaymoreacrosstheboardIneachofthecompensationcategories(salary,cashbonus,long-termincentives),topquintilecompaniesweremorelikelythanmid-quintilecompaniestopayabovethebenchmarkaveragefortheirindustry(Exhibits1-5)EMERGINGPERSPECTIVESONFINANCIALINCENTIVESA-3PerspectiveDetailHigh-performingcompaniesactivelyseekoutwaystomakekeyemployeesthinklikeshareholdersNotonlyistotalcompensationhigher,butmanycompaniesaretyingaportionoftheirrewardstolonger-termcompanysuccess.However,theytakegreatcaretoensurethatoptionsdonotcometobeseenasa“perk”ratherthananincentive,andthenlosetheirmotivationalvalue–Stockoptions,performanceshares,andtime-vestedstockareoftenpushedfurtherintotheorganization(Exhibit6)–Atonecompany,forexample,togetmanagerstofocusonstimulatinggrowth,annualcashincentiveswererecentlyreducedtofunda3-yearincentiveplanlinkedtogrowingEVAtm.–Companiesthatexperienceddramaticimprovementsinperformanceworkedtoincreasetheequityholdingsoftheirtopteams.Ourresearchhasshownaverystronglinkbetweenexecutivestockandstockoptionholdingsandperformance.DiscretionorforgivenessaroundrewardslinkedtoexplicitgrowthorperformancetargetsshouldbeminimalHavingestablishedclearagreedminimumparametersforincentives(the“gate”)andstretchtargets,leadersofhighperformingcompaniesrarely,ifever,deviatefromtherewardhurdlesthatarelinkedtothesepoints.Iftheydo,theyhavefoundthatthisvisiblyreducesthemanagementeffectivenessoftherewardsystemitself.Thisdoesnotimplythatthereisnoroomfordiscretionwhereexceptionalperformanceisachieved,orthatadiscretionarypenaltyshouldnotbeappliedifbehaviorisbelowexpectationIndexingcanbeavaluabletoolwherecompanieshavesignificantexposuretomacroeconomicconditionsThisindexingisappliedeitherindeterminingtheoptionsexerciseprocessorinthetotalvalueofpayoutlinkedtogroupresultsBroadsalarybandsimprovemanagement’sabilitytousesalaryandopportunitiesmoreflexiblytorewardhighperformersInourresearchwefoundthattopquintilecompaniesaremuchmorelikelytousebroadbandingforsettingsalaries(Exhibit7)Payforperformance–butonlyforafewperformancemeasuresThemoremeasuresintheappraisalsofperformance,themoredifficultitistocombinethemintoanoverallappraisalofperformanceEMERGINGPERSPECTIVESONFINANCIALINCENTIVES(CONTINUED)A-4KEYISSUESTOADDRESSWHENDESIGNINGANINCENTIVESYSTEM•Whatdrivesbasicsalaryandsalaryincreases?•Whatkeyindicatorsmakeupthe“gate”toannualorlong-termincentives?•Howdoyoudeterminerealisticstretchtargetswithinmanagementcontrol,butwithoutgoingintodetailedannualnegotiation?•Howsteeplydoestherewardincreaseasmanagersapproachtheiragreedstretch?•Howdoappropriateorinappropriatebehaviorsimpacttherewardlevel?•Howisperformancebeyondstretchrewarded?•Whatcombinationofshort-andlong-termincentivesisappropriate?•Whatistherightmixoffocusonindividualandgroup/peergroupresults?Exhibits8-11providemoredetailandcaseexamplesastheunderlyingmentalmodelforincentivedesignsA-5Step1.Translateoverallstrategyintospecifictargets2.Establishguidingprinciples3.Conductcompetitivebenchmarking4.Designhigh-levelcompensationframework5.Developcompensationprogrambycategoryofseniormanagement6.Stress-testthecompensationprogram7.Determinelegalandtaximplications8.Implementindividualplans9.Designimplementationapproach10.CreateongoingmanagementprocessesBriefdescription•Clarifyinggrowthaspirationintermsofclearvaluedrivers(typically3-5,e.g.,AUM,earnings,EVAtm,etc.).•Developingsetofguidingprinciples,e.g,levelofconformancetocompany’scompensationpolicies,useofvariablecompensation,levelofdeferredcompensation,etc.•Benchmarkingcompetitivecompensationlevelsandstructures,upper/lowerquartilesforeachlevel,etc.•Foreachcategoryofseniormanagement,establishcompetitiv