职业经理人的约束与激励的理论依据

1223456771V92V93Vi104Ei105E2i11111112143X151718118219320425261262282930311322343363713723934244254364346471118411051932AC19785912000234W.Dill19815MMMMMM=M+M=(M+M)+ME1E2iViM=E1ME2E1VMVE1M=(M+M)+M=V+E1V+E1M=V+E1(V+MVVViE1E2i1VV2VV3Vi4E1E15E2i61712risk-neutral382corporategovernance9103X11XLeibenstein12X13SE1e1S23e2e22e1e2SE12319991HaySystem1420503050152OABxn%xCADxn%-ym%yx16CABOABCAD173EPS1819EPS3520Triplett(1988)HarkinsJackson(1985)EVAEVAEconomicValueAdded21EVAEVA41know-whatknow-whyknow-howknow-whoknow-howknow-whoknow-whatknow-why2222324JensenFama1983198925261998271123CEO4521234563282912MBA34530631MarkLatham(1997)InstitutionalShareholderServices(Black1998)1BrucerEllig,ExecutiveCompensation:ATotalPayPerspective,McGraw-Hillbookco.,19822ManagePeople,NotPersonnel:MotivationandPerformanceAppraisal,AHarvardBusinessReviewBook,HBSschoolPress,19903GardinerCMeans,AMonetaryTheoryofEmployment,MESharpe,19904DavidGBlanchflowerandAndrewJOswald,TheWageCurve,TheMITPress,19945MichaelCJensen,WilliamHMeckling,TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructure,HarvardUniversityPress,19986SelectedEssaysofPeterDrucker)19997[]CI1997108[]F200099[]F198610[]F198911200012[]P19971213[]19971214[]B20011152000616W199017198718[]200010191998320WWA2001321200110222000122319981242001925200192620021272000528200112919997302000731200073220014331999123419978351998836199912372000638199910391997401997412000642200074320016441998451999846199911DanielGoleman,LeadershipThatGetsResults,HarvardBusinessReview,March-April20002MichaelCJensen,OrganizationTheoryandMethodology,TheAccountingReview,April19833EugeneFFama,MichaelCJensen,SeparationofOwnershipandControl,JournalofLawandEconomics,June19834EugeneFFama,MichaelCJensen,AgencyProblemsandResidualClaims,JournalofLawandEconomics,June19835WHCE200086[]GPEA200097[]MarkLatham199810819972919973101996611199751220001113199781420001015199821619961217200141819961219199611201999102120015222000123199932420001225200132620018272001282001329200143020001031200023219978331999563420007352000536[]20007837CEO1999893820012392001340199924119991142199910431999104420016191545212001528612214619991147200084820001492000550199955120001052199955320011XEVAAbstractFollowingthestepoftheWesternManagerRevolution,accompanyinggraduallysettingupoftheSocialisticMarketingEconomyofChina,andseparatingofownershipandmanagingrightinorganization,firmsinChinaarealsofacingaManagerRevolution.TheresultofManagerRevolutioninChinamustbetheappearanceofprofessionalmanagersandgraduallyformingofprofessionalmanagerstratum.Atthesametime,organizationsaredevelopingintomanager-controlledfirmwiththechangeofenvironmentandconditions.Enterprisesaremeetingnewissuessuchashowtomotivatingandconstrainingprofessionalmanager.Andhowcanwesufficientlymotivatingandconstrainingprofessionalmanagerisoneofthemostimportantissuesthatmanager-controlledfirmmustsolvedinordertorealizingthehealthyandsustainedgrowth.Professionalmanagerreferstotheprofessionalgroup(orstratum)thathastheabilitiestomanageandcontrolenterprise,andtheyalsotaketheoccupationofmanager.Entrepreneurisalsothepersonwhoregardsmanagementastheirvocation,sowecansaythatentrepreneurisbelongtotheprofessionalmanagers.Butonlytheprofessionalmanagerswhoarereallyoutstandingcanbecalledentrepreneur.Andprofessionalmanagerscanbedividedintotwoparts:highprofessionalmanagersandprofessionalmanagers.Theirdifferencesmainlyareability,experienceandposition.FromtheDillComprehensiveMotivationalModel,weknowthatmotivationofprofessionalmanagershouldconsidertwoparts:intrinsicmotivationsandextrinsicmotivations.Extrinsicmotivationsmainlyrefertothemotivationsthatorganizationprovidedtomanagers,thatisremuneration.Intrinsicmotivationsmainlyarespiritualandpsychologycontentsthatgetfromprocessofworkorresultofwork.Fromtheprincipal-agenttheoryweknowthatunderasymmetricinformation,thevalue-maximumgoalofownersonlycanbeachievedbygivingmanagersincentivesofgainingtheirownbenefits,itmeansthattheirsalarymustconcluderiskyreward,andtheyshouldhavedueresidualclaim.FromtheCorporateGovernanceTheoryweknowthatconstraintofprofessionalmanagershouldconcludedbothextrinsicandintrinsicconstraint.FromXEfficiencyTheoryweknowthatthereisaninertareawhenweconsidertheendeavordegreeandcontentdegreeofprofessionalmanager.Whenitisintheinertarea,wemustmeettheneedsofincreasedcontentofprofessionalmanagerbyguidingintensecompetitionofoutside,meanlybyperfectmarketingmechanismandsettingupefficiencymanagermarket.Motivationofprofessionalmanagershouldconsidertwoparts:intrinsicmotivationsandextrinsicmotivations,theirsalarymustconcluderiskyreward,andtheyshouldhavedueresidualclaim.First,extrinsicmotivationscanbedividedintodirectremunerationandindirectremuneration,mainlyincludeprimarysalary,bonus,long-termincentiveincomeandindirectremuneration(insuranceplan,welfareplan,extraallowanceandothers).Primarysalary:playasbasicguarantee,usuallydoesnotaffectbyperformance,isdependableincomeofprofessionalmanager.Bonus:istheshort-termincentiveincome,ismainlydependedonthemeritsoftheyearorlastyear,andshouldbedecid