【PPT精品课件】货币金融学7版英文课件--11-大学课件2

Chapter11EconomicAnalysisofBankingRegulation©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-2HowAsymmetricInformationExplainsBankingRegulation1.GovernmentSafetyNetandDepositInsuranceA.Preventsbankrunsduetoasymmetricinformation:depositorscan’ttellgoodfrombadbanksB.CreatesmoralhazardincentivesforbankstotakeontoomuchriskC.Createsadverseselectionproblemofcrooksandrisk-takerswantingtocontrolbanksD.Too-Big-to-Failincreasesmoralhazardincentivesforbigbanks2.RestrictionsonAssetHoldingsA.Reducesmoralhazardoftoomuchrisktaking©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-33.BankCapitalRequirementsA.Reducesmoralhazard:bankshavemoretolosewhenhavehighercapitalB.HighercapitalmeansmorecollateralforFDIC4.BankSupervision:CharteringandExaminationA.ReducesadverseselectionproblemofrisktakersorcrooksowningbanksB.Reducesmoralhazardbypreventingriskyactivities5.NewTrend:AssessmentofRiskManagement6.DisclosureRequirementsA.BetterinformationreducesasymmetricinformationproblemHowAsymmetricInformationExplainsBankingRegulation©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-43.BankCapitalRequirementsA.Reducesmoralhazard:bankshavemoretolosewhenhavehighercapitalB.HighercapitalmeansmorecollateralforCDIC4.BankSupervision:CharteringandExaminationA.ReducesadverseselectionproblemofrisktakersorcrooksowningbanksB.ReducesmoralhazardbypreventingriskyactivitiesC.Newtrend:Assessmentofriskmanagement5.DisclosureRequirementsA.BetterinformationreducesasymmetricinformationproblemHowAsymmetricInformationExplainsBankingRegulation©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-5MajorBankingLegislationinCanada11-6MajorBankingLegislationinCanada©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-7WhyaBankingCrisisin1980s?EarlyStages1.Managersdidnothavetherequiredexpertisetomanagerisk2.TheexistenceofCDIC,moreopportunitiesforrisktaking3.Becauseofthelendingboom,bankactivitieswerebecomingmorecomplicated.Regulatorshadneithertheexpertisenortheresourcestomonitortheseactivitiesappropriately4.i,networthofbanksA.InsolvenciesB.IncentivesforrisktakingResult:FailuresandriskyloansLaterStages:RegulatoryForbearance1.RegulatorsallowinsolventbankstooperatebecauseA.InsufficientfundsB.Sweepproblemsunderrug©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-8PoliticalEconomyoftheBankingCrisisExplanation:Principal-AgentProblem1.PoliticiansinfluencedbybanklobbyistsratherthanpublicA.DenyfundstoclosebanksB.Legislationtorelaxrestrictions2.RegulatorsinfluencedbypoliticiansanddesiretoavoidblameA.LoosenedcapitalrequirementsB.RegulatoryrestrictionsonriskyassetholdingsC.Regulatoryforbearance©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-9CDICDevelopments•CDICinsureseachdepositoratmemberinstitutionsuptoalossof$60000peraccount•AllfederallyincorporatedfinancialinstitutionsandallprovinciallyincorporatedTMLsaremembersoftheCDIC•Insurancecompanies,creditunions,caissespopulaires,andinvestmentdealersarenoteligibleforCDICmembership•QDIBinsuresprovinciallyincorporatedinstitutionsinQuébecandtheotherprovinceshavedepositinsurancecorporationsthatinsurethedepositsofcreditunionsintheirjurisdiction•CDICinsuresonlydepositsinCanadiancurrencyandpayableinCanada;foreigncurrencydepositsarenotinsured•NotalldepositsandinvestmentsofferedbyCDICmemberinstitutionsareinsurable©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-10NotAllDepositsAreInsurableInsurabledepositsinclude•Savingsandchequingaccounts•Termdepositswithamaturitydate5years•Moneyordersanddrafts,certifieddraftsandcheques,andtraveller’schequesTheCDICdoesnotinsure•Termdepositswithaninitialmaturitydate5years•T-bills,bondsanddebenturesissuedbygovernmentsandcorporations(includingthecharteredbanks)•Investmentsinstocks,mutualfunds,andmortgages.©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-11DifferentialPremiumsBy-Law©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-12Opting-OutBy-Law•PermitsScheduleIIIbanks,thatacceptprimarilywholesaledeposits(definedas$150000ormore),tooptoutofCDICmembershipandthereforetooperatewithoutdepositinsurance•Itrequires,however,anopted-outbanktoinformalldepositors,bypostingnoticesinitsbranches,thattheirdepositswillnotbeprotectedbytheCDIC,andnottochargeanyearlywithdrawalpenaltiesfordepositorswhochoosetowithdrawImplications:•MinimizesCDICexposuretouninsureddeposits•Bycompensatingonlytheinsureddepositorsratherthanalldepositors,thislegislationincreasestheincentivesofuninsureddepositorstomonitortherisk-takingactivitiesofbanks,therebyreducingmoralhazardrisk©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-13EvaluatingCDICLimitsonScopeofDepositInsurance1.Eliminatedepositinsuranceentirely2.Lowerlimitsondepositinsurance3.Eliminatetoo-big-to-fail4.CoinsurancePromptCorrectiveAction1.Criticsbelievetoomanyloopholes2.However:accountabilityincreasedbymandatoryreviewofbankfailureresolutionsRisk-basedInsurancePremiums1.HardtoimplementOtherProposedChanges1.Regulatoryconsolidation2.Market-valueaccounting©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-14BankingCrisesWorldwide©2005PearsonEducationCanadaInc.11-15CostofBankingCrisesinOtherCountries